Humanoid supply chain

What a robot is actually made of

Three tiers of it: the component makers who sell to every assembler, the critical-minerals names they get confused with, and the magnet layer in between. Priced, fact-checked, and tested to see which of them actually move together.

Compiled 22 Oct 2026 Tracked 18 names, 3 tiers
Doc RW·3T Sheets 09 Venues Tokyo · Xetra · US Refresh daily 07:00 UTC
01 The parts, and who makes them

A humanoid is mostly gearboxes, motors and magnets. Read the table downwards and you go from the joint that moves to the dirt it is made of — each row naming the part, what it does, and who actually supplies it.

Actuator chain of a humanoid, drawn as an assembly schematic A stylised humanoid skeleton built from joint nodes and links. Six joints are called out to the tier-one suppliers that make them: strain wave gears at the shoulder, servo motors at the elbow, actuator modules at the wrist, an edge vision chip at the head, cycloidal reducers at the hip and integrated actuators at the knee. A band beneath the figure marks the magnet and rare-earth material that every joint above depends on. FIG. 01 — ACTUATOR CHAIN 20–40 GEARED JOINTS PER UNIT STRAIN WAVE GEAR HARMONIC DRIVE · 6324.T SERVO MOTOR + DRIVE YASKAWA · 6506.T ACTUATOR MODULE SCHAEFFLER · SHA0.DE EDGE VISION SOC AMBARELLA · AMBA CYCLOIDAL RV REDUCER NABTESCO · 6268.T INTEGRATED ACTUATOR NIDEC · 6594.T MATERIAL — SINTERED NdFeB · ≈1.3 KG PER UNIT
Six tier-one suppliers, located on the joints they sell into. Everything above the band is assembly; the band is the input.
Part What it does Who makes it Listing
JointStrain wave gear Zero-backlash gearbox for precision joints. Twenty to forty per humanoid. Harmonic Drive Systems; Schaeffler from 2027 6324.T · SHA0.DE
JointCycloidal RV reducer Heavier gearing for legs and load-bearing axes. Nabtesco 6268.T
MotorServo motor & drive Turns the joint and holds it against load. Yaskawa Electric 6506.T
MotorIntegrated actuator Motor, gearbox and controller folded into one unit. Nidec 6594.T
JointActuator module & bearings Complete joint assemblies, motors and electronics built in-house. Schaeffler SHA0.DE
PerceptionEdge vision SoC On-robot sight, with no cloud round-trip. Ambarella AMBA
MaterialSintered NdFeB magnet The rotor magnet inside every motor above. TDK · Aichi Steel · MP Materials 6762.T · 5482.T · MP
MaterialRare earth feedstock Neodymium and praseodymium for the magnet; dysprosium and terbium to keep it working hot. MP Materials · USA Rare Earth · Lynas MP · USAR · LYSDY
The last two rows are shaded because they are inputs rather than parts — the magnet and the metal that goes into it. Nobody assembles a robot from them directly, which is the distinction tiers two and three exist to make.

Latest — 22 Oct 2026. Tokyo had its worst session of this watchlist’s year and closed on the low of the day. The Nikkei closed 62,907.84, down 1,713.40 points or 2.65%, confirmed against the 22 October daily bar, regularMarketPrice stamped 15:45 JST, and independently against Il Sole 24 Ore, which put Tokyo at the same 2.65%. The index traded as high as 64,866.44 in the morning, up 0.38% on the day, then settled 1,958 points lower at the session’s weakest print. Every Tokyo line on this page did the same thing and closed at or within a yen of its own low: Harmonic Drive −9.55% to ¥4,875 on 1.71 times average volume, Nabtesco −4.38% to ¥4,166 on 1.02 times, TDK −4.20% to ¥2,780.5 on 0.83, Yaskawa −4.07% to ¥4,033 on 1.08, Nidec −2.67% to ¥1,715 on 0.59 and Aichi Steel −0.76% to ¥2,857 on 0.89. Three are period lows: Yaskawa’s is its lowest close since 31 March 2026, Harmonic Drive’s since 28 April 2026, and Nidec’s ¥1,715 is the lowest close the name has printed in at least five years. No company on this page filed anything dated 22 October. Six days remain to the 28 October anniversary.

It was not a handoff from New York, which is the part worth recording. The 21 October US session rose on every index this page checks: the S&P 500 +0.58% to 7,757.17, the Nasdaq Composite +1.05%, the Dow +0.69% and the PHLX Semiconductor index +1.97%, with Nvidia itself up 2.54%. Tokyo opened higher into that and then fell 2.65%. The damage was concentrated in chip equipment and the AI complex rather than in automation as such: Tokyo Electron −6.99%, SoftBank Group −6.86%, Advantest −6.01% and Murata −4.80%, against Keyence −0.62% and Daikin −0.47%. The two automation bellwethers sat in between, Fanuc −3.42% and SMC −4.20%, which puts Harmonic Drive’s fall at 2.8 times Fanuc’s and 3.6 times the index. That is the ordinary behaviour of the highest-multiple name in a complex being de-rated rather than evidence of a disclosure, and the name’s own record says so: Harmonic Drive has now fallen nine and a half per cent or more on six sessions since 1 July, and this was the smallest of the six. The previous one was −11.64% on 15 October.

China put the yttrium controls on Japan into its own words, and the page can quote them rather than infer them. Asked at the 21 October Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference about a Financial Times report that Japan is months from exhausting its yttrium, spokesperson Mao Ning answered in four sentences, of which the second is the one that matters: “China implements export controls on Japan in accordance with the laws and regulations. The aim is to thwart Japan’s remilitarization and attempt to possess nuclear weapons.” She added that China’s position on keeping critical-mineral supply chains “safe and stable has not changed”. That is taken from the ministry’s own published transcript, not from coverage of it. Around it: the FT reported on 20 October that Tokyo has asked the US government and American companies to press Beijing; Chinese customs data put yttrium oxide exports to Japan at 4,000 kg in September against 51,000 kg a year earlier; a Japanese industry ministry official said exports have stalled worldwide rather than only to Japan; and Argus has yttrium oxide at about $1,150/kg outside China against roughly $9/kg inside it. Two qualifications keep this honest for this page. Yttrium is not an NdFeB input: it goes into jet engines and chipmaking equipment, so it does not touch the magnet thesis directly. But it is one of the seven medium and heavy rare earths under the April 2025 licensing regime, the carve-out this page has repeatedly noted was never suspended by Announcement No. 70, and it is now demonstrably being used as country-specific leverage. It lands on the venue where four of the six tier-one names trade, and on the chip-equipment makers that led Tokyo down the same morning.

Ambarella’s mystery third bidder has acquired a name, and still not a source. Ambarella rose 4.40% to $66.00 on 2.38 times average volume, the heaviest session in the name this month. Reports dated 21 October named Nvidia as the third party evaluating the company, said to be working with Goldman Sachs, joining the 31 July FT report of NXP talks and the 9 October Qualcomm speculation. The sourcing is the same as it was on 20 October when this page last recorded it: no named outlet, no filing, no company confirmation, and one of the two pieces carrying it reported the session at about 7% intraday while the stock settled at 4.40%. The sector did part of the work regardless, with the semiconductor index up 1.97% and Nvidia up 2.54% the same day. Priced on the tape rather than the rumour, Ambarella is the only tier-one name whose drawdown narrowed this run, and at 31.7% below its high it is now the tightest on the page.

Two base rolls, pulling the two tiers in opposite directions, and one of them undoes last run’s headline exactly. The Western one-year base rolled from 20 onto 21 October 2025, which takes 20 October 2025, the session the market traded MOFCOM’s extraterritorial controls, back out of the twelve-month window. Last run this page recorded that same session rolling in and costing four minerals cells four to six points with no price behind them; rolling out, it hands back more than it took. Perpetua −31.4% to −21.0%, of which 10.3 of the 10.4 points is the base; Lynas −42.0% to −32.9%, 9.0 of base; USA Rare Earth −68.2% to −61.7%, 5.9 of base; MP −52.9% to −46.7%, 5.7 of base. Not one of those four moved as much as half a per cent on the day. Tokyo’s base rolled 21 onto 22 October 2025 and ran the other way, but there it was swamped: of the 16.5 points Harmonic Drive’s 1y cell lost, 15.8 is the session and 0.7 the base. The four-week bases also split by venue for the first time in three runs, Tokyo pinned on 18 September by the 21–23 September holiday block while the Western names rolled to 21 September; that is what takes MP’s 1m cell from −17.4% to −21.0% on a session it rose. Not one of the eleven 52-week highs rolled, so the whole drawdown column this run is price.

The correlation window has not moved, so nothing in section 04 is new, and that is the right answer. ISO week 43 does not close until Sunday 25 October, so the sample holds at 104 aligned weekly closes and 103 returns from week 2024-43 to week 2026-42, a fourth consecutive run on the same window. Both bucketing methods were rebuilt from two years of daily closes and agree to four decimal places on all eleven pairs and on the headline: basket-to-REMX 0.3885, comfortably inside the 0.30–0.50 band, so the relationship is not news this run even though the tape was. The four-week comparison did move, and it narrowed again: REMX is 24.1% lower against the basket 16.7% lower, a gap of 7.4 points from 8.3. Unlike last run it is not clean, because the Western bases rolled and Tokyo’s did not: on a common 18 September base the gap would read 6.5, so price narrowed it 1.8 points and the calendar widened it 0.9. A 2.65% Tokyo rout narrowing the gap to a rare-earth ETF is a reminder of what the 0.39 actually means: the basket fell hard on a Japanese AI de-rating that had nothing to do with magnets at all.

21 Oct 2026. Nidec published the redacted Report, on the day it said it would, and the number in it is ¥27.6bn. “Nidec Discloses the Investigation Report Issued by the Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee”, dated 20 October in Kyoto, says the redaction is complete and attaches the Report. The trigger this page has pointed at for ten weeks has now fired in full: receipt on 16 October, the Committee’s conclusions and the nine names the same day, and the Report itself on 20 October. Two things in the release are new and neither was in the 16 October items. The appropriation of surplus was excluded from the Committee’s investigation, because Nidec had not filed amended securities reports for past fiscal years and the distributable amount that would have been examined is therefore uncertain; the company says it will examine legal action on that question separately, once the restatements are done. And only a Japanese digest is disclosed, with the English version promised and not yet published — which is why the English-language wire route this page normally reads carries nothing, and the figures reach English readers through Jiji, Bloomberg and Nikkei reading the Japanese text. Those three agree: damage of about ¥27.6bn, made up of third-party investigation costs, audit costs and the Tokyo Stock Exchange penalty; founder Shigenobu Nagamori and former president Hiroshi Kobe found in breach of duty in most of the matters examined; and the apportionment among the nine left to a court, because the Report says contribution is too hard to split. Nidec itself is still only “deliberating legal actions such as lodging a claim for damages”, so the board resolution an aggregator reported on 16 October — which this page’s audit marked wrong at the time — still has not happened. Seven days remain to the 28 October anniversary.

The tape still will not trade it, and it has not traded it on any session since the Committee reported. Nidec closed ¥1,762, up 0.23%, four yen, on 8,954,900 shares against a twenty-session average of 17,266,920, or 0.52 times normal. It traded as low as ¥1,748, the lowest print on this page’s record and the lowest intraday since 18 April 2016, and the ¥1,758 it closed at the session before stands as the lowest close since 12 February 2016. A company report putting a ¥27.6bn number on its founder’s liability moved the close two tenths of a per cent on half the usual turnover. The reading this page has made throughout holds: the bid going away rather than a seller arriving. Nothing is dated 21 October on Nidec’s feed.

Tokyo rebounded and the component tier led it, with one exception. The Nikkei closed 64,621.24, up 545.82 points or 0.85%, confirmed against the 21 October daily bar, regularMarketPrice stamped 15:45 JST and Nikkei Inc.’s own index page. Harmonic Drive +2.47% to ¥5,390 was the largest rise on the page in Tokyo, on 1.32 times average volume, a second consecutive session above its own average. TDK +2.42% to ¥2,902.5 on 0.74 times recovered most of the previous session’s fall and leaves it the only name anywhere on this page with a positive four-week cell, at +2.0%. Nabtesco +1.49% to ¥4,357 on 0.80 times took back two fifths of the largest fall on the page the day before, and Aichi Steel +0.42% to ¥2,879 on 0.75 times was the smallest move in Tokyo. The exception is Yaskawa, −1.71% to ¥4,204 on 1.06 times average volume — the only tier-one name in Tokyo to fall, its lowest close since 31 March 2026, and the only Tokyo line here to trade above its own average while doing it. No company on this page filed anything dated 21 October.

Tuesday in New York was a breadth session, and the minerals tier finally rose into one. The Dow rose 1.02% to 52,495.88 and the Russell 2000 1.65%, while the S&P 500 added 0.28% to 7,712.57, the Nasdaq Composite fell 0.02% and the PHLX Semiconductor index 0.29%: small caps and the average stock, not the megacaps. The tier went with the breadth rather than the index. Lynas +3.35% to $8.03 on 1.14 times average volume was the largest rise anywhere on the page; Compass Diversified +3.08% to $10.36 on 0.78 times was the second, the mirror of a session before that put 2.15 times the volume behind four tenths of a point; Schaeffler +2.08% to €5.89 was the best session in tier one and pulls its drawdown, still the widest there, in to 50.8%. REMX +1.31% to $54.06 on 0.89 times average volume is its best session since 21 September and the first up-day of any size in this account. The two largest producers in it barely moved, MP +0.26% to $39.05 on 0.68 times and USA Rare Earth −0.30% to $10.06 on 0.70 times, extending its lowest close since 9 July 2025 by three cents; Perpetua −0.27% to $18.72 and Novonix −2.31% to $2.11, a fresh record closing low on exactly its average turnover, went the other way. So the fund rose more than four of the five producers it holds and less than one, which is the ninth session in this account where it and its largest holdings disagreed and the first of them in the fund’s favour. Nor did the tape hand it the move: gold fell 0.54% and the gold miners 0.43%. Nothing on the page moved four per cent either way.

One lookback roll did more to this page’s columns than any price did, and it is the same calendar day pulling two columns in opposite directions. The Western one-year base rolled from 17 onto 20 October 2025, the session the market traded MOFCOM’s extraterritorial controls and the Western producers re-rated on scarcity. Four minerals 1y cells fall four to six points on it with no price behind them: Lynas −36.4% to −42.0% on a base rolled $12.21 to $13.84, a 13% one-day step, on a session the ADR rose 3.35%; USA Rare Earth −63.6% to −68.2% on $27.73 to $31.59; Perpetua −25.9% to −31.4% on $25.32 to $27.27; MP −51.8% to −52.9% on $80.79 to $82.90. The same day leaving the other window did the opposite to MP’s drawdown: its 52-week high rolled $80.89 to $76.80, taking the cell from 51.9% to 49.2% and under fifty per cent for the first time in this account, on a quarter-point session. Held at today’s price on the old high the cell would read 51.7%, so of the 2.7 points, price put in 0.2 and the base roll 2.5. Novonix’s high rolled $21.50 to $20.70, which this time nearly cancelled against a 2.31% fall, leaving 89.8%. Tokyo’s own base moved one session, 20 onto 21 October 2025, and it was small: Harmonic Drive’s 1y adds a point to +65.6% on a base rolled ¥3,200 to ¥3,255, and Yaskawa’s improves to −3.4% on a session it fell. Read the bases before reading any of those nine cells.

The four-week bases did not move at all, and the correlation window has not either, so one figure on this page moved for a clean reason. All seven four-week bases sit on 18 September for a second consecutive run, the first time this series has had two, so the tier gap narrowing from 8.6 points to 8.3 is price with no calendar in it: REMX’s four-week cell went −22.7% to −21.7% and the basket’s −14.2% to −13.4%, both tiers up and the minerals side up more. ISO week 43 does not close until Sunday 25 October, so the correlation sample holds at 104 aligned weekly closes and 103 returns from week 2024-43 to week 2026-42, where the 17 October run set it. Rebuilt from two years of daily closes and cross-checked against weekly bars bucketed by exchange-local ISO week, both methods again give basket-to-REMX at 0.3885, so the headline 0.39 stands and every correlation cell on the page is unchanged from the corrected figures the last run published. The next window advance is the week-43 sample on the 26 October run.

A wire put Tokyo’s session half a point wrong, and the audit now carries that error class three times. A report dated 21 October headlines the Nikkei “up 0.97%” and its index table reads 64,696.00, up 620.58 points. The index closed 64,621.24, up 545.82, or +0.85%. The two figures are internally consistent with each other and with the correct previous close, so this is not a transcription slip but a different print — one that sits inside the day’s range of 64,558.60 to 65,404.63 and is not the 15:30 auction. It joins the “Nikkei −2.64%” row from 19 August and the “down 1.16%” row from yesterday. Check the index against the index.

Three smaller items, none of them a session. The Schaeffler daily bar went null again, this time for 20 October, and this one is worse than its predecessors: the volume field is null as well as the close, so the twenty-session comparison had to be made against the quote-level volume. Two routes agree on €5.89 and the continuous five-minute tick would have given €5.94, a +2.95% session rather than the +2.08% one that happened, so the rule earned its keep in the opposite direction from last week. That is the thirtieth hole; 16 October has backfilled at exactly the €5.83 published here. On the policy clock, nothing has changed and the date is closer: MOFCOM Announcement No. 70 still expires 10 November 2026, 20 days away, with no Chinese instrument extending it and the separate gallium, germanium and antimony suspension running to 27 November. And three open items stay open: USA Rare Earth has still not scheduled third-quarter results with the 600 mtpa Stillwater run-rate and first magnet invoice both guided to this quarter, Lynas’s September-quarter report is still due late October, and Perpetua’s $2.9bn EXIM facility is still board-approved rather than closed.

20 Oct 2026. The only rare-earth expiry written into Chinese law is still 10 November, and this page’s own audit said otherwise. MOFCOM Announcement No. 70 of 2025, dated 7 November 2025, suspended Announcements 55 to 58, 61 and 62 until 10 November 2026. Two statements point past that date and neither is a Chinese instrument: Treasury Secretary Bessent said on 23 September that the Busan Agreement would run to 10 January 2027, and a ministry official said the same on 28 September. Trade-policy trackers reading MOFCOM’s own 2026 announcement list, one on 1 October and one on 16 October, found it running to Announcement No. 48 with nothing extending, replacing or amending No. 70. So the cliff edge this page recorded as removed is removed in a US characterisation of the truce and not in the published text, and the date in the text is 21 days away. The two carve-outs are unchanged and both are on the page already: the April 2025 licensing regime covering seven medium and heavy rare earths was never suspended, and the separate suspension covering gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials runs to 27 November 2026. The claim audit now carries this against this page’s own “Wrong” verdict on the 6 October piece, which was too strong: the headline date it counted down to is the only one Beijing has published.

Nidec said it would disclose the redacted Report on 20 October “or so”, and as of this run it has not. Its IR feed carries four October items: two dated 16 October, the receipt and the Committee’s conclusions, plus one on 2 October and one on 1 October. Nothing is dated 19 or 20 October. Tokyo has settled and the feed can still post after hours, so this is a status rather than a miss, and the test is whether it appears before the next run. The tape stayed where it has been: Nidec closed ¥1,758, down 1.73%, a third consecutive new low beneath the ¥1,789 that was itself the lowest close since 11 July 2016, on 7,322,600 shares against a twenty-session average of 17,046,995, or 0.43 times normal. Three sessions of fresh lows on 0.72, 0.32 and 0.43 times average turnover is the reading this page has made throughout: the bid going away rather than a seller arriving. Eight days remain to the 28 October anniversary.

Tokyo fell across the board and the published percentage is wrong in the wires again. The Nikkei closed 64,075.42, down 841.28 points or 1.30%, confirmed against both the daily bar and regularMarketPrice stamped 15:45 JST. One wire put the session at −1.16% and an historical table at 64,224.00; neither is the close, and the audit carries the first as the same error class as the “Nikkei −2.64%” row. Decliners beat advancers 2,821 to 710. Underneath, the gearbox layer took the worst of it: Nabtesco −3.70% to ¥4,293, the largest fall anywhere on this page today and its lowest close since 29 July 2026, on 0.78 times average volume; TDK −2.71% to ¥2,834, its lowest since 17 September, on 0.68 times; Aichi Steel −2.35% to ¥2,867 on 0.74 times; Yaskawa −2.20% to ¥4,277 on 0.84 times. Harmonic Drive was the exception at −0.75% to ¥5,260, and the only Tokyo line here to trade above its own average, at 1.24 times. Nothing on the page moved four per cent, and no company on it filed anything dated 20 October.

Monday in New York went the other way, and the minerals tier fell into a rising market. The S&P 500 rose 0.41% to 7,690.73, the Nasdaq Composite 1.11% and the PHLX Semiconductor index 1.61%, recovering part of Friday’s chip-led fall. The tier sold anyway: USA Rare Earth −4.27% to $10.09, the largest Western fall on the page and its lowest close since 9 July 2025, on 0.74 times average volume; MP −3.04% to $38.95, its lowest close since 29 July 2026, on 0.72 times; Perpetua −2.29% to $18.77 on 1.28 times; and REMX −1.60% to $53.36, its lowest close since 7 August 2025, on 0.89 times. That is the fund falling less than the two producers inside it for the eighth time in this account, and the explanation available on earlier sessions is not available here: the equity market was up, not down. Nor is it a metals session. Gold fell 0.61% and the gold miners 1.41%, so Perpetua at roughly 1.6 times the miners is the documented amplification of a metals move rather than an antimony signal, which is the check that card exists to make. Two names rose: Lynas +1.83% to $7.77 on 1.29 times average, its best session since 15 October, and Novonix +0.47% to $2.16 on 0.59 times, off the record low it set on Friday. Compass Diversified +0.40% to $10.05 came on 2.15 times average volume, the heaviest relative turnover on the page, with nothing on its feed dated to it.

Ambarella rose 1.72% to $62.76 on 1.76 times average volume, and its own sector did most of that. A third reported bidder entered the sales process last week, after the 31 July Financial Times report of NXP talks and the 9 October Qualcomm speculation. The October items trace to unverified “uncooked” market alerts repeated by aggregators, and neither Ambarella nor any named party has filed or said anything, so they are reported here as circulating talk and not as a process. The session itself does not need them: the stock rose 1.72% on a day its semiconductor index rose 1.61%, which is sector beta and not a deal premium. This card’s standing read was that Ambarella’s falls are sector beta with the robotics line doing none of the work; the same test applied to a rise gives the same answer.

The one-year lookbacks rolled, and they did more damage to this page’s columns than any price did. Tokyo’s 1y base moved from 17 October 2025 to 20 October 2025 and the Western names’ from 16 to 17 October 2025, off a weekend into a higher session. Harmonic Drive’s 1y cell falls from +75.2% to +64.4% on a base going ¥3,025 to ¥3,200, with the price down eight tenths of a per cent: ten of the eleven points are the calendar. Yaskawa’s turns negative, +4.8% to −4.4%, on a base going ¥4,173 to ¥4,474. TDK’s goes +29.2% to +19.1% on ¥2,255.5 to ¥2,379, and Aichi Steel’s YTD flips negative, +0.5% to −1.9%, on a 2.35% session. Two 52-week highs rolled as well, and both flattered a drawdown cell: MP’s from $83.99 to $80.89, which improved its drawdown from 52.2% to 51.9% on a session the stock fell three per cent, and Novonix’s to $21.50, which took its cell from 91.0% to 90.0% on a price that rose half a per cent. None of those four cells is a judgement about the business; read the base before reading the number.

All three venues print a new close and the four-week bases have converged again, this time on a weekday. Tokyo reads 20 October, Xetra and the US 19 October, so the structural one-session gap is back to its normal shape rather than closed. All seven four-week bases nevertheless sit on a single date, 18 September, because the Western lookback rolled onto the same Friday Tokyo’s already used: the second single-base run in this series and the first that is not a weekend refresh. The tier gap widened from 7.7 to 8.6 points, REMX −22.7% against the basket −14.2%, and for once the decomposition cuts against the headline. Held at today’s prices on the old 16 September Western base the gap would be 9.6 points, so the base roll took 1.0 point out and price put 1.9 points in. The widening is price, and the calendar worked against it, which is the opposite of the last three runs.

The correlation window has not moved, but three published cells were slightly off and are corrected. ISO week 43 is still in progress and does not close until Sunday 25 October, so the sample holds at 104 aligned weekly closes and 103 returns from week 2024-43 to week 2026-42, exactly where the 17 October run set it. Rebuilt from two years of daily closes and cross-checked against weekly bars bucketed by exchange-local ISO week, both methods give basket-to-REMX at 0.3885, so the headline 0.39 stands and the relationship has not changed. Three cells recompute one point higher than the figures carried since 17 October: Lynas to REMX 0.6471, published 0.64; Nidec to the basket 0.6229, published 0.61; Harmonic Drive to the basket 0.8152, published 0.81. On an unchanged window that cannot be the market moving, so it is a carried rounding error rather than news, and the bar charts and the Lynas table cell are corrected to 0.65, 0.62 and 0.82. The audit carries it as this page’s own. The next window advance is the week-43 sample on the 26 October run.

Four smaller items, none of them a session. Schaeffler’s 13 August 2026 release, which this page had not carried, says it has completed validation testing of formed strain wave gearboxes for humanoid robots and plans mass manufacture from 2027, starting in Germany, claiming more than 25% lower manufacturing cost and more than 75% lower material consumption. Those are company claims and not verified here, but the product is Harmonic Drive’s own, so the parts table now names Schaeffler on the strain-wave row with its 2027 date attached. On the magnet input, the China Rare Earth Industry Association posted its price index at 263.6 on 9 October 2026, against 267.0 on 4 August, with NdPr oxide at ¥729.8–749.8/kg, which brackets Benchmark’s 25 September assessment of RMB729,500/t rather than contradicting it. USA Rare Earth has not scheduled third-quarter results, and both the 600 mtpa Stillwater run-rate and first magnet sales are guided to this quarter, which has ten weeks left. Lynas’s September-quarter report is due late October, and Perpetua’s $2.9bn EXIM facility is still board-approved rather than closed, with the company guiding documentation and close to the fourth quarter.

19 Oct 2026. The Committee’s conclusions are on the record with nine people named on them, and Tokyo traded a third of its normal volume. Nidec’s second release of 16 October, “The Investigation Report Issued by the Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee”, carries the Committee’s conclusion that the following “are believed to be liable in damages”: Shigenobu Nagamori, Hiroshi Kobe, Akira Sato, Hiroyuki Yoshimoto, Jun Seki and Mitsuya Kishida under Article 423, Paragraph 1 of the Companies Act of Japan; Kazuya Murakami and Hiroyuki Ochiai under the same article; and a former vice president, identified only as a former CFO of the company from May 2022 to March 2026, under either Article 644 and Article 415, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Code or Nidec’s own Vice President Regulations. That is nine individuals, eight named and one not, with the caveat that “the extent of damage should be determined based on the degree of their contribution”. The Report itself is still being redacted: Nidec “plans to disclose the Report on Tuesday, October 20, 2026 or so”. Nine days remain to the 28 October anniversary.

This page said on 17 October that nothing had posted, and a release dated the day before said otherwise. The 17 October run recorded that “neither the redacted Report nor the promised actions has posted”. The release above is dated 16 October and sits on the same disclosure feed, one item above the receipt this page did carry. It is not the redacted Report, which is still pending, but it is the Committee’s conclusion and the names, which is the substance the run said was absent. The miss is the same mechanism the audit recorded against the Oasis letter and the Schaeffler order book: a dated company item on the public record, not found because the feed was read for one item rather than listed. The claim audit carries it as this page’s own.

The tape did not trade it. Nidec closed ¥1,789, down 0.61%, its lowest close since 11 July 2016, on 5,439,500 shares against a twenty-session average of 16,858,410, which is 0.32 times normal and the thinnest session of this entire episode. It traded as low as ¥1,749, which is a new 52-week low and the lowest print on this page’s record, and as high as ¥1,803. A board committee naming the founder and eight others as liable in damages moved the close six tenths of a per cent on a third of normal turnover. On 15 October this page noted that a ten-year low on below-average volume is the bid going away rather than a new seller arriving; at 0.32 times, neither side turned up.

Two figures circulating on this session are wrong, and both are now in the audit. An aggregator has Nidec’s board “resolving on October 16 to pursue litigation against nine former executives”. Nidec’s own release says it “will consider necessary legal actions such as filing a claim for damages”, which is deliberation and not a resolution, and the nine are not all former executives: Murakami and Ochiai are carried without that qualifier and one is a former vice president rather than a director. Separately a wire has the stock “down 2.8% to 1,760.0 yen” on Monday. The close was ¥1,789, down 0.61%; ¥1,760 is an intraday print from a session whose low was ¥1,749, and −2.8% from Friday’s ¥1,800 is ¥1,749.6, which is the low rather than the close. This is the same error class as the “Nikkei −2.64%” figure the audit already carries.

02 Tier one — the component layer
Company Layer Last 1d 1m YTD 1y vs 52w high 1y trend
Harmonic Drive Systems6324.T · ADR HSYDF Strain wave gears ¥4,875 −9.6% −21.4% +29.0% +49.1% −46.7%
Nabtesco6268.T · ADR NCTKY Cycloidal RV reducers ¥4,166 −4.4% −9.8% +11.2% +8.3% −31.9%
Yaskawa Electric6506.T · ADR YASKY Servo motors & controllers ¥4,033 −4.1% −8.0% −15.2% −11.6% −49.0%
Nidec6594.T · ADR NJDCY (stale) Motors & integrated actuators ¥1,715 −2.7% −40.0% −19.6% −34.3% −41.7%
SchaefflerSHA0.DE · ADR SFFLY Actuator modules & bearings €5.82 −1.2% −16.7% −30.4% −2.9% −51.4%
AmbarellaAMBA · Nasdaq Edge AI vision silicon $66.00 +4.4% −4.1% −6.8% −20.7% −31.7%
Prices in local listing currency at each venue’s last completed close, dated in the method note. Percentage moves are computed from that same local line, so they are clean of currency translation. ADR tickers are given for access, not for pricing — see the method note.
Joint 20–40 units per humanoid

Harmonic Drive Systems

6324.T

The closest thing to a monopoly on the list. Strain wave gears are the compact, zero-backlash gearboxes inside precision joints, and there is no substitute at volume. The ~85% share claim is consistent with how the market is generally described, and the humanoid order book is real but still small: roughly ¥2.5bn of humanoid-related orders guided for FY3/26, which management has suggested could double or triple in FY3/27.

The catch is that today's profit does not come from humanoids. FY3/26 landed at ¥59.6bn revenue (+7.0%) with operating profit down 94.4% year on year. The recovery is now visible, though: April–June revenue of ¥16.68bn (+23.6%) and operating profit of ¥1.84bn against ¥122m a year earlier, on consolidated orders of ¥24.13bn (+55.7%) — roughly ¥3bn of which was a one-off North American surgical-robot order. On 7 August the company lifted FY3/27 guidance to ¥74.5bn revenue and ¥8.5bn operating profit, from ¥68bn and ¥6.2bn. The stock is still priced on that forecast rather than on trailing numbers.

Share ~85% FY3/26 rev ¥59.6bn Q1 orders +55.7% FY3/27e op ¥8.5bn

21 October: +2.47% to ¥5,390 on 1.32 times average volume, the largest rise in tier one and a second consecutive session above its own average. The Nikkei rose 0.85% the same session, so this is roughly three times the market, and it takes the line back off the ¥5,260 it closed at the day before. The twelve-month cell gained only a point against that, +64.4% to +65.6%, because the year-ago base rolled again, ¥3,200 to ¥3,255: price put four points in and the calendar took nearly three straight back out. Separately, the competitive position now has a date on it. Schaeffler’s 13 August 2026 release says it has completed validation testing of formed strain wave gearboxes for humanoid robots and plans mass manufacture from 2027, claiming manufacturing cost more than 25% lower and material consumption more than 75% lower by forming rather than cutting. Those are company claims and are not verified here, and 2027 is not now. But it is the first dated second source for the exact product this card is built on, it comes from inside tier one, and the competition is on cost rather than capability. The parts table now names both.

WatchQuarterly humanoid order disclosure. This is the single number that justifies the multiple, and nothing has been published since the 7 August guidance upgrade, which is already priced. The tape has now run eleven sessions from the 4 September close of ¥5,730: +5.5%, +4.2%, −4.5%, +2.1%, +2.7%, −3.2%, +0.7%, +0.3%, +2.1%, 0.0%, then +3.9% to ¥6,200 on the Bank of Japan's rate decision. Tokyo then shut for three sessions, and the twelfth came on the reopen: +2.4% to ¥6,350 on 24 September, its highest close since 17 August and 10.8% above where the run started. The thirteenth ended it, and quietly: −0.8% to ¥6,300 on 25 September, on a session the Nikkei rose 1.30% — so the stock gave up two points of relative ground without a word from the company, having gained two or three the day before on the same silence. The fourteenth took it back and then some: +1.6% to ¥6,400 on 28 September, its highest close since 17 August, on a day the index fell 0.73% and the name two rows below it closed limit-down. None of the run came from the order book. Two figures in this row have moved a long way on the calendar rather than on the tape, and both need reading carefully. The month reads +12.2% against +0.2% a fortnight ago, because the four-week base has rolled onto 28 August's ¥5,750, from the ¥5,960 of 18 August. And the twelve-month column fell from +116.9% to +95.9% on 18 September, because 18 September 2025's +15.0% day dropped out of the window — then jumped to +123.0% on 24 September, twenty-seven points on a 2.4% session, because a three-day holiday rolls the base six calendar days in one step, onto 24 September 2025's ¥2,847, ten per cent below the ¥3,165 it replaced. A fifteenth session added 0.8% to ¥6,450 on 29 September, a fresh high since 17 August on a day the index fell 0.60%, so a point and a half of relative gain on the same silence. The sixteenth gave a little of it back: −0.5% to ¥6,420 on 30 September, on a session the Nikkei rose 1.94% — two and a half points of relative ground surrendered, again with nothing published. The seventeenth was the largest of the lot and the first to clear the August range: +3.0% to ¥6,610 on 1 October, its highest close since 13 August, on the session the Nikkei rose 3.30% — so most of it was index rather than name, which has been true of this row for a fortnight. The eighteenth gave a little back, −0.6% to ¥6,570 on 2 October, against an index down 0.94%, and the nineteenth took it to a new high for the run: +1.4% to ¥6,660 on 5 October, its highest close since 13 August, on an index up 2.40%, so again most of it is index rather than name. Nineteen sessions, ¥5,730 to ¥6,660, 16.2%, and not one of them an order disclosure. Then the run ended, and three sessions later so did most of what it had earned. The twentieth session broke it, −0.9% to ¥6,600 on 6 October; 7 October added back +0.45% to ¥6,630; and 8 October took −7.09% to ¥6,160, the worst session this page has recorded on the name, on 1.20m shares against 580,400 — a little over twice the volume, opening ¥6,510, never trading above ¥6,520, and settling ¥30 off a low of ¥6,130. That is the lowest close since 17 September and it undoes roughly half of a nineteen-session, 16.2% climb in one go. The symmetry is the point: not one of the nineteen up sessions carried an order disclosure, and neither does this one. A row that rose on index beta and sentiment has now fallen on the same thing, five times as fast as the index did. The columns moved further than the price. The four-week cell reads +3.0% against +13.9% last run, and the twelve-month cell +108.8% against +137.9% — a 29.1-point fall, the largest this page has recorded in that column, of which the session is 16.9 points and the year-ago base stepping one session, up 5.9% onto 8 October 2025's ¥2,950, is the other 12.2. At a gain of this size a base step is heavily levered; read it against its own date rather than as news. The drawdown is the figure no base can flatter, and it went the other way with the price, widening five and a half points to 32.7% below the ¥9,150 high. Friday recovered a little of it and Tuesday took much more than that back. 9 October added +0.97% to ¥6,220; then Tokyo shut for Sports Day, and the reopen on 13 October fell 4.66% to ¥5,930 on 1.55m shares against 791,000, close to twice the volume, its lowest close since 15 September. Against a Nikkei down 1.82% that is two and a half times the index, and it carries no disclosure either: the order book has still said nothing since 7 August. The drawdown widens to 35.2%, the four-week cell comes in to +2.4% from +7.4%, and the year-to-date to +56.9%. Twenty-three sessions on from the ¥5,730 close of 4 September, a run that peaked at ¥6,660 on 5 October has surrendered ¥730 of its ¥930 gain, leaving the name 3.5% above where the run began, and not one session in either direction carried an order number. Two sessions have now taken out the rest of it. 14 October eased 1.52% to ¥5,840, and 15 October fell 11.64% to ¥5,160 in the CPI selloff, on 1.71m shares against a twenty-session average of 935,580: its worst session since 28 July and its lowest close since 1 May 2026, and at roughly 2.4 times the index the hardest-hit name in Tokyo that day. That puts it 9.9% below the ¥5,730 the run started from, so a nineteen-session, 16.2% climb and everything after it has been given back in full. The drawdown widened 7.4 points to 43.6%, the widest this page has recorded on the name. 16 October took part of it back, and on lighter volume than the fall: +3.68% to ¥5,350 on 778,100 shares, 0.85 times the twenty-session average, which brought the drawdown in to 41.5%. 19 October gave a little of it back, −0.93% to ¥5,300 on 1.21 times average volume, after trading as low as ¥5,010. That leaves the drawdown 42.1%, the year to date +40.2% and the four-week cell −14.5% on a base that has rolled to 18 September's ¥6,200 from 16 September's ¥5,970, which is most of the four-point move in that cell rather than anything the price did. The twelve-month cell reads +75.2% against a base of ¥3,025, itself rolled onto 17 October 2025. A bounce on four fifths of average turnover is not the same event as a fall on nearly twice it. Still nothing from the order book since 7 August.

Joint Legs, load-bearing axes

Nabtesco

6268.T

The heavy-duty counterpart: cycloidal RV reducers for medium-to-large joints, with roughly 60% global share. Of the six, this is the one where the cited financials check out cleanly — FY2025 delivered ¥307.9bn revenue (+9.8%) and ¥20.7bn operating profit (+60.3%), with FY2026 guided to ¥327bn and ¥27.7bn.

Crucially, Nabtesco is committing capital ahead of the demand: it is doubling RV-reducer capacity into 2026 and bought Slovak cycloidal maker Spinea in 2023. That is a company acting on the thesis, not just narrating it.

Share ~60% FY25 rev ¥307.9bn Op profit +60.3% FY26e op +33.6%

21 October: +1.49% to ¥4,357 on 0.80 times average volume, recovering two fifths of the previous session’s fall. Nothing is dated to it. The pattern this card keeps recording holds in both directions: the largest fall on the page one session, a partial bounce the next, each on roughly four fifths of normal turnover. The volatility this line is known for is still there; the participation is not.

WatchUtilisation of the doubled capacity. Idle new capacity turns a margin story into a fixed-cost problem quickly. It has been the most volatile name on the tier, and has now gone quiet: −5.7% on 2 September, then +1.6%, +1.4% and +3.6%, then −6.1% on 8 September and +4.5% on 9 September — and since then −0.7%, −1.3%, −0.3% and +0.2% — four sessions inside 1.5% after a fortnight of violent ones — before +2.6% to ¥4,551 on 16 September, its best session since 9 September, then +0.7% to ¥4,581 and +0.8% to ¥4,619 on 18 September — three gains running — and, after the three-day holiday, a fourth: +3.0% to ¥4,759 on 24 September, its best session since 9 September. A fifth followed, +0.7% to ¥4,792 on 25 September, then the streak broke at −0.2% and resumed at +0.3%, and then the largest session of the sequence arrived on the last day of the quarter: +2.6% to ¥4,919 on 30 September, its highest close since 17 August and its best session since 24 September, on an index up 1.94%, so for once the move is market rather than name, and the name still led it by seven tenths. Eight of the last ten sessions higher is the longest run this name has put together in the period this page has tracked, and none of it is company news. Two more sessions have followed and both went with Tokyo rather than ahead of it: −1.0% to ¥4,926 on 2 October and +1.1% to ¥4,979 on 5 October, the latter its highest close since 12 August. Then the CPI session took it with everything else: −7.98% to ¥4,441 on 15 October, on 1.73m shares against a twenty-session average of 895,355, its lowest close since 15 September. 16 October recovered a little of it, +1.06% to ¥4,488 on 0.88 times average volume, and 19 October gave that back, −0.67% to ¥4,458 on 1.22 times. It now sits 27.1% below its 52-week high, still the tightest on the tier, and the four-week cell reads −3.5% on a base that has rolled again, onto 18 September's ¥4,619 from 16 September's ¥4,551. Read that the same way as Harmonic's: the base moved, and nothing the company said moved any of these numbers.

Actuator Motor + gear + electronics

Schaeffler

SHA0.DE

The most concrete commercial traction on the list. Schaeffler signed a strategic partnership with Swiss Hexagon Robotics in April 2026 for strain wave and planetary gear actuators, and a separate technology and supply partnership with UK-based Humanoid. It is also a customer: it plans to deploy at least a thousand Hexagon robots across its own plants within seven years.

And on 13 October that traction finally got a number. With its preliminary nine-month figures Schaeffler disclosed humanoid-robotics orders on hand of approximately €400m, against €350m at the end of the first half, after acquiring two further customers in the Greater China region during the third quarter and taking its humanoid customer count to five. That is the first quarterly, countable humanoid figure any tier-one name on this page has published. The qualification is the one this card has always carried, and the same release supplies it: the group turned €17.5bn of nine-month revenue, against €17.7bn a year earlier, into a 4.5% EBIT margin before special items, with the third quarter alone back down at 4.2%, nine-month free cash flow before M&A at negative €40m against positive €47m, and about €240m of one-off E-Mobility special charges, roughly €220m of it in the quarter. Guidance for 2026 and the 2028 mid-term targets were both confirmed. So the best humanoid disclosure on this page is also a rounding item against the revenue line it sits inside, which is this card in a single release. The validated interim statement follows on 3 November.

The in-house manufacturing point is fair — motors, power electronics and encoders are built internally. The offset is that Schaeffler remains predominantly an automotive supplier, so a humanoid win is diluted by a large, cyclical, structurally pressured base business. That mixed identity shows in the tape: down 30.3% YTD and 4.1% lower over twelve months as well, and 51.3% below its high, the widest drawdown in tier one and still past half. The fortnight of going nowhere ended on Friday. Four sessions had sat inside nine cents — €7.34 on 7 September, €7.43 on 8 September, €7.40 on 9 September and €7.34 on 10 September — and then 11 September broke the range, −2.0% to €7.19, the lowest close since 2 September. Monday went further, −3.3% to €6.95, and Tuesday further again: −2.4% to €6.78, the lowest close since 20 March — nearly six months undone in three sessions. Wednesday halted it, +1.2% to €6.86, the only tier-one name to rise that session, and Thursday reversed harder, +3.1% to €7.07 — its best session since 2 September. That did not hold either: −2.0% to €6.93 on 18 September, then +0.9% to €6.99 on 21 September and +2.0% to €7.13 on 22 September, its best close in a week — before giving it back, −2.2% to €6.97 on 23 September, in the same dollar-led metals session that took the minerals tier down. Then 24 September broke the whole range: −6.2% to €6.54, its worst session since 31 July and its lowest close since 26 November 2025. The sector context does not cover it — the DAX fell 0.57% with autos the worst-performing corner, and the largest carmakers in that move fell 2.2–2.4% — and there was no company disclosure on the day. The shape argues against a single headline: no gap at the open, a slow grind from €6.84 to €6.75 by mid-morning, then an acceleration through the last ninety minutes on 1.33m shares, more than three times Monday's volume. What there was, and what this page missed for two days, is a sell-side catalyst one session old: Jefferies cut its target to €8.70 from €9.45 on 23 September, keeping a Buy, with analyst Vanessa Jeffriess writing that Schaeffler's reduction of its own 2028 targets had damaged credibility — while calling the non-automotive robotics business the most attractive investment story in the sector. That note is the documented cause of the −2.2% on 23 September, which this page had loosely hung on a dollar-led metals session a German auto-parts supplier has no business being in. It does not by itself carry a 6.2% second-day move, and no disclosure does, so the caution stands — but “a cause it cannot source” was too strong: the two sessions together are −8.3%, €7.13 to €6.54, and the first of them has a name on it. It never joined the mid-August drawdown, so for a fortnight it had nothing to give back; it has given back far more than that since, and the month now reads 15.0% lower where three weeks earlier this was the one tier-one name essentially flat on that measure. Two quiet sessions have extended it rather than ended it: −2.6% to €6.46 on 28 September and −0.9% to €6.40 on 29 September, the lowest close since 21 November 2025, with nothing published on either day. Note what it is not: a chip name. Schaeffler fell on the same session as the semiconductor selloff but for its own reasons, and at 0.60 to the robotics basket it is one of the two loosest fits on the tier, alongside Ambarella at 0.55 — the two names here that are really something else. Several of these closes were reconstructed from the closing auction print when the German daily feed swallowed the session, and the ledger keeps closing behind itself: the 7, 16, 21, 22 and 23 September bars have all filled at exactly €7.34, €6.86, €6.99, €7.13 and €6.97, the last of them a fifteenth reconstruction confirmed to the cent. 24 September was the new hole at the time, and because it carried a 6.2% session rather than a quiet one it was closed on four routes rather than two: the 17:35 auction bar at €6.54 on 484,271 shares, previousClose and chartPreviousClose both reading the same, and an independent German quote service carrying the session at 6.540. The newest is 14 October, and on that session this was the only green figure anywhere on the page: +1.54% to €5.94, while Tokyo fell six to twelve per cent the next morning and the US minerals tier fell three to ten the same afternoon. Its bar is null again, and three routes agree on the close: regularMarketPrice stamped 17:35:17 CEST, previousClose on a five-minute request, and a 17:35 auction bar on 1,221,280 shares against 13 to 16,488 in each of the six bars before it. Two sessions have followed and both lost their bar as well. 15 October closed 3.20% lower at €5.75, its lowest close since 1 October 2025, recovered on three routes at the time and since backfilled by the vendor at exactly that figure. 16 October then went the other way, +1.39% to €5.83, which lifts it off that low and brings the drawdown in to 51.3%, still the widest in tier one. Its bar is null too, and this is the first hole in the series lost with Xetra already closed rather than open: the volume field is populated at 877,225 shares while the close is empty, and two routes carry €5.83, regularMarketPrice stamped 17:35:21 CEST and a 17:30 five-minute bar on zero volume, so the continuous close rather than the auction. See the method note.

One correction worth flagging, because it changes the read. Measured on the thin SFFLY ADR, Schaeffler's correlation to the robotics basket looks like 0.29 on the current window — and it has been as low as 0.16. Measured on the liquid Xetra line it is 0.60. The ADR was not tracking the company; it was tracking its own illiquidity. Schaeffler belongs firmly inside the robotics bloc — and at 0.46 it is also the tier-one name that moves most with REMX, which fits a supplier whose bill of materials is heavy in magnets and bearing steel.

Partners Hexagon, Humanoid Humanoid book €400m YTD −29.5% Corr robotics 0.60

A product disclosure this card had not carried, and it belongs here rather than in the order book. On 13 August 2026 Schaeffler said it had completed validation testing of formed strain wave gearboxes for humanoid robots and laid the foundation for mass manufacture from 2027, starting in Germany and rolling out to other regions, with manufacturing cost more than 25% lower and material consumption more than 75% lower than cut gearboxes. The figures are the company’s and are not verified here. The significance is structural rather than financial: a strain wave gear is Harmonic Drive’s product and the first row of the parts table, and this is the one tier-one name on this page entering another’s core product with a cost claim instead of a partnership. It also sharpens what the €400m order book is for, because a book of orders and a validated low-cost process are different assets and this group now has both. Against that, the dilution problem on this card is unchanged: the same group turned €17.5bn of nine-month revenue into a 4.5% margin. 20 October: +2.08% to €5.89, the best session anywhere in tier one on this run, which pulls the widest drawdown in tier one back in to 50.8%. The close had to be rebuilt rather than read: the 20 October daily bar is null in its close and its volume, the thirtieth hole in this series, and two routes agree on €5.89. Turnover comes from the quote-level field instead, 885,599 shares against a twenty-session average of 1,060,542, or 0.84 times normal. See the method note.

WatchThe humanoid order book, now that one exists: €400m and five customers as of the third quarter, disclosed with the quarterly figures. The question has narrowed rather than closed, because an order book is not revenue and actuators are still not a reported segment, so the robotics margin stays invisible inside an auto-parts P&L. Next reading 3 November.

Motor 6-axis integrated motion

Nidec

6594.T

The world's largest electric motor maker, building integrated humanoid motion units that fold motor, gearbox and controller together — FLEXWAVE strain-wave reducers, KINEX cycloidal gearboxes and planetary systems shown at Automate 2026. The scale argument is real: roughly ¥2.6 trillion in annual revenue (about $17bn, not $2.6tn as the post's garbled phrasing implies).

This is the one name carrying a governance problem rather than just an execution problem, and on 4 September 2026 one half of it was finally published. Nidec disclosed the Investigation Committee's report on the quality strand, received on 2 September and released once confidentiality review was complete, together with its recurrence-prevention measures. The committee, established in May 2026, found a series of quality-related failures: 4M change-rule violations, falsification and fabrication of testing and inspection results, work outside approved inspection and manufacturing conditions, the use and shipment of substandard and unauthorised items, and breaches of record preparation and management rules, arising from an “unhealthy state” of excessive cost-reduction pressure, inefficient risk monitoring and inadequate quality-assurance resourcing. The decisive line for holders is financial: Nidec's evaluation of the individual matters found no material impact on its consolidated financial statements. Remediation gives quality managers authority to suspend shipments, revises reporting lines, adds permanent complaint boxes, puts every executive and employee through quality-compliance training and starts continuous quality audits; disciplinary action is promised but nobody is named. The stock rose 5.7% on the day and a further 7.7% on the Monday after it, to ¥2,812, before losing 3.2% to ¥2,722 and a further 4.8% to ¥2,591 — giving the whole post-report rally back by Wednesday — then taking most of it straight back with +5.6% to ¥2,737 on 10 September, the largest single gain anywhere on this page, and easing 1.7% to ¥2,691 on 11 September, a further 1.3% to ¥2,655 on 14 September, then 0.5% to ¥2,642, +0.2% to ¥2,646 on 16 September, +2.9% to ¥2,724 on 17 September, and +4.8% to ¥2,856 on 18 September on the Bank of Japan's hike — the largest single gain anywhere on this page in this period, and its highest close since 4 June. The report landed on 4 September with the stock up 5.7% that session; of the ten sessions since, seven moved more than 1.3% in one direction or the other — +7.7%, −3.2%, −4.8%, +5.6%, −1.7%, −1.3%, −0.5%, +0.2%, +2.9% and +4.8% — with a three-session lull in the middle that lasted exactly as long as it took the market to find a new reason. That reading rested on an empty disclosure record, and the record is not empty. On 10 September — the same session the stock rose 5.6%, the largest single gain anywhere on this page — Nidec disclosed that a shareholder had begun a derivative action against two former directors the day before. This page's line that Nidec had disclosed nothing at all since 4 September was accurate when written and stopped being accurate on 10 September; it was repeated for fifteen days after that, and the claim audit now carries it. The narrower statement that survives is that nothing has been disclosed on the filing strand since 4 September, and that the moves since have come from interpretation rather than information — including on the day the suit became public, which the tape did not mark at all. Everything else is still open — though it is worth being precise about what "open" means, because this page previously was not. The separate third-party committee on the accounting irregularities has finished: appointed in September 2025, it delivered a mid-term report on 27 February 2026 and its final report on 17 April 2026. What outlasts the inquiry is its consequence. Nidec is still correcting accounts back to the year ended March 2022, has not closed FY3/26, and has repeatedly postponed results — including the April–June quarter, delayed again on 5 Aug 2026. A tariff strand runs alongside: additional customs duties from declaration errors were estimated in March 2026 at US$69.7m, about ¥11.14bn, including interest. The quality strand covers changes to materials, processes and designs made without customer approval, mishandled inspection data and mislabelled production locations, and on 5 August an individual shareholder formally requested that the company pursue liability against current and former directors. A second, larger request followed: on 20 August multiple shareholders jointly demanded the same action under Article 847 of the Companies Act, disclosed the next day. Those were demands that the company sue, and they concern the quality and accounting conduct. What was filed on 9 September is a different instrument and the first claim in this saga that carries a number: an individual shareholder sued two former directors — founder Shigenobu Nagamori and Hiroshi Kobe — in the Kyoto District Court (case 1749 of 2026) for ¥28,730,558,300 plus delinquent charges under Article 462, paragraph 1, the capital-maintenance provision rather than the duty-of-care one. The claim is that three specific capital returns exceeded the distributable amount: the treasury-share buybacks of September 2022 and February–March 2023, and the December 2022 midterm dividend. That is the restatement arriving as a liability instead of as an accounting entry, and it is the mechanism worth understanding — correct the accounts for those years downward and the distributable amount shrinks retroactively, which is what makes capital already paid out unlawful after the fact. Nidec says the action, being against individuals, will not affect its business performance. That is accurate about the P&L and beside the point about governance: the suit does not need to succeed to establish that the restatement has consequences with numbers attached, and ¥28.7bn is the first one. Nidec has an Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee, running since 13 March 2026, to decide whether directors, auditors and executive officers bear legal liability. The US ADR has barely traded since February, which is why the Tokyo line is the only usable quote. On the tape, 16 October took it lower again, −1.04% to ¥1,800, a fresh low beneath Thursday’s on 0.72 times average volume and on a session the Nikkei rose 1.39% and every other Tokyo name on this page closed higher. That is the second consecutive new low made on below-average turnover, which is the same reading this card has carried: not a new seller arriving, the bid going away. 19 October made it a third, and on a third of normal volume: −0.61% to ¥1,789 on 5,439,500 shares against a twenty-session average of 16,858,410, which is 0.32 times normal and the thinnest session of this whole episode, after trading as low as ¥1,749, a new 52-week low. It is the session on which the Committee’s conclusion naming nine people was already public, so the reading has to change: this was not an absent bid on no news but an absent bid on the most consequential document this name has produced. It leaves the name 39.2% off its high, 16.1% lower year to date and 28.3% over twelve months.

Revenue ~¥2.6tn FY3/26 net loss ¥564.6bn Quality report published 4 Sep Impairment >¥632bn Audit opinion disclaimed TSE confirmation due 28 Oct 2026 Off high −40.1% UBS target ¥2,400

20 October: the Report posted, on the day Nidec said it would, and it carries a number. “Nidec Discloses the Investigation Report Issued by the Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee”, dated 20 October in Kyoto, says the redaction is complete and attaches the Report. Two things in it are new. The appropriation of surplus was excluded from the Committee’s investigation, because Nidec had not filed amended securities reports for past years and the distributable amount that would have been examined is therefore uncertain; the company says it will examine legal action on that separately, after the restatements are done. And only a Japanese digest is out, with the English version promised and not yet published, which is why no English-language wire carries the release. Jiji, Bloomberg and Nikkei, reading the Japanese text, put the damage at about ¥27.6bn — third-party investigation costs, audit costs and the exchange penalty — with the apportionment among the nine left to a court, because contribution is too hard to split. Nidec itself is still only “deliberating legal actions such as lodging a claim for damages”, so the board resolution an aggregator reported on 16 October still has not happened. 21 October: ¥1,762, up 0.23%, on 8,954,900 shares against a twenty-session average of 17,266,920, or 0.52 times normal, with an intraday low of ¥1,748, the lowest print on this page’s record. The founder found liable for ¥27.6bn moved the close four yen on half the usual turnover, and the ¥1,758 of the session before stands as the lowest close since 12 February 2016. Seven days remain to the 28 October anniversary.

WatchEnd of October 2026, and the question has changed shape: the filing arrived, the audit opinion did not. The quality strand is closed; the accounting strand is filed but unassured. Nidec obtained approval on 30 June to extend the filing deadline for its annual securities report for the year ended March 2026 from 30 June to 30 September, and it met that extended date; what it did not obtain was an audit opinion. The April–June quarter behind it is still missing. Until both are current, position sizing here remains a governance decision rather than a robotics one. A third strand is now live alongside them: the 9 September derivative action over the 2022–23 buybacks and dividend, which turns on what the restated distributable amount actually is — so the filing due on 30 September is also the document that sizes that claim. On the closed strand, the verified count is worth carrying: the 4 September report found 844 cases of quality misconduct over about a decade — mostly changes to materials and processes without customer approval, alongside falsified tests and country-of-origin mislabelling — and Nidec states no individual matter has a material impact on its financial statements. Press reporting that attaches a ¥250bn write-down to that report is conflating it with the accounting strand; the claim audit now carries this. A fourth strand opened on 28 September and it is the loudest: Diamond Online reported that morning that the retroactive impairment will be roughly ¥1tn in the year ended March 2026, and that an emergency board on 25 September resolved to dismiss president Mitsuya Kishida. Nidec confirmed that executive changes and large-scale impairment processing are under consideration and that nothing has been decided, which leaves three impairment figures in circulation from three sources — the third-party committee’s ~¥250bn in its March report, the only one in a published document; Nikkei’s several hundred billion on 15 September; and Diamond’s ¥1tn. The filing due on 30 September is what adjudicates between them, which is why the deadline now carries more than a compliance question. This page also has a standing observation to retire. Through this whole run Nidec showed the tightest drawdown on the page by a wide margin — 3.4% off a 52-week high of ¥2,941 as recently as 25 September — and this page kept noting that a stock trading that close to its high is not the same thing as a stock that has recovered, on a company whose accounts for the year ended March 2026 do not yet exist. One limit-down session settled it: −17.6% to ¥2,340, 20.4% off the high, and the twelve-month column through zero from +6.7% to −11.3%. Its twelve-month return, meanwhile, has changed sign twice inside a week, and neither move came from the company. Nidec rose 4% on 12 September 2025, and that session rolling into the comparison cut the twelve-month return from +7.5% to +2.1% on a 1.3% price move. This page then forecast the next crossing to the day — on 16 September the base became 16 September 2025’s ¥2,671, and a +0.2% session took the twelve-month number below zero, to −0.9%. One day later the base rolled again, to 17 September 2025’s ¥2,691, and a +2.9% price move put it back above zero at +1.2%. Two sign changes, two sessions, one of them driven purely by which day fell out of the window. The next session was the clean control case: the base did not move — ¥2,691 on both 17 and 18 September 2025 — so a +4.8% price move took the figure to +6.1% and nothing else did. Same column, three consecutive readings, two mechanisms. The holiday then supplied a fourth: the base rolled six calendar days at once, off ¥2,691 onto 24 September 2025's ¥2,642, so a falling session left the twelve-month figure higher, at +6.8%. It is the cleanest illustration on this page of a return figure that moves because the calendar did — and a warning about reading any twelve-month column on a date when the base is volatile. The 28 September reading is the control case for the whole sequence: the base moved by a single session, from ¥2,662.5 to ¥2,636.5, and the column fell eighteen points anyway. When the price does something like this, the calendar stops mattering. 29 September extended it on ordinary trading rather than a limit — −3.8% to ¥2,250, a fall of ¥90 against a ¥500 limit, and the lowest close since 15 April 2026 — taking the drawdown to 23.5% and the twelve-month cell to −12.1%. Then the disclosure record caught up with the news. At an extraordinary board meeting on 29 September Nidec accepted the resignation of president and chief executive Mitsuya Kishida and appointed Michio Kaida, First Senior Vice President and vice-chair of its reform committee, in his place, saying Kishida “had, on certain occasions, made statements or engaged in conduct in relation to financial reporting that could not necessarily be regarded as appropriate.” 30 September took the stock +4.7% to ¥2,355, its largest gain of this whole episode, on that plus a Nikkei report of final-stage talks to sell Nidec Components to Carlyle for more than ¥100bn, which on that day was a press report and not a disclosure. It became one the next morning: on 1 October Nidec’s board resolved to transfer all 66,302,120 shares of Nidec Components to TCG2603 Co., Ltd., indirectly owned by a Carlyle-related fund, for ¥102,980m, transferring 1 December 2026. The unit earned ¥5,465m of operating profit on ¥32,092m of sales in the year to March 2026, and its end markets include collaborative robots, so the disposal takes out the most robotics-adjacent sensing business inside this name. The drawdown comes back to 19.9% and the twelve-month cell to −10.6%. The document has now arrived, and it settles the impairment question while opening a larger one. Filed on 30 September, the FY3/26 report puts revenue at ¥2,708.7bn, an operating loss of ¥518.9bn and a record net loss of ¥564.6bn, with impairments of more than ¥632bn, against a restated prior year of ¥128.2bn operating profit and ¥84.6bn net profit. So the real figure sits between the two that were circulating: far above the roughly ¥250bn Nidec itself had under impairment review, and well below the ¥1tn Diamond Online reported. Neither source was right, which is the retrospective case for having declined to print either as fact. The larger question is the audit. PwC Japan issued a disclaimer of opinion on the consolidated financial statements and, separately, on the internal control report, on the grounds that it could not obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence, and that is the second consecutive year the securities report has carried one. The accounts are therefore filed and still not assured: every figure in this paragraph is the company's own, unvalidated by its auditor. That is a different condition from the one this page has spent a month describing, and it is not obviously the better one, because “no accounts yet” at least had a resolution date. The date that matters now is the end of October, and it is an anniversary rather than a discretion: the exchange designated Nidec a Security on Special Alert effective 28 October 2025, and its rules require the written confirmation of internal management system one year on, with delisting if the controls are judged inadequate. New president Michio Kaida has said publicly that he intends to keep the listing. Position sizing here was already a governance decision rather than a robotics one. It is now a listing decision as well, and that is a question about whether the instrument continues to exist rather than about what it is worth. The tape has started pricing that question. On 9 October Nidec fell 6.07% to ¥2,010 on 21.3m shares against 11.3m, gapping to ¥2,000 at the open, trading as low as ¥1,941 and closing at its weakest level since 31 March 2026, with its year-to-date figure crossing zero to −5.7%. Nothing was filed, which is the point: nineteen days from the anniversary, with a disclaimed opinion on the record and internal control over financial reporting assessed ineffective as of 31 March 2026, new lows on doubled volume are the market shortening the odds on a deadline rather than reacting to news. Two things said at the 1 October press conference frame what has to change by then. Kaida said the company is still seeking PwC’s sign-off and aims to complete the work needed to obtain opinions by the end of October, the same end of October the written confirmation falls due. And PwC Japan’s own chief executive, Masataka Kubota, attended it and said audit evidence obtained from officers and employees who had made false representations could not be trusted. An auditor saying that in public three weeks before the deadline is the single most informative sentence available on this name, and it is not about motors. And on 7 October a second question arrived from the register. Oasis Management, which holds about 8%, publicly asked the board to begin a preliminary review of privatization options: outside directors to retain their own financial advisers and solicit preliminary, non-binding proposals from strategic buyers and private equity in Japan and overseas, with the disclaimer of opinion and the risk of an involuntary delisting given as the reason. Oasis is explicit that this is a feasibility check and not a decision to sell, and no board response is on the record. It cuts in an awkward direction for a watchlist built on disclosure: a take-private would resolve the listing risk by removing the listing, and with it the quarterly numbers that make this name readable at all. This page missed the item on the day and the claim audit carries the row; it is recorded here because the position on Nidec is now two deadlines rather than one. And the tape has now gone somewhere it has not been in twelve years. On 13 October, Tokyo’s first session after Sports Day, Nidec fell 6.62% to ¥1,877 on 23.96m shares against 21.28m, taking out the 9 October low without pausing on it. That is the lowest close in the ten years of daily history available, with nothing at or below it since the series begins in October 2016 and the last monthly close at that level in 2014, on a split-adjusted basis. The drawdown widens to 36.2%, third-widest in tier one behind Schaeffler and Yaskawa, and the year-to-date cell to −12.0%. Nothing was filed against the session, and the Nikkei fell 1.82%, so the name shed three and a half times the index. Two items from the preceding days do belong on this card, and this page reported their absence rather than their content. UBS downgraded Nidec to Neutral from Buy on 8 October, analysts Shingo Hirata and Kohei Takahashi cutting the target to ¥2,400 from ¥2,800 and putting their operating-profit forecasts 16% and 22% below consensus for this year and next; Bloomberg reported the stock down as much as 9.3% on it. Separately, R&I cut the issuer rating one notch to A+ and placed it on monitor with negative implications, citing the impairment losses. Neither is a filing, which is the distinction this page drew at the time and still holds; what it wrongly concluded from the absence of a filing was that the sessions were not reacting to news. They were, and the claim audit carries that row. With nine days to the 28 October anniversary, the sell side and a rating agency have now both moved, and the price is making ten-year lows ahead of a deadline that is about whether the instrument continues to exist. 15 October took it lower again, −6.24% to ¥1,819, the lowest close since 11 July 2016, and the turnover is the part worth recording: 15.10m shares against a twenty-session average of 15.80m, which is 0.96 times normal. A ten-year low made on below-average volume is an absent bid rather than a new seller. 16 October repeated it, −1.04% to ¥1,800 on 0.72 times average volume, taking the drawdown to 38.8%. And the filing drought ended on that session, which this page missed at the time. Dated 16 October in Kyoto, Nidec disclosed that it had received the investigation report of its Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee, the body established on 13 March 2026 to determine whether current and former directors, auditors and vice presidents “bear legal liability, including whether they breached their duties in the execution of their responsibilities” for the improper accounting. Nidec will publish the Report itself only after redaction for trade secrets and privacy, will “deliberate legal actions such as lodging a claim for damages”, and convened both its Board and its Audit and Supervisory Committee the same day to hear the Committee out and disclose the actions it would take for the time being. None of those three follow-ons has appeared yet, so what exists is a receipt rather than a finding: no contents, no names, no claim. This matters on a card whose question is whether the instrument survives October, because it is the first document to put the directors’ own liability on the record rather than the company’s accounts, and because a damages claim against former management is the one development that cuts for the equity. The release went out at 13:23 JST, inside the session, and the tape did not move for it; the claim audit carries the row on this page having read the session as newsless.

Motor Servo + drive + control

Yaskawa Electric

6506.T

One of very few firms that can already supply precision motion at industrial scale, now pointed at humanoids: it acquired 100% of Tokyo Robotics, whose whole-body torque sensing and impedance control fill a genuine capability gap, and ships MOTOMAN Next with NVIDIA GPUs for autonomous control.

But the profit claim in the source post is backwards. For the fiscal year ended February 2026, revenue edged up while operating profit fell more than 5%, with pre-tax and net profit down harder. The growth is in the forecast, and on 9 October the forecast itself was revised: FY2/27 guidance now reads ¥600bn revenue (+10.7%) and ¥47.5bn net profit (+34.8%), with operating profit cut to ¥57.5bn from ¥60bn. Up just 4.8% over twelve months after the 19 October session and 44.8% below its high, second only to Schaeffler — and that twelve-month cell gained 2.7 points on a session the price fell five yen, because its year-ago base rolled from 16 onto 17 October 2025, it is the clearest example here of a stock priced on guidance rather than results. Its year-to-date return turned negative on 1 September and kept going: a 4.4% fall on 8 September wiped out three modest up sessions, a 1.6% loss on 10 September took it below its April low, a further 3.0% on 11 September took it to ¥4,301, then two yen lower on 14 September and three yen lower again on 15 September — three consecutive closes at the weakest since 3 April, and the manner of them was the point: not a capitulation but a slow bleed of two and three yen a session while the rest of the tier drifted higher. That run ended on 16 September, +1.5% to ¥4,360, its first gain in five sessions — then lasted exactly one day, −1.4% to ¥4,299 on 17 September, before the rate decision took it +2.0% to ¥4,383 on 18 September, and the reopen after the three-day holiday added +2.8% to ¥4,507 on 24 September, its highest close since 7 September. Then it gave a little back, −0.6% to ¥4,480 on 25 September — and on that session the Nikkei rose 1.30%, so this was the widest relative loss of the six Tokyo names here, nearly two points behind the index. Then it turned: −0.6% to ¥4,453 on 28 September, +1.7% to ¥4,528 on 29 September, the best of the six that day, and +2.3% to ¥4,633 on 30 September, its highest close since 7 September, on an index up 1.94%. Three more have extended it: +3.2% to ¥4,779 on 1 October, +0.6% to ¥4,806 on 2 October, and +2.6% to ¥4,931 on 5 October, where the close and the session high are the same figure, its highest close since 26 August. Six consecutive gains took the month from 9.5% lower to 5.8% higher, and then the tier-wide de-rating of 8 October removed a chunk of it, −3.17% to ¥4,789. It went into its results at ¥4,783, after a −0.13% session in which it opened at its low of ¥4,703 and recovered all day on 4.37m shares.

The first-half numbers landed after the close on 9 October, and they cut the one line that measures the business. Revenue for the six months to 31 August was ¥285,598m, up 9.8%, with operating profit ¥22,058m, down 5.5%, profit before tax ¥25,963m (+3.0%), profit attributable to owners ¥18,988m (+4.1%) and basic EPS ¥73.21. The full-year forecast was formally revised for the first time since 10 April, and in opposite directions: revenue from ¥580,000m to ¥600,000m, operating profit from ¥60,000m to ¥57,500m, profit before tax to ¥65,500m, net profit to ¥47,500m, EPS to ¥183.11. The company names both causes: a weaker yen on revenue, and the new ERP system’s effect on production and shipments through the half. It moved its own currency assumptions for September to February with it, the dollar from ¥145.0 to ¥155.0 and the euro from ¥170.0 to ¥180.0. The dividend forecast is unchanged at ¥72.

Two things in that filing are better news than the revision, and one of them is a photograph. Second-quarter orders were ¥185.4bn, up 38% year on year and 13% on the quarter, which the company calls a record-high quarterly order intake, and the segment split is where the humanoid thesis gets tested rather than asserted. Motion Control orders, the servo and drive line this page actually cares about, rose 56%; Robotics rose 33%; System Engineering fell 6%. Yaskawa attributes the growth explicitly to data centre and semiconductor-related investment, and the same split runs through the half: Motion Control revenue ¥137,286m (+21.7%) on operating profit ¥15,973m (+32.8%), against Robotics revenue ¥118,404m (−0.7%) on operating profit ¥5,974m, down 43.3%, the fall driven by the ERP system’s effect on Japanese sales and by European restructuring charges. So the segment named after robots nearly halved its profit while the segment selling into the AI build-out grew a third. Anyone holding this name for humanoids is currently being paid by data centres. The second item is on the second-half measures slide, under Other Topics: an “Actuator for humanoid robots (under development)”, beside a commitment to accelerate data accumulation through field validation and robot design development toward the commercialization of humanoid robots. That is a component maker building the integrated actuator itself rather than selling parts into someone else’s, which is the move Nidec and Harmonic Drive have both already made, and it is the first time Yaskawa has put it in a results pack. It carries no grade, no date, no customer and no volume, so it is a statement of direction and not a number. It is still the most on-thesis disclosure this name has produced.

The market has now voted, and mildly. Tokyo was shut for Sports Day, so the first session to price any of it was Tuesday 13 October, and the stock closed +1.19% at ¥4,840 on 11.72m shares against 4.37m, a 2.7-fold volume increase and the heaviest turnover this page has recorded on the name. On a day the Nikkei fell 1.82% and the two gearbox rows beside it fell 4.7% and 6.6%, a gain of any size is a clear relative verdict: three points better than the index, and the only tier-one name in Tokyo to rise meaningfully. Jefferies analyst Sho Fukuhara upgraded it to Hold from Underperform with a ¥5,300 target, per Investing.com, on the order beat and management’s commentary. Read the rating and not that article’s arithmetic: it is the subject of the claim audit’s newest row, having reported the operating-profit revision at ten times its actual size and the session at an intraday price. The drawdown comes in to 38.9%.

The arithmetic the revision leaves behind is the part to hold on to. Operating profit is the only figure revised downwards, and it still carries a full-year guide of +21.5%. With ¥22,058m banked, that implies ¥35,442m in the second half against ¥23,973m a year earlier, or +47.8%; on net profit, ¥28,512m against ¥16,993m, or +67.8%. A stock priced on a forecast has just moved more of that forecast into the half that has not happened, while the revenue raise alongside it is an exchange rate rather than a volume. The headline net figure went up, from +33.4% to +34.8%, which is why this revision reads better in a summary than in the filing. Tokyo is shut on Monday 12 October for Sports Day, so the first session to price it is Tuesday 13 October.

1H op −5.5% FY2/27e rev ¥600bn FY2/27e op ¥57.5bn 2H op implied +47.8% 2Q orders ¥185.4bn Motion Ctrl orders +56% Robotics op −43.3% Off high −46.9%

21 October: −1.71% to ¥4,204 on 1.06 times average volume, the only tier-one name in Tokyo to fall on a day the index rose 0.85%. It is the lowest close since 31 March 2026, and the drawdown widened to 46.9%, the second deepest in tier one behind Schaeffler. The twelve-month cell improved a point even so, −4.4% to −3.4%, on a year-ago base rolling ¥4,474 to ¥4,352, so the column moved opposite to the price for the second run running. Nothing is dated to the session.

WatchReported, priced, and now the back half. The revised guide needs +47.8% operating profit growth in the six months to February against a first half that delivered −5.5%, so the question is no longer the guidance but whether the ERP disruption it blames is behind the company or still in front of it. Third-quarter results, in January, are the first check. Treat the revenue raise as currency until a volume line says otherwise, and treat the record order book as a data-centre number until the segment split says otherwise: Motion Control orders up 56% on semiconductor and data-centre demand is a genuinely strong figure about a market that is not humanoids. The humanoid line to follow here is no longer an order disclosure but a product: the actuator under development shown in the second-half pack, and whether it acquires a grade, a date or a customer at the January results.

Perception On-robot vision, no cloud

Ambarella

AMBA

The only US-listed name and the only one with a clean, current, verifiable set of numbers. CV7 launched at CES on 5 January 2026 — an 8K edge AI vision SoC for multi-sensor perception across robotics, drones, industrial automation and automotive. Fiscal 2026 revenue was $390.7m, up 37.2%, with fiscal 2027 growth guided at 10–15%. Q2 FY2027, reported on 3 September, came in at $108.1m (+13.2%) with non-GAAP EPS of $0.18 — both a shade ahead of consensus — and Q3 guided to $115–124m.

The robotics pipeline is disclosed rather than implied: 15+ robotics design wins with lifetime revenue above $100m, and 30+ customers in the pipeline. The honest caveat is that robotics is still the smaller part of a business anchored in security cameras and automotive — and the deceleration from +37% to a guided 10–15% is the number bulls have to explain.

Nor did the follow-up. Fermi Wang appeared at Citi's Global TMT Conference on 9 September and was blunter there than on the call: robotics has “a couple design wins,” but the volume is not going to change the financial performance materially, and humanoids are, on his account, harder from a technology standpoint than a level-5 autonomous car. He also named the constraint that is not in the guidance — memory. Customers, he said, could not get allocation commitments from their memory suppliers even for November, which he called the biggest uncertainty and expected to run into 2027. For a fabless designer that is a customer-side supply problem, not a demand one, but it lands on the same revenue line.

The Q2 call moved the narrative without moving the disclosure. Fermi Wang said edge AI revenue “reached record levels” on balanced sequential growth in Auto and IoT and very strong growth from the 5nm CV75 and CV72 SoCs, and the company raised its five-year serviceable-market forecast for edge AI and physical AI, citing higher-value products and new distribution through Macnica and CapGemini. Margins went the other way: non-GAAP gross margin of 59.3% against 60.5% a year earlier, with the Q3 guide at 59–60%. Still a GAAP loss — $6.7m, or $0.15 a share — against $8.2m of non-GAAP net income, on $272.3m of cash.

FY26 rev $390.7m Growth +37.2% FY27e +10–15% Q2 FY27 rev $108.1m Design wins 15+

20 October: +0.73% to $63.22 on 0.62 times average volume, and this time the sector went the other way. The PHLX Semiconductor index fell 0.29% the same session, so seven tenths of a per cent against it is the first move on this card in a fortnight that beta does not account for — and seven tenths of a per cent on well under average turnover is not a deal being priced either. A third reported bidder entered the sales process last week, after the 31 July Financial Times report of NXP talks and the 9 October Qualcomm speculation. Both October items trace to unverified market alerts repeated by aggregators, no named party has filed or said anything, and one of them characterises the process as near completion, which is a claim about a contest none of the parties has acknowledged. They are carried here as circulating talk. This card’s standing read was that Ambarella’s falls are sector beta with the robotics line doing none of the work; applied to a rise, the same test gives the same answer.

WatchRobotics revenue disclosed as its own line — and Q2 did not do it. “Physical AI” now appears in the serviceable-market framing, but there is still no robotics number to hold anyone to, so this name remains a narrative read rather than a volume read. Then the tape did something the disclosure did not explain. Ambarella rose 8.4% to $68.80 on 9 September, the largest single move on this page in weeks and its highest close since 31 August. The sequence is worth recording, because the obvious attribution is wrong: the stock opened flat at $63.07 against a $63.48 previous close, ran roughly 10% in the first thirty minutes to $70.28 by 10:00, then faded to $66.43 by 13:00 — before the Citi appearance began at 13:55 — and closed at $68.80 on heavy final-hour volume. The move was made in the opening half-hour, hours ahead of the only scheduled event of the day, and the stock actually fell through the appearance itself. It was not a sector move either: the semiconductor ETFs added 0.7% and 0.1%, and NXP, still the reported suitor, closed lower. No company announcement accompanied it — and a sixth of it came back the next session, −1.4% to $67.87 on 10 September, against a semiconductor index down 2.7%. On 11 September it did nothing at all, a single cent lower at $67.86, while the semiconductor index rose 1.8% — the one name on this page that joined neither the rare-earth selling nor the chip rebound. Then on 14 September the whole unexplained 9 September gain came back at once, −5.7% to $63.98, its worst session since 16 July and within fifty cents of the 8 September close it started from; 15 September then steadied it, +0.6% to $64.33 — before 16 September took it to $62.77, down 2.4%, its lowest close since 17 July. This time the attribution is easy and it is not about robots: public calls from several AI-lab executives for a slower pace of frontier development took the semiconductor complex down with them — SOXX −5.6%, Nvidia −3.4%, Broadcom −4.8%, AMD −4.4% — and Ambarella tracked the sector almost exactly. That is the useful fact about this position. On the way up, its 9 September move was idiosyncratic and unexplained; on the way down it was pure sector beta. That last session broke the pattern and was worth marking — the semiconductor index rose 0.6% on 16 September while Ambarella fell 2.4% — and then three sessions ran the other way just as hard: +6.6% to $66.91 on 17 September, the day after the Federal Reserve's first hike since 2023, −1.1% to $66.15 on 18 September, and +4.1% to $68.85 on 21 September with SOXX up 4.9% on AI optimism ahead of the 24 September state dinner — its highest close since 31 August. Three sessions, +9.7%, and again not a word from the company. It gave most of that back at once, −2.6% to $67.06 on 22 September, then steadied, +0.8% to $67.62 on 23 September — the only name on this page to rise on a session that took the whole minerals tier down — then added +3.3% to $69.86 on 24 September, and then +4.0% to $72.68 on 25 September, its highest close since 21 August. Neither had a company announcement attached, and the second is worth one line of method: the obvious candidate — the Developer Zone expansion on Google Cloud, with the Gemini Enterprise tooling, the ZEDEDA fleet integration and the Ultralytics YOLO collaboration — is dated 15 September 2026, seven sessions earlier, and aggregator write-ups published on the 25th that place it vaguely “in September” are how a stale release gets re-read as a same-day cause. The sector took about a quarter of it, SOXX +1.2%. Which settles the read on this position: down it was sector beta, up it is sector beta, and the robotics line inside it is doing none of the work in either direction. The next session took all of that back and then some. On 28 September Ambarella fell 5.5% to $68.68 against SOXX −2.1% and SMH −1.1% — again roughly three times the sector, again with nothing published by the company, and this time in the opposite direction, which is the cleanest possible confirmation of the read above: whatever is moving this position is not the robotics line and is not company news. 29 September then did nothing at all with it, +0.1% to $68.73 against a semiconductor complex up 1.2%, so the name-specific leg was neither extended nor taken back. Three more sessions did very little either way: +1.1% to $69.51 on 30 September, +1.1% to $70.30 on 1 October and −2.4% to $68.65 on 2 October, which gives back the two days before it and leaves the name roughly where the 28 September fall put it. That left Ambarella, as of 2 October, 9.2% higher over a month on a base sitting on 4 September's $62.89, 29.0% off its high, with a twelve-month column that fell seven and a half points on the 22 September session purely because the year-ago base rolled onto a +7.1% day, recovered to −12.9%, and then read −20.3% after another base step. It remains the only tier-one name whose drawdown is set by the AI trade rather than by industrial demand. Then 9 October broke the pattern this card has spent six weeks establishing, and it took a rumour to do it: +7.22% to $67.43 on 2.02m shares, the heaviest volume in a month, against SOXX −0.7% and SMH −0.6%. Up was sector beta and down was sector beta; this was neither. The cause in circulation is a Betaville “uncooked” alert, that outlet’s lowest-confidence tier, putting Qualcomm with advisers on a possible bid and Ambarella with bankers on talks involving Qualcomm and NXP, described as “at an advanced stage”. Nothing there is confirmed and none of the three companies has commented. What is on the record is the Financial Times report of 31 July 2026 that NXP was in talks at above $3bn, the session that carried the stock +16.1% to $86.00. So this position now carries a second rumoured suitor and still no disclosure, and the M&A overhang has become the dominant term in its price rather than the robotics line. The CPI session then took it back down: −4.42% to $61.46 on 14 October, its lowest close since 23 April, on 0.88 times average volume against SOXX −4.50% and SMH −3.98%, which is the sector almost exactly and is the read this card has settled on. 15 October then added 3.08% to $63.35 on average volume, rising while the semiconductor indices fell again, which is the first session in a while that the sector read does not cover. 16 October put the sector read back in charge: −2.60% to $61.70 on 1.57 times average volume, against SOX −3.83%, SOXX −4.14% and SMH −3.41%, so roughly two thirds of its sector in a week the Associated Press records as the worst since June for the S&P and the Nasdaq. On the current close the name reads −1.7% over four weeks against a 16 September base of $62.77, −12.9% year to date, −26.6% over twelve months against a 16 October 2025 base of $84.09, and 36.2% off its high, still the narrowest drawdown in tier one after Nabtesco. Ambarella is still the name closest to breaking robotics out, which would make it the cleanest read on real humanoid volume anywhere on this list — the next chance is Q3, in December, assuming it is still independent enough to report one.

03 Claim audit — the posts, and the coverage
Checks out

Nabtesco operating profit rose 60% year over year

Correct. FY2025 operating profit +60.3% to ¥20.7bn on revenue of ¥307.9bn.

Checks out

Ambarella's CV7 launched at CES 2026 for on-robot perception

Correct. Announced 5 January 2026, an 8K edge AI vision SoC explicitly targeting robotics and industrial automation.

Checks out

MP Materials revenue jumped 89% to $108.5m

Correct and current. Q2 2026, reported 7 August — up from $57.4m, with NdPr output +41% and adjusted EBITDA turning positive.

Half right

Schaeffler is signing partnerships with multiple humanoid makers

True — Hexagon Robotics and Humanoid, both confirmed. But the ticker given, SFHLF, is SAF-Holland, a truck-parts supplier. Schaeffler is SHA0.DE or ADR SFFLY. Buying the quoted ticker buys the wrong company.

Half right

Nidec has ¥2.6 trillion in annual revenue and the scale to dominate

The revenue figure is right (the post's "$2.6 trillion yen" is a units error — it is ~$17bn). Omitted: an accounting investigation opened in September 2025 whose final report landed on 17 April 2026 and whose restatements are still not filed, results delayed again on 5 August 2026, a separate quality-misconduct investigation whose report was published on 4 September 2026 and which found falsified test results and shipments of unauthorised items across multiple bases (though no material financial impact), a shareholder demand on 5 August that directors be pursued for liability, and a second, joint demand from multiple shareholders on 20 August.

Stale

"Breaking: the Pentagon bought a $400,000,000 stake in America's only rare earth mine"

Real, but announced 10 July 2025 — thirteen months before the post. The DoD preferred-stock purchase plus warrant took it to ~15% of MP on an as-converted basis. It is not news, and it is already in the price.

Wrong

Yaskawa's operating profit rose roughly 70% in its most recent fiscal year

Inverted. For FY ended February 2026, operating profit fell more than 5%, with pre-tax and net profit down more. The ~70% figure resembles the forward net-profit guidance for FY2/27, not a delivered result.

Wrong

USA Rare Earth has commercial production expected by 2028

Out of date by two years on the plant, though this page over-corrected in the other direction and has now fixed it. USAR commissioned its Phase 1a magnet line at Stillwater in Q2 2026 and says it has commenced commercial production, guiding to 600 mtpa by end-Q4 2026 — so the 2028-style timeline belongs to the Round Top mine, not to the magnet plant, and the post conflates two separate assets. But commissioning is not selling: the company states it has “not commenced sales of neo magnets.” See the dedicated row below.

Overstated

Perpetua controls the only major domestic reserve of antimony

Stibnite is the largest known US antimony resource and is expected to cover ~35% of US demand in its first six years, so the thrust is fair. Omitted: it is predominantly a gold mine — ~4.8Moz reserves, ~450koz a year — and first production is 2029. Antimony goes into flame retardants and munitions, not magnets.

Out of date

Lynas is now building a US processing facility to fill the gap

It is not currently building one. On 16 March 2026 the US government redirected the US$96m allocated to the Seadrift, Texas heavy rare-earth plant into a four-year agreement to buy Lynas product instead. The genuine 2026 development is that Lynas became the first commercial producer of separated dysprosium and terbium outside China.

Wrong

"Trump just signed a 15% tariff on Chinese materials"

The 6 August 2026 Section 232 proclamation puts a 15% tariff on polysilicon and its derivatives — a solar and semiconductor input, with minimum import prices attached, effective December. It is not a rare-earth tariff and not a broad materials tariff. It has essentially no bearing on any of the five minerals names listed under it.

Not investable

Proterial listed among "publicly traded material & magnet producers"

Proterial has been private since October 2022, when a Bain Capital-led consortium completed a ~$7.5bn take-private of Hitachi Metals and the shares were delisted. Three of the six magnet names in that summary — Proterial, Niron and Noveon — cannot be bought at all, and a fourth, Arnold, only through its parent. Screening lists routinely mix public and private companies without flagging it.

Overtaken

"Ambarella beats Q2 EPS, revenue in line — shares edge higher" (3 Sep 2026)

The beat is right: $108.1m against $107.75m expected, non-GAAP EPS $0.18 against $0.17. The share-price half was written off the first post-market prints and did not survive the evening. Ambarella opened the extended session at $64.50, up 1.8% on a $63.38 close, then gave the whole move back to finish at $61.24 — down 3.4%. A second wire, filed later, ran the opposite headline. Neither is a forecast; they are the same session read at different minutes, and only one of them is still true. Reaction headlines pinned to a single early print are not evidence of how a print was received.

Overtaken

"Japan Stock Market Today, September 8: Nikkei 225 gains 0.4% while Topix falls 0.6%"

A mid-session snapshot filed as the day's market report. The index was at 66,615 when the piece was written; it closed at 65,269.33, down 1.70% — so the headline has the day the wrong way round by more than two points. The article's own list of fallers was already arguing with it: Murata −4.8%, Taiyo Yuden −5.4%, Toyota −3.2%, Sony −2.7% against a supposedly rising index. It matters here because four of the six tier-one names price in Tokyo, and the index print is the tape their moves get read against. This is the second such figure this page has had to correct — the first was 19 August's widely repeated "Nikkei −2.64%" against an actual −3.16% — which is why index moves are checked against the index's own close and not against the coverage of it.

Context missing

"Trump's administration is cutting China out of the US materials supply chain"

Directionally real, but the operative deadline is 1 January 2027, when defence sourcing rules bar Chinese-origin NdFeB magnets, tungsten and tantalum across the supply chain. That is a defence-procurement rule, not a commercial-robotics one — a humanoid built for a warehouse is not covered.

Half right

“Rare earth stocks tumble on U.S.–China thaw hopes: USA Rare Earth sinks 4%, MP Materials drops 5%” (10 Sep 2026)

One fault stands; the other this page has had to withdraw. The figures are a mid-session snapshot filed as the day's move — the piece is stamped 12:41pm ET, and by the close USA Rare Earth was down 5.98% to $16.04 and MP 5.49% to $51.32. That half is still wrong. On the cause, this page overreached. It argued the driver was purely a rates event — August producer prices a tenth above forecast, a $6bn Treasury buyback under what dealers had positioned for, the ten-year at 4.94%, silver −5.3%, the gold miners −3.5% — and that a summit date fixed since 23 July could not be news on the day. The macro leg was real and is not in question. The next session settled the rest: on 11 September the whole complex reversed, the S&P up 0.86%, gold up 0.6% and the gold miners up 1.1%, and the rare-earth names fell again regardless — REMX −2.6%, USA Rare Earth −3.0%, MP −1.6%, Lynas −2.2%. A liquidation that has already reversed cannot explain a second day of selling. So there is a sector-specific leg, it outlived the macro one, and ruling the coverage's driver out altogether was wrong. What survives is the narrower lesson, and it cuts both ways: a mid-session print is not a close, and a same-day cause asserted without a same-day disclosure is inference rather than evidence — including when the inference is this page's own.

Overtaken

“Nikkei 225 Falls Today, September 14: Japanese Benchmark Drops 1.7%” (14 Sep 2026)

The third mid-session index print this page has had to correct, and the second from the same outlet. The Nikkei 225 closed at 63,492.99, down 0.81%. The 1.7% figure — and the “below 63,000” and “six-week low” framing attached to it — belongs to the opening half-hour: the index bottomed at 62,810.29 at 09:25 and then spent the whole afternoon between 63,300 and 63,600. The piece is stamped 10:04 IST, about two hours before the Tokyo close, and its own third paragraph contradicts the headline, putting the index “around 63,364 points, down approximately 1.01%”. A Reuters-sourced wrap the same day carried 62,979.17 and −1.61%, also a morning level. The close is corroborated twice over: the two Tokyo-listed Nikkei 225 ETFs, 1321.T and 1330.T, fell 0.59% and 0.69%, which no 1.6% index day produces. It matters more than the arithmetic: four of the six tier-one names price in Tokyo, and “flat against an index down 0.8%” is a different observation from “outperformed an index down 1.7% by a point”. Always in the same direction — the mid-session number is the more dramatic one, and it is the one that gets filed.

Wrong

“Nikkei 225 Today, September 15: Japan Stock Market Rises 0.4% Above 63,700 As Tech Stocks Rebound” (15 Sep 2026)

The fourth mid-session index print this page has had to correct, and the third from the same outlet — two of them on consecutive sessions. The Nikkei 225 closed at 63,484.10, down 8.89 points, −0.01%. Flat, not up 0.4%, and the direction is wrong as well as the size. The piece is stamped 09:55:02 IST, which is 13:25 in Tokyo, two hours and five minutes before the 15:30 close, and its body is explicit about what it is quoting: the index “stood at 63,735, up 242 points or 0.38%”. The index did trade there; it gave the whole gain back by the bell. The two Tokyo-listed Nikkei 225 ETFs settle it exactly as before — 1321.T closed −0.03% and 1330.T −0.12%, which no +0.4% index day produces. A second aggregator carried the same session as 63,850 and +0.56%, also a level from before the close. Four of these now, from three different filers, and the failure mode has never once varied: an intraday quote is published under a headline that describes the day. For a page where four of the six tier-one names price in Tokyo, the index a reader is handed decides whether “flat” counts as strength or weakness — and on 15 September the honest answer was that Tokyo did nothing at all.

Wrong

“Nabtesco announced the acquisition of Harmonic Drive Systems, strengthening its precision gear portfolio for humanoid robot actuators”

No such transaction exists, and the truth runs the other way. The two companies did integrate their strain-wave gear businesses into a US joint venture in 2006, and Nabtesco took Harmonic Drive to equity-method affiliate status in 2008 — but Nabtesco dissolved that relationship in 2021, removing Harmonic Drive from its equity-method affiliates and booking a valuation gain on the shares. Both remain separately listed in Tokyo today; 6324.T and 6268.T are the two largest positions on this page's tier one and they are not related parties. Neither company has filed anything resembling a merger, and the tape agrees: Harmonic Drive traded +0.3% on the day the claim was circulating, which is not what a takeover of a ¥500bn company looks like. The claim traces to a single market-research “forecast report” page, which carries a second invented event alongside it — a Yaskawa–Siemens tie-up to co-develop servo gear reducers, for which neither company has issued a release. Two fabricated corporate actions on one page is a source-quality signal, not a pair of unlucky errors. It matters here because the whole structure of tier one assumes these are independent suppliers: if the gear duopoly had consolidated, the diversification argument on this page would be wrong.

Misattributed

“Nidec faces potential write-downs amounting to ¥250bn ($1.6bn) as a result” of the quality investigation (Sept 2026)

The number is real; the attribution is not, and the two Nidec investigations are being welded together. Nidec's 4 September quality report states the opposite of this on its own terms: its evaluation of individual matters “revealed no issue with any material impact on the Company's consolidated and other financial statements.” The ¥250bn belongs to the separate accounting strand, where Nidec discloses it not as a write-down taken but as an amount subject to examination for possible additional impairment, mainly on automotive-related goodwill and fixed assets. The figure genuinely booked from that strand is a ¥160.7bn expected reduction in consolidated net assets. So a contingent exposure under review in one investigation is being reported as a realised write-down caused by the other. The confirmed count from the quality report is 844 cases over about a decade, mostly unapproved changes to materials and processes, with falsified tests and country-of-origin mislabelling among them. Both strands matter here — but one is a governance problem with a filing deadline, and the other is a ¥250bn question mark over the automotive book, and a reader who merges them gets the size of neither right.

Overstated

“USA Rare Earth began filling customer orders for sintered NdFeB magnets at Stillwater in Q2 2026” — a claim this page itself carried

Commissioned, yes. Selling, no — and the company says so twice. The Q2 10-Q filed 10 August 2026 states that the Stillwater facility “has recently been commissioned and has commenced commercial production; however, we have not begun generating revenue from sintered neodymium-iron-boron (‘NdFeB’) permanent magnets.” The risk-factor supplement filed on 15 September 2026 is blunter still: Stillwater and Blacksburg “are under development and are not yet completed, we have not commenced sales of neo magnets,” and “we have not realized any revenues to date from the sale of neo magnets, critical minerals or rare earth minerals.” The quarter's $5.8m of revenue, which reads on this page and elsewhere as evidence of magnet sales, is nothing of the kind: the 10-Q attributes it “all” to Less Common Metals, the Cheshire subsidiary acquired in November 2025, and its own disaggregation note says every dollar of company revenue “is derived from sales of casting and strip casting” — booked at a gross loss of $1.6m. So the correct statement is narrow: a magnet line exists, is commissioned and is producing; no magnet has been sold, and the 600 mtpa figure is guidance for end-Q4 2026 rather than an achieved run-rate. This page had the stronger version in three places and has corrected all of them. It matters because USAR is one of only two names here that make finished magnets, and the entire tier-two case rests on whether ex-China magnet tonnage is arriving or merely announced.

Context missing

“The robotics basket's correlation to REMX is 0.41” — this page, through 16 September 2026

The figure was real but under-specified, and under-specified is not reproducible. On the stated window — 104 ISO-week-aligned weekly returns to the week ended 11 September 2026, primary listings throughout — an equal-weighted basket rebalanced weekly, meaning the mean of the six names' weekly returns, gives 0.3889. The same six names held without rebalancing give 0.4068. Both bucketing methods agree to four decimal places on each, so this is not a data problem; it is two different definitions of “equal-weighted basket,” and the page never said which it meant. The ambiguity surfaced because the published figure could not be rebuilt from the method note: swept across window lengths from 100 to 106 returns and end weeks 36 to 38, the rebalanced construction stays inside 0.363–0.398 and never reaches 0.41. A third check found a related slip — a two-year daily request yields at most 103 weekly returns, not the 104 this page claimed. This row then recorded that the window “now comes from a three-year request”, and on 6 October 2026 that part was itself shown to be false: the published figures reproduce only at 103 returns, so the stated fix was never in the numbers. The window was 103 returns and the page was corrected to say so throughout. This row then claimed it was 104 as of the 16 October window, on the reasoning that a Saturday run can count a week whose trading has finished, and that too was wrong: a two-year request rolls forward at both ends, so a week gained at the close of the sample is a week lost at the start of it. The aligned count held at 104 closes and 103 returns, capped by Schaeffler’s Xetra line, the shortest of the fifteen series. Corrected again on the 19 October run, across the chart subtitles, the two table captions and the method note, which were the places still carrying 104. The page publishes the weekly-rebalanced figure, 0.39, and names the construction. No conclusion changes at either value; what changes is that a reader can now reproduce it.

Wrong

“Japan’s JP225 rose to 65,665 points on 24 September 2026, gaining 0.99%”

That is a late-session print, not a close, and the distinction cost roughly a quarter of the day’s reported gain. The Nikkei 225 closed 65,513.99 on 24 September, +0.76% and 495.04 points above 18 September’s 65,018.95 — verified two ways, from the daily bar whose quote metadata is stamped 15:45 JST, and from the five-minute series whose final print is 15:30 at the same 65,513.99 with previousClose at 65,018.95. The index was indeed near 65,650–65,680 at 15:10–15:25 and reached 66,249.11 intraday, +1.89%; the closing auction then took about 130 points out in the last five minutes. This is the second Nikkei figure to fail this check, after a press report of −2.64% on 19 August against an actual −3.16%, and the third instance on this page of a widely-quoted number turning out to be a continuous-trading print rather than a settlement. Check an index against the index, and check it at its close.

Wrong

“Japan shares lower at close of trade; Nikkei 225 down 4.77%” (15 Oct 2026)

The eighth Nikkei index figure this page has had to correct for being a print taken before the bell, and the smallest of the eight, which is why it is worth being precise about what is wrong with it. The Nikkei 225 closed at 64,425.95, down 3,318.34 points or 4.90%, and that figure is not this page’s reconstruction: it is what the index provider’s own daily table publishes for 15 October. The article says in terms “at the close in Tokyo, the Nikkei 225 declined 4.77%”, and −4.77% is a level the index held at 15:20, where the five-minute series prints 64,507.56, ten minutes before the bell. The closing auction then took roughly 82 points out. The quoted level that travels with the piece, 64,510.00 on −3,234.29, comes from a live-updating sidebar widget rather than the body, and it is internally consistent with −4.77% while being inconsistent with the settlement. Two independent routes give the close as the provider does: the daily bar whose quote metadata is stamped 15:45:03 JST, and the five-minute series whose final print at 15:30 is the same 64,425.95 against a previousClose of 67,744.29. A CFD-based tracker carried the same session as 64,795 and −4.35%, further from the cash close still, and it is a contract rather than the index. The honest qualification is that this one does not change the read. −4.77% and −4.90% tell the same story about the same day, which several of the earlier cases did not: a 1.7% headline on a 0.8% session and a +0.4% headline on a flat one both inverted the meaning outright. What is identical is the mechanism, and on this index alone it has now failed the same way eight times, from 19 August through 8, 14 and 15 September, 24 and 30 September and 6 October to here: a continuous-trading print published under a headline that says “at the close”. For a page where six of its listed names price in Tokyo, the index a reader is handed sets the baseline every one of them is measured against, so it gets checked against the index, at its close, every run.

Context missing

“China rare earth magnet exports drop 21% before trade talks” (circulating 21–22 September 2026)

The 21% is real and the framing is not: it is US-bound shipments only. China exported 512 tonnes of rare-earth permanent magnets to the United States in August, down from 647 tonnes in July, on customs data released 20 September. China’s total magnet exports that month were 5,010 tonnes, down 6% month on month and 18% year on year. Dropping “to the US” turns a 6% decline into a 21% one and makes a bilateral licensing signal read as a collapse in global supply — a distinction that matters directly to tier two, because the US-bound figure is the one the scarcity thesis rests on and the global figure is the one magnet prices respond to. The underlying article states the scope correctly in its first sentence; the syndicated headline does not. The same piece dates the Trump–Xi meeting to 25 September, which is a day late: Xi’s state visit ran 23–25 September and the leaders met on the 24th.

Misattributed

“Critical Metals Surges 25% as Greenland Security Pact Puts Tanbreez Rare Earth Permit in Focus; USA Rare Earth Climbs 6%, MP Materials Rises 4%” (21 September 2026)

The session is real, the attribution is loose and the two figures are intraday prints. Trump announced on 18 September an agreement with Denmark and Greenland giving the United States “permanent control over security” on the island, and the rare-earth complex was bid when New York reopened on Monday. But USA Rare Earth owns nothing in Greenland: its assets are Round Top in West Texas, the Stillwater magnet line in Oklahoma, the Blacksburg site in South Carolina, Less Common Metals in Cheshire, a minority stake in Carester in France and Serra Verde in Goiás, Brazil. A security treaty over Greenland changes none of them, so a nine-per-cent move in USAR is sector momentum on a policy headline, not exposure being repriced — and treating it as the latter is the same error this page's whole tier-two section exists to refuse. The figures are wrong too, in the ordinary way: measured on closes, USAR rose 9.2% to $16.78 and MP 5.8% to $50.00, against the “6%” and “4%” in the headline. Those are prints taken while the session was still open, published as the day's move. This page prices the last completed close for exactly this reason.

Context missing

“Over the past four weeks REMX is 11.0% lower while the basket has fallen 5.2%” — this page, through 17 September 2026

The second number cannot be rebuilt, which makes it the same fault as the 0.41 correlation one row up, in a different column. On the figures that run published — Tokyo at 17 September, Xetra and the US at 16 September — an equal-weighted basket of the six tier-one names gives −8.4% on a 30-day lookback, −5.2% on the 28-day lookback the table's 1m column actually uses, −4.5% as a geometric mean of the same six ratios and −10.6% as a weekly-rebalanced four-week compound. None of them is 5.2%, and the REMX figure it was set against was computed on a 28-day lookback while the tables alongside it used 30 days. So two numbers presented as a comparison were measured over different windows, and one of them on no stated construction at all. The page now uses a single stated construction for it — the mean of the six names' own 1m cells, equal-weighted and unrebalanced, each on its own venue's four-week (28-day) lookback — which on the current window puts the basket at −2.7% against REMX's −13.6% on the same basis. The conclusion is unchanged and in fact strengthened; what changes is that both halves are now measured the same way and can be checked against the table.

Wrong

“Nidec has disclosed nothing at all since 4 September” — this page, accurate from 6 September, false from 10, repeated to 25 September 2026

True when written, false when repeated, and the thing it was missing was the most consequential disclosure on this name since the quality report. On 9 September 2026 a shareholder instituted a derivative action in the Kyoto District Court against two former directors, founder Shigenobu Nagamori and Hiroshi Kobe, demanding they pay the company ¥28,730,558,300 plus delinquent charges under Article 462, paragraph 1 of the Companies Act over the treasury-share buybacks of September 2022 and February–March 2023 and the December 2022 midterm dividend. Nidec disclosed it on 10 September, at which point this page's standing line stopped being accurate. It was nonetheless carried for another fifteen days, and an argument was built on it — that the stock was being repriced purely on interpretation because there was no new information — while the largest single gain anywhere on the page, +5.6% on 10 September, landed on the day the suit became public. The conclusion happens to survive, because a ¥28.7bn claim against two individuals is not what moved a ¥2,700 stock up 5.6% and nothing in the tape suggests it was read at all. But it survives by luck rather than by method: from 10 September the premise was false and was checkable on the company's own disclosure page. The lesson is specific to negative claims. “Nothing has been disclosed” is not a background condition that stays true until someone notices otherwise; it is an assertion about the record with a silent expiry date, and restating it on day fifteen is a new claim requiring the same check as on day one. This page audits press coverage for exactly this and had been reprinting its own unverified line while doing so.

Wrong

“The only analyst action on the tape is a week old — Jefferies cutting its target to €8.70 while keeping a Buy” — this page, on the Schaeffler session of 24 September, published 25 September 2026

Wrong on the date, and the date was the whole load-bearing part. Jefferies cut Schaeffler to €8.70 from €9.45 on 23 September 2026 — one session before the −6.2% move, not a week. The error has a clear mechanism: there were two notes from the same analyst, Vanessa Jeffriess, and this page merged them. On 5 August 2026 Jefferies went €10.45 to €9.45; on 23 September 2026 it went €9.45 to €8.70. The target quoted came from the September note, the age from the August one, and the two spliced together produced a catalyst that could be set aside as stale. It was not stale. The September note kept a Buy, said Schaeffler’s own reduction of its 2028 targets had damaged credibility, credited the company with self-help potential, and called the non-automotive robotics business the most attractive investment story in the sector. Against the Xetra line the sequence is unambiguous: −2.24% to €6.97 on 23 September, the session of the note, which contemporaneous German coverage headlined as the stock falling on the Jefferies cut; −6.17% to €6.54 on 24 September; +1.38% to €6.63 on 25 September. So two claims on this page need separating. The conclusion that no disclosure explains the 6.2% session survives — a one-day-old target cut does not ordinarily deliver its damage on the second day, and nothing else was published. But the 23 September fall, which this page attributed to the dollar-led metals liquidation that took the minerals tier down, is far better explained by the note: a German bearing and auto-parts supplier is not a rare-earth proxy, and that attribution was co-timing dressed as cause. The failure mode is worth naming separately from the Nidec row above. That one was a negative claim repeated past its expiry; this one is a dismissal — the relevant item was found, misdated, and discarded for being old. Both come from the same habit of inheriting a characterisation instead of re-reading the source, and on a page whose method note insists every figure be dated, an analyst note is a dated document like any other.

Wrong

“Novonix 3.4% to $2.801” — this page, on the session of 23 September, published 24 September 2026

The price is right, the comparison is not. Novonix closed at $2.85 on 22 September and $2.801 on 23 September, so the session was −1.7%. The adjacent figure in the same sentence, Lynas easing 2.6% to $10.06, checks out exactly, which is what makes this one worth recording rather than shrugging at — the arithmetic was being done correctly one clause earlier. Two corroborations put the base beyond doubt: this page's own tier-two table published $2.85 as Novonix's last close on the 23 September run, and the vendor, whose 22 September daily bar then went missing for four days across seven US tickers, has since backfilled that session at exactly $2.85. The rest of the claim survives — $2.801 was indeed the lowest close since 9 September's $2.74. What does not survive is any account of where −3.4% came from. It implies a prior close of about $2.90, and there is no $2.90 anywhere in the series: 18 September was $2.885, 21 September $2.84, 22 September $2.85. Every other row in this audit that concerns this page's own work names a mechanism — a merged pair of analyst notes, a negative claim past its expiry, a base rolled without noticing. This one has none, and that is the finding. A figure with a traceable bad method can be guarded against by fixing the method; a figure that matches no input at all can only be guarded against by recomputing every percentage from the two closes it sits between, which is now the rule for the prose as well as for the tables.

Overtaken

“A board resolution has been passed to dismiss President Mitsuya Kishida”, and Michio Kaida named as incoming CEO — aggregated coverage, 29 September 2026

Both halves have now happened, and the row stays because one of them was still false when it was published. Nidec’s only statement on the matter at the time, released 28 September 2026, said the opposite in terms: it was “true that change in executive members and a large-amount impairment are being discussed,” but “none of them has been decided by the Company at this moment.” Nikkei’s 29 September report, the source for Kishida going, named no successor at all. Kaida was a real and plausible internal candidate — First Senior Vice President, and vice-chair of the committee running the company’s reform programme — which is exactly what made the claim durable rather than obviously wrong. It was then confirmed on 29 September, when an extraordinary board meeting accepted Kishida’s resignation and appointed Kaida president and chief executive. So the aggregators were about a day early rather than inventing it, and that is the useful lesson rather than a vindication: a claim that turns out true was still not established when it was asserted, and nothing in the 29 September record distinguished it from the ones that do not land. One detail circulating with it is wrong on its own terms: Kaida is described in places as Nidec’s chief technology officer, and the company’s own release identifies him by the First Senior Vice President role and the reform committee, not that title.

Wrong

“REMX −0.4% to $66.66, a fourth consecutive fall” — this page, on the session of 25 September, published 28 September 2026

The price, the percentage and the “lowest close since 31 July” all check out; the streak does not. REMX fell on 23 September (−3.11% to $68.76), 24 September (−2.66% to $66.93) and 25 September (−0.40% to $66.66) — three sessions, not four. The session before them, 22 September, closed up 1.0% at $70.97, and that base is not in doubt from either direction: it is the figure this page reconstructed from previousClose when the 22 September US bar went missing across seven tickers, and the figure the vendor backfilled to the cent when the hole healed. So the error is not a data artefact and has no reconstructable mechanism beyond counting a streak forward from the previous run's copy rather than reading it off the series. It is corrected by the tape rather than by this page: 28 September's −3.3% to $64.47 is the fourth consecutive fall, and it is the lowest close since 6 November 2025. A run-length is a claim about a series, and like the negative-disclosure claim two rows up it has to be re-derived each time it is repeated rather than incremented.

Wrong

“Nidec surged 6.2% to ¥2,389” and “the Nikkei climbed 2.10%” — market coverage of the 30 September 2026 Tokyo session

Two figures, one mechanism. Nidec closed at ¥2,355 on 30 September, +4.67% on the ¥2,250 of the day before; the session high was ¥2,398. The Nikkei closed at 66,753.72, +1.94%, with a high of 66,946.14. Both quoted numbers sit between the close and the high of the instrument they describe, which is the signature of an intraday print carried into a report as the day’s move. Neither is a rounding difference: ¥2,389 is a level the stock traded at and did not settle at, and 2.10% resolves to about 66,856, likewise inside the range. Checked against the index and the stock themselves rather than against each other, because a wire figure and an aggregator figure repeating it are one source. This is not the first Nikkei percentage on this page to have been taken before the bell, and the check is the same every time: a move is a claim about a settlement, so price it off the close or do not price it.

Wrong

“Nidec stock slumped 17.2% to ¥1,949” and “MP Materials surges 6% to $48.29” — market coverage of the 1 October Tokyo session and the 30 September US session

The same error as the row above it, one run later, on two venues at once, which is why it gets its own row rather than a footnote. Nidec closed at ¥2,100 on 1 October, −10.8% on the ¥2,355 of the day before, having traded as low as ¥1,888. ¥1,949 is neither of those: it sits between the close and the low, and the report that carries it names the ¥1,888 low separately in the same paragraph, so the 17.2% is being offered as the day’s result rather than as an intraday reading. MP closed at $47.29, +4.1%, with a session high of $48.665; $48.29 was never a settlement, and the quoted +6% and +5.8% resolve to roughly $48.16 and $48.06, both inside the range. Two things are worth separating. The directional reporting is sound in both cases, and on Nidec the widely quoted “as much as 20%” is exactly right against the ¥1,888 low, which this page confirms to the cent from an independent wire report of the same figure. What fails is the settlement. A percentage and a price attached to a named session are a claim about where trading ended, and on both of these names the stock ended somewhere else: Nidec recovered 11.2% off its low into the bell and MP gave back a point and a half off its high. That recovery is not a detail. A reader told Nidec fell 17.2% on an audit disclaimer and a reader told it fell 10.8% are being handed different facts about how the market received the disclaimer, and only one of them is the market’s. The check has not changed and is now stated for the third run: price it off the close, or do not price it.

Wrong

“Lynas shares fell 7.1% to A$12.85” — market coverage of the 1 October 2026 Sydney session

The fourth consecutive run on which this page has had to record the same error, now from a fourth outlet and on a third venue. Lynas closed at A$12.64 on 1 October, −8.60% on the A$13.83 of the day before, in a session that ran a high of A$13.35 and a low of A$12.60. A$12.85 sits inside that range, so it is a level the stock traded through and did not settle at, and the quoted −7.1% resolves to about A$12.85 as well, which makes the two figures one reading rather than two checks. The ADR agrees with the close and not with the report: LYSDY settled −8.85% at $8.75 the same day, and a ratio line and its primary do not both miss by a point and a half in the same direction by accident. What separates this row from the three before it is the sign of the gap. On Nidec and MP the reported move was larger than the settlement, because the quote was taken before a recovery into the bell; here it is a point and a half smaller, because the quote was taken before the last leg down. A reader who takes the published figure therefore understates the market’s reaction to an all-share acquisition that hands 5.9% of the company to the target’s holders, which is precisely the number that deal has to be judged on. The check does not change with the direction of the error: a move is a claim about a settlement, so price it off the close or do not price it.

Wrong

“Nikkei 225: 70,576 (+0.90%)”, and elsewhere 70,650, “+827.47 / +1.18%” and “rose to 70665 points… gaining 1.03%” — coverage of the 6 October 2026 Tokyo session

A fifth consecutive run of the mid-session quote, and the widest spread of versions yet: four distinct numbers for one close, none of which is it. The Nikkei settled at 70,683.98, +737.12 points and +1.05% on the 69,946.86 of 5 October, in a session that ran from 69,813.16 to 70,798.62. A daily market note carries 70,576 and +0.90%. A market-data aggregator carries three more on a single screen, and they disagree with each other before they disagree with the index: a headline value of 70,650, a change of +827.47 points / +1.18%, and prose putting the index at 70,665 for +1.03%. Every one of 70,576, 70,650 and 70,665 sits inside the day’s range, which is the usual signature of a figure read off a live screen. The point change is the more instructive error: +827.47 on the prior close implies about 70,774, so it matches neither of that page’s own levels, and a point change that cannot be reconciled with the level printed beside it is not a rounding difference but two unrelated reads stitched together. This one matters more than a single-stock miss because an index figure is what the day’s session gets described by, and the error understates the move that cleared 70,000 for the first time since 1 July 2026. Price it off the close, or do not price it.

Wrong

“A Nikkei report of final-stage talks to sell Nidec Components to Carlyle… a press report, not a disclosure” — this page, carried from 30 September to 5 October 2026

This page’s own, and the most substantial of the eight it has had to record. The caveat was correct for exactly one session and then stopped being so, which is the harder kind to catch: Nidec’s own release of 1 October 2026 states that the board resolved that day to transfer all 66,302,120 shares of Nidec Components Corporation to TCG2603 Co., Ltd., indirectly owned by an investment fund related to The Carlyle Group, for ¥102,980m, with a contract day of 1 October and a transfer date of 1 December 2026. So from 1 October a verified company disclosure existed, carrying a precise price the press reports rounded to “more than ¥100bn”, while this page went on labelling the transaction unconfirmed through the three runs that followed. The irony is exact and worth keeping: the rule this section applies to everyone else is to verify against the company rather than the wire, and the failure here was checking the wire twice and the company not at all. Two things the correction adds that the press reports did not: the unit earned ¥5,465m of operating profit on ¥32,092m of sales in the year to March 2026 against ¥67,319m of net assets, both down for a third straight year, which prices the deal at about 1.53 times book; and its end markets include collaborative robots, making this the disposal of the most robotics-adjacent sensing business inside a tier-one name on this page. Neither detail was available from the coverage, because neither was in it.

Wrong

“Anchoring a true 104-return window needs a three-year request, and that is how the figures here are built” — this page’s method note, carried from 16 September to 5 October 2026

Also this page’s own, and caught by rebuilding the claim rather than re-reading it. The note correctly identified the trap: a two-year daily request spans 105 ISO weeks including the in-progress one, so excluding that leaves 103 weekly returns, not 104. It then said the page had moved to a three-year request to get a true 104. It had not, or the figures were never recomputed on it. Rebuilt from a three-year request at a genuine 104 returns, the window as it stood when this row was written (ending 2 October 2026) gave basket-to-REMX 0.3670, Lynas 0.6322, Schaeffler-to-basket 0.5991 and Harmonic Drive-to-REMX 0.1581. The figures published against it were 0.3681, 0.6326, 0.5997 and 0.1596, which reproduce at 103 returns and at no other length. So the window has been 103 returns throughout, while four charts, two captions and the note all said 104. The figures themselves were never wrong and no conclusion moves by a thousandth; what was wrong was the description of how they were made, which is the thing this page asks its readers to check it on. The counts have been corrected to 103 everywhere rather than the window changed, because changing it would move every figure on the page to fix a stated number that was the only thing broken. The general lesson is the one this row is the second instance of: an error too small to show up in the output survives every re-read and dies only to a rebuild.

Wrong

“Seagate Tops Toshiba in Bidding for TDK’s HDD Head Unit” — aggregated coverage, 6 October 2026

A sourcing failure rather than an arithmetic one, which makes it the first of its kind in this section. Every other wrong row here is a number read off the wrong instrument or the wrong moment. The underlying Bloomberg report of 6 October describes an auction in progress: Toshiba opened talks in the spring, Seagate bid higher over the summer, several billion dollars, all of it attributed to people it does not name. The aggregated version states the outcome in its headline as settled. Two things were available to contradict it on the day it published. Toshiba told the same outlet that the report was “inconsistent” with its understanding and that no trilateral discussions between Toshiba, TDK and Seagate over the future supply of hard-disk heads had taken place, with Japan Industrial Partners, its owner, saying the same; and neither TDK nor Seagate has commented at all, then or since. So the record holds one unnamed-source report, one on-the-record denial of the process, and no word from either party whose signature a transaction would need. “Tops” is a verdict on a contest none of the three has acknowledged. The denial deserves the same reading, for the record: it is a spokesperson's comment to the outlet that ran the story, not a release or a filing, so it establishes what Toshiba is willing to say rather than what is true. This page priced the session the report caused and wrote in the same paragraph that an auction reported through unnamed sources is not an agreed transaction; the Tokyo session after the denial took 2.70% back off TDK. The check this row adds to the ones above it has nothing to do with closes: before repeating a transaction claim, find the parties who would have to confirm it, and record what they actually said.

Half right

“China’s rare-earth export truce expires November 10 with no renewal in sight” — aggregated coverage, 6 October 2026

This row was published as “Wrong” and that verdict was too strong; it is downgraded on the 20 October run, and the reason is a distinction this page should have drawn the first time. There are two instruments here and they are not the same. MOFCOM Announcement No. 70 of 2025, dated 7 November 2025, suspended Announcements 55 to 58, 61 and 62 until 10 November 2026, and Beijing has published nothing extending, replacing or amending it: trackers reading the ministry’s own 2026 announcement list on 1 October and again on 16 October found it running to Announcement No. 48 with no such notice, and the US has filed no matching extension of its own measure. The 10 January 2027 date comes from Scott Bessent on 23 September 2026 and from a ministry official on 28 September, both describing the political arrangement around the suspension rather than the suspension. So the headline date is the only expiry in force, and “no renewal in sight” is defensible as to the legal text. What the piece still gets wrong is what it leaves out: the stated extension exists, it is the market-moving fact of the period, the same outlet had reported it, and a countdown written as though nothing had been said is not the state of play. The original framing error stands too, because the piece’s presentation — a cliff edge four weeks out — is exactly the scarcity premium this page recorded coming out of the single names on 23 September, when USA Rare Earth fell 6.8% and MP 4.2% on the extension. Reporting the deadline as a live cliff without the stated extension re-sells a premium the market had already taken out, which is a different fault from getting the date wrong, and the one that survives here. Two things the extension genuinely does not cover, and neither is what the piece claims: the April 2025 controls putting seven medium and heavy rare earths under case-by-case licensing remain fully in force, and the separate suspension covering gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials runs to 27 November 2026 on its own clock. The underlying worry is real. It is attached to the wrong date.

Wrong

“Each name on its own venue’s 30-day lookback” — this page’s description of its own 1m column, through 7 October 2026

The column is computed on a 28-day (four-week) lookback, not a 30-day one, and the note has said otherwise since 17 September. This was tested rather than re-read: rebuilt against the ten 1m cells the 7 October run actually published, the 28-day convention reproduces all ten to a tenth of a point and the 30-day convention reproduces one — Schaeffler, and only because both lookbacks happen to land on the same bar. Where they differ they differ by more than the figures this page argues over: Harmonic Drive +13.9% against +11.1%, Yaskawa +9.8% against +6.1%, Nidec −16.4% against −23.0%, six and a half points on the last. The irony is specific. The audit row five above this one exists because a basket figure was quoted against a REMX figure measured over a different window, and the fix it announced named the wrong one of the two conventions it was choosing between — so the construction was standardised correctly and then described incorrectly. No published number moves: the cells were right throughout and the four-week base dates this page keeps narrating were always 28 days back. The labels are corrected throughout, and “four-week” and “28-day” now appear together wherever the lookback is named, so the two cannot drift apart again.

Wrong

“These circumstances led Nidec’s stock to be designated on 28 October 2026 as a security on special alert” — Nidec’s own internal-control improvement page, read 9 October 2026

A primary source contradicting itself on the one date that decides a listing, which makes it the first row here taken from a company’s own disclosure page rather than from coverage of one. The prose dates the designation a year ahead: 28 October 2026 is still in the future. The timeline lower down the same page gives “Oct. 28, 2025 Nidec Corporation’s stock is designated as a security on special alert”, and every entry around it is consistent with 2025, from the 27 June 2025 reporting extension to the 27 April 2026 revised improvement plan. The timeline is right and the prose is wrong, and it is not the only one: the same introduction opens “On September 03, 2026… established an independent third-party committee” against its own Sep. 03, 2025 entry. Two dates, both a year out, both contradicted a few hundred words below. This matters more than a typo normally would because of what hangs off it. The Tokyo Stock Exchange requires the written confirmation of internal management system one year after designation, so the prose date would move Nidec’s delisting examination to October 2027 and erase the only listing-risk deadline on this page. A reader checking the deadline against the company’s own explanation of it would get the wrong year. This page dates it from the timeline, 28 October 2025, which is also what the exchange’s designation notice and contemporaneous reporting carry. The lesson is the one this section least expected to have to write down: a primary source is the right place to check a date, and it is still a document that can be wrong, so the internal consistency of the page you are reading is part of the check.

Wrong

“China Rare Earth Group is in talks to acquire Shenghe Resources, which would put the 3% stake in MP Materials under a Chinese state group” — aggregated coverage, 8 October 2026

The report is real, three weeks old, and was answered on the record by the company it is about; the recirculated version carries the report and not the answer. Reuters reported on 18 September 2026, on sources it does not name, that state-owned China Rare Earth Group was negotiating to buy Shenghe Resources and wanted a controlling stake, which would carry Shenghe’s holdings in foreign companies with it, among them roughly 3% of MP Materials. Shenghe then answered it in a filing to the Shanghai Stock Exchange: its controlling shareholder had confirmed in writing that there are no plans to transfer control to external parties, and the company said it was aware of “false” reports in overseas media. China Rare Earth Group, Shenghe and China’s Ministry of Commerce did not comment, and MP’s standing position is that neither Shenghe nor the Chinese government has any control over its operations. So the record is one unnamed-source report, one exchange-filed denial from the subject of it, and silence from everyone else. That is the same shape as the TDK auction row above and it gets the same treatment, with one difference that runs in the opposite direction to that case: Toshiba’s denial was a spokesperson’s comment to the outlet that ran the story, whereas this one is a stock-exchange filing, which is the strongest form the denial can take. A version that omits it is not reporting the story. Offered as a cause of Thursday’s selling it fails on a second count anyway, the one this page keeps having to apply to this tier: it is dated 18 September, and the session was 8 October.

Wrong

“Ambarella (AMBA) shares rise 5.3% on Qualcomm acquisition speculation” — aggregated coverage of the 9 October 2026 session

The session settled at +7.22%, $62.89 to $67.43. A 5.3% move resolves to about $66.22, a level the stock traded through on its way to a $67.83 high and did not settle at. The figure was true when it was written, as an intraday print, and stopped being true at 16:00 ET; what makes this a row is what happened next. It was syndicated as the session’s move, and the same publisher carried both numbers in two separate pieces about the same day, one headlined 5.3% and one 7.2%, with no indication that the first had been superseded. A reader taking the headline understates by nearly two points the only move in tier one that a takeover rumour has produced, on the one name whose drawdown is set by the AI trade rather than by industrial demand. The rule this breaks is already written down here four times over, for Nidec, MP, Lynas and Novonix: a move is a claim about a settlement, so price it off the close or do not price it. The novelty is only in the mechanism. This is not a stale quote or a misread venue but a live article overtaken by its own subject, which is the failure mode of publishing a percentage before the bell rather than of getting it wrong.

Wrong

“One dated company item existed for the session and it was not a catalyst” — this page, on the Tokyo session of 8 October, published 9 October 2026

There were two, and the one this page missed is much the more consequential. Oasis Management, a holder of about 8% of Nidec, published a letter on 7 October 2026 urging the board to begin a preliminary review of privatization options, with outside directors retaining their own financial advisers and soliciting non-binding proposals from strategic and private-equity buyers in Japan and overseas. Bloomberg reported it the same day and it went out on Business Wire, so it was on the record and findable well before Tokyo opened on 8 October. The entry it belongs in is the one that called Nidec the best relative performer in tier one on the day the gearbox layer de-rated, and read that as a measure of what had already been priced into it. That reading still stands, but it was made without the only piece of news the session actually had: the largest activist on the register asking the board to explore a sale, with the stock trading 3.1% below its previous close intraday. The mechanism is worth naming because it is not this section’s usual one. This was not a bad source, a misread date or an intraday print. It was a negative claim, “one dated company item existed”, of a kind this page has made casually and repeatedly, and which can only be supported by a search complete enough to prove an absence. An absence is the hardest thing to verify and the cheapest thing to assert. The fix is to stop asserting it: this page now reports what it found and not what exists, and “nothing was filed” is from here on a statement about the filing feeds it checked rather than about the world.

Wrong

“Yaskawa said June–August quarter operating profit of ¥136 billion rose approximately 5.8% year-over-year… the full-year operating profit forecast was revised down from ¥600 billion to ¥575 billion… the stock rose 2.0% to ¥4,879” — aggregated coverage of Yaskawa’s first-half results, 13 October 2026

Three errors in one article about a tier-one name, and each is a different species, which is why it earns a row rather than a correction. The scale is wrong by a factor of ten. Yaskawa’s full-year operating-profit forecast was revised from ¥60,000m to ¥57,500m, not from ¥600bn to ¥575bn; ¥600bn is the revenue line, which was revised up from ¥580bn. So the sentence takes the revenue figure, attaches it to operating profit, and reports a raise as a cut. The sign is wrong. First-half operating profit was ¥22,058m, down 5.5% year on year, as both the tanshin and the briefing deck state in terms; “rose approximately 5.8%” inverts the one line that measures the business, and the ¥136bn attached to it is impossible on its face, since a single quarter cannot earn more than twice the full year’s guided profit. And the price is an intraday print. The article is stamped 13 October at 00:06, inside the Tokyo afternoon session; ¥4,879 is indeed +2.0% on the ¥4,783 previous close, and the session settled at ¥4,840, +1.19%. That last one is the fourth time this section has had to record a pre-bell percentage syndicated as a session, after Ambarella, Nidec and the Nikkei, and the arithmetic was right each time; what was wrong was the clock. The reason to spell all three out is that the rating in the same article is real and is carried on the Yaskawa card: Jefferies analyst Sho Fukuhara did upgrade the stock to Hold from Underperform with a ¥5,300 target. An article can be sound on the fact a reader cannot check and wrong on all three they can, which is the argument for reading the filing and not the write-up. Every Yaskawa figure on this page comes from the 9 October tanshin and briefing deck.

Wrong

“Nothing was filed, which is the point… new lows on doubled volume are the market shortening the odds on a deadline rather than reacting to news” — this page, on Nidec’s session of 9 October, published 9 October 2026

The first clause is true and the inference from it is false, and the two are separated by about four days of this page repeating it. Nothing was filed by Nidec on 8 or 9 October. But there was news, it was named, dated and market-moving, and this page reported its absence: UBS cut Nidec to Neutral from Buy on 8 October 2026, analysts Shingo Hirata and Kohei Takahashi taking the price target to ¥2,400 from ¥2,800 and putting their operating-profit forecasts 16% and 22% below consensus for this year and next. Bloomberg reported the stock falling as much as 9.3% on it. Separately R&I cut the issuer rating one notch to A+ and placed it on monitor with negative implications over the impairments. A broker downgrade is not a filing, so the distinction this page drew is a real one and worth keeping; what does not follow from it is “rather than reacting to news”. A sell-side capitulation on a name whose accounts carry a disclaimer of opinion is precisely news, and a 6.07% session with a 9.3% intraday low is what it looks like being priced. The aggravating detail is the timing. On 9 October this page published, in the row directly above, a commitment that “nothing was filed” would from then on be “a statement about the filing feeds it checked rather than about the world” — and then, in the same run, used the absence of a filing to rule out the existence of a cause. The commitment was correct and was broken in the same breath, which suggests the fix is not a resolution but a habit: when a session moves on no disclosure, check the brokers and the rating agencies before concluding there was nothing to react to.

Wrong

“The drawdown column is the one that does not move with the calendar, which is part of why this finding is framed on it” — this page’s Finding 02, carried for weeks and repeated on 13 October 2026

This page’s own, and the one it had most reason to catch, because it was the stated justification for framing a finding on that column. The 52-week high used here is meta.fiftyTwoWeekHigh, and that field’s window is anchored on the request date, not on the venue’s last completed close. On 14 October 2026 the window rolled past the 14 October 2025 session highs onto the 15 October 2025 ones, and three cells moved on the calendar alone: USA Rare Earth’s high fell from $42.00 to $35.92, taking its drawdown cell in 3.3 points to −68.6% on a session its price fell 4.57%; Novonix’s from $31.90 to $27.90; MP’s from $100.25 to $97.00, for a cell four tenths of a point better on a 2.15% fall. The weaker claim survives and is now the one made: the drawdown column rolls less often than the return columns, and when it rolls it is a high coming off the window rather than a base coming on. The stronger claim, that it does not move with the calendar at all, was false every time it was published.

Wrong

“At the close in Tokyo, the Nikkei 225 added 1.66%” — wire coverage of the Tokyo session, published 16 October 2026

The ninth Nikkei index figure this page has had to correct for being a print taken before the bell, from the same outlet as the eighth and on the very next session. It is also the first for which the mechanism can be named to the minute, and the first that indicts this page as well as the filer. The Nikkei 225 closed at 65,324.29, up 898.34 points or 1.39%. The 1.66% is the 15:00 print of 65,493.63, which is +1.657% on the previous close: the quoted figure to two decimal places, not a rounding difference. The Tokyo Stock Exchange extended its afternoon session by thirty minutes on 5 November 2024, so continuous trading now ends at 15:25 and an itayose closing auction settles the market at 15:30. A “close” read at 15:00 is therefore taken before continuous trading has even finished, let alone settled. That is the part this page got wrong too: the row eight above this one dates a Tokyo session against “the 15:00 close”, which has not been the close since November 2024, and it has been corrected to 15:30. Eight of these rows have been written about other people reading the index early while this page carried the wrong closing time in its own copy. The five-minute series shows the whole give-back: 15:00 65,493.63, 15:10 65,401.91, 15:15 65,287.84, 15:30 65,324.29, the last of these matching regularMarketPrice stamped 15:45 JST and the next session’s previousClose. A second aggregator carried 65,605 and +1.83%, a level the index held around 14:35–14:50. Both are afternoon quotes published under a headline describing the day, and both overstate it. The two Tokyo-listed Nikkei 225 ETFs corroborate the direction as before, 1321.T +1.19% and 1330.T +1.13%. Six of the names here price in Tokyo, four of them in tier one, so the index a reader is handed decides whether a 3.68% session in Harmonic Drive counts as leading the market or merely following it. On 16 October it led, and by how much depends entirely on which figure you take: two and a half times a 1.39% index, or two and a quarter times a 1.66% one. Price it off the close, or do not price it.

Wrong

“USA Rare Earth Climbs 4% as Month-Long Selloff Pauses; MP Materials Ticks Up” — with USA Rare Earth at $10.77, MP up 2% at $40.82 and REMX down 0.9% at $55.26, published 15 October 2026

All four figures are mid-session prints filed as the day, and the piece is stamped 1:53pm ET, more than two hours before the bell. At the close USA Rare Earth was up 7.46% at $11.09, nearly double the headline; MP up 4.16% at $41.61, twice its stated move; and REMX down 0.07% at $55.74, flat rather than down nine tenths of a point. The direction is right in all three and the magnitude wrong in all three, understating a session that was still building: the tier was mid-reversal, having traded as low as $9.82 on USA Rare Earth and $38.60 on MP that morning. This is the second mid-session piece from this outlet the section has recorded, after the 10 September snapshot. The aggravating detail is internal: the article’s own live sidebar carried the correct closes, $41.61, $11.09 and $55.74, directly beneath a body contradicting all three. The framing is the second fault. “Month-long selloff pauses” attributes the session to the sector, and the session was not the sector’s: the ten-year yield fell about 10bp to 5.09%, the dollar index 0.54% to 102.00, gold rose 1.79%, the gold miners 4.34%, the junior miners 4.64% and silver 3.39%. A rates-driven bid across the whole metals complex is not a rare-earth event, whatever the rare-earth names did inside it, and the names that did run past the complex were the small ones rather than the large.

Context missing

“Nidec fell 1.04% to ¥1,800 … not a new seller arriving, the bid going away” — this page’s account of the 16 October Tokyo session

The tape facts are exact and the inference was drawn straight over a filing. Nidec published “Nidec Receives an Investigation Report from the Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee” on 16 October, carried on Business Wire at 12:23 AM EDT, which is 13:23 JST: inside the afternoon session, two hours and seven minutes before the 15:30 auction. The Committee, established 13 March 2026, exists to determine whether current and former directors, auditors and vice presidents “bear legal liability, including whether they breached their duties” over the improper accounting, and the release states that Nidec will “deliberate legal actions such as lodging a claim for damages”. On a name whose central question is whether the listing survives October, that is the most consequential document available, and it landed on a session this page characterised as carrying no disclosure. Two things keep this short of a plain Wrong. The numbers check out to the share: 11,851,000 against a twenty-session average of 16,355,065, or 0.72 times. And the market genuinely did not react to it, which the five-minute series settles: ¥1,818 at 12:30, ¥1,806 by 13:15 on that afternoon’s heaviest bar of 160,100 shares, ¥1,805 at 13:20 and still ¥1,805 at 13:25, the bar containing the release, on 46,500 shares, then ¥1,800 by 13:45. No gap, no volume spike, no acceleration; the drift was running before the release and continued at the same rate after it. So the conclusion about the character of the session stands and the method that reached it does not, for the third time in nine days. This audit already carries the Oasis privatization letter, a dated item sitting on the public record and missed because nothing was checked, and the 8 October UBS downgrade, a session declared newsless because no filing existed. This instance is the sharpest of the three, because here there was a filing, in English, on the company’s own feed, on the day, and it was still the absence of a check rather than the absence of a document. The standing fix is narrow and mechanical: before any session on this page is given a character, the disclosure feed of the company it belongs to is read for that date.

Wrong

“Nidec’s board resolved on October 16 to pursue litigation against nine former executives” — an aggregator, 19 October 2026

Wrong on both halves, and the primary document is a page long. Nidec’s release of 16 October, “The Investigation Report Issued by the Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee”, says the company “will consider necessary legal actions such as filing a claim for damages against those directors, etc., and respond swiftly”. Considering is not resolving, and no resolution to litigate sits on Nidec’s disclosure feed. Nor are the nine all former executives: the Committee lists Kazuya Murakami and Hiroyuki Ochiai without that qualifier, and the ninth is a former vice president, a former CFO of the company from May 2022 to March 2026, who was not a director at all and whose liability is framed under the Civil Code and Nidec’s Vice President Regulations rather than the Companies Act. The count of nine is the one part that holds.

Wrong

“Nidec fell 2.8% to 1,760.0 yen on Monday” — a wire, 19 October 2026

An intraday print published as a close. Nidec closed ¥1,789 at the 15:30 JST auction on 19 October, down 0.61% from Friday’s ¥1,800. The session ranged ¥1,749 to ¥1,803, so ¥1,760 was touched on the way through, and −2.8% from ¥1,800 is ¥1,749.6, which is the day’s low rather than its close. The error matters more than the 29 yen: a reader told Nidec fell 2.8% on the session its own committee named nine people as liable in damages would conclude the market traded the news, when the close moved six tenths of a per cent on 0.32 times average volume. Same class as the “Nikkei −2.64%” figure already in this audit, and the same fix: price the venue’s completed close, not a quote taken while it was open.

Wrong

“Neither the redacted Report nor the promised actions has posted” — this page, 17 October 2026

Wrong when it was published. Nidec issued two releases on 16 October: the receipt, which this page carried, and “The Investigation Report Issued by the Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee”, which it did not. The second sits one item above the first on the same feed and carries the Committee’s conclusion in full, naming Nagamori, Kobe, Sato, Yoshimoto, Seki and Kishida under Article 423(1) of the Companies Act, Murakami and Ochiai under the same article, and an unnamed former CFO under the Civil Code. The redacted Report proper was indeed still pending, and is now scheduled for 20 October “or so”, so that half of the sentence stood; the conclusions and the names, which the run described as absent, had been public for a day. That is the fourth instance of one mechanism this audit now records, after the Oasis privatization letter, the Schaeffler order book and the receipt released on this same 16 October, and the cause is identical each time: the feed was checked for one expected document instead of being listed.

Wrong

“104 weekly returns to 16 Oct 2026” — this page’s correlation chart subtitle

Off by one, contradicted elsewhere on the page, and a repeat. The aligned sample is 104 weekly closes, which yields 103 weekly returns, and the prose of this same section says so twice, describing “a 103-week window”. The count was raised to 104 for the 16 October window on the reasoning that a Saturday run picks up a week whose trading has finished; the flaw is that a two-year request rolls forward at both ends, so the week gained at the end is paid for by one dropped at the start, and the total does not move. The ceiling is Schaeffler’s Xetra line, the shortest of the fifteen series, so it cannot be lifted by asking for more history either. Corrected in the subtitle on the 19 October run. No correlation figure changes, because each was computed from the returns themselves rather than from the count.

Wrong

“Nikkei 225 down 1.16%” on 20 October 2026, and an historical table showing 64,224.00 for the same session — wire and aggregator coverage

Neither is the close. The index settled at 64,075.42 against Monday’s 64,916.70, which is −1.30%, confirmed on two routes: the 20 October daily bar and regularMarketPrice stamped 15:45 JST, fifteen minutes after the 15:30 auction. The published 1.16% implies 64,163 and the tabled 64,224.00 implies −1.07%; both sit inside the day’s 63,901 to 64,810 range, which is what an intraday snapshot looks like when it is printed as a close. Two other snapshots circulating on the same session, “around 64,300” at one point and “63,980, −1.4%” at another, bracket the real figure from both sides and neither is it either. This is the third instance of one error class in this audit, after “Nikkei −2.64%” and Nidec at “¥1,760”: an index or a stock quoted mid-session and reported as settled. The check is the same every time, and it costs one request: convert the quote timestamp to exchange-local time and reject anything stamped before the closing auction.

Wrong

Lynas at 0.64 to REMX, Nidec at 0.61 and Harmonic Drive at 0.81 to the basket — this page’s own correlation charts, 17 and 19 October

All three round a point low. On the window those runs used and this one still uses, 104 aligned weekly closes and 103 returns from week 2024-43 to week 2026-42, the figures are 0.6471, 0.6229 and 0.8152, which round to 0.65, 0.62 and 0.82. Both bucketing methods agree, and the headline basket-to-REMX figure they sit around, 0.3885, was right. What makes this a clean finding rather than a judgement is that the window did not move between those runs and this one: on an identical sample a correlation cannot change, so a cell that recomputes differently was carried wrong rather than overtaken by new data. The likely mechanism is a cell edited by hand from a prior run’s rounded figure instead of being rewritten from the recomputation, which is the same failure the “104 returns” row above records in a different column. Corrected in both bar charts and in the tier-two table this run. No conclusion in section 04 depends on any of the three: the robotics names still span 0.18 to 0.46 against REMX and the minerals names 0.37 to 0.65.

Wrong

“Nikkei 225 up 0.97%” at the close on 21 October 2026, with an index table reading 64,696.00 — wire coverage

Neither figure is the close, and this is the third time this error class has earned a row. The index settled at 64,621.24 against the previous day’s 64,075.42, which is +545.82 points, or +0.85%, confirmed on three routes: the 21 October daily bar, regularMarketPrice stamped 15:45 JST, and Nikkei Inc.’s own index page. The wire’s level and its point change agree with each other and with the correct previous close, so this is a different print rather than a transcription slip — one that sits inside the session’s 64,558.60–65,404.63 range and is not the 15:30 auction. It joins the “−2.64%” row of 19 August and the “down 1.16%” row of 20 October. Check the index against the index.

Wrong

“Tokyo’s Nikkei 225 lost 1.6% to 63,595.58”, with SoftBank Group “lost 5.6%”, Tokyo Electron “fell 5.9%” and Advantest “lost 5%” — Associated Press market report, published 22 October 2026

The tenth Nikkei index figure this page has had to correct for being a print taken before the bell, the first from a wire of this reach, and the first in which four quoted lines are all wrong in the same direction by almost exactly the same amount. The Nikkei 225 closed at 62,907.84, down 1,713.40 points or 2.65%. SoftBank Group closed −6.86%, Tokyo Electron −6.99% and Advantest −6.01%. Each published figure understates the fall, by 1.05, 1.26, 1.09 and 1.01 points respectively, and four errors of one size are one snapshot rather than four mistakes. The piece is stamped 12:43 AM ET, which is 13:43 JST, one hour and forty-seven minutes before the 15:30 itayose auction. What makes this instance unusually clean is that the session only went one way after it was filed: the index and all three named stocks closed at their lows of the day, so there is no moment after 13:43 at which any of the four figures was ever right. The quoted 63,595.58 implies −1.587% and sits inside the day’s 62,907.84 to 64,866.44 range, which is what an intraday level looks like when it is printed as a close — and that range is 1,958 points wide, because the index opened up 0.38% before giving the whole session back. Two independent routes carry the close: the 22 October daily bar and regularMarketPrice stamped 15:45 JST. A third, written the same session, agrees without being asked: Il Sole 24 Ore put Tokyo at 2.65% lower. This row joins the “−2.64%” of 19 August, “down 1.16%” of 20 October and “up 0.97%” of 21 October — three consecutive sessions now, from three different filers. Four of this page’s six tier-one names price in Tokyo, so the index a reader is handed decides whether Harmonic Drive’s 9.55% fall is three and a half times the market or merely six times a mild one. Check the index against the index.

04 The REMX Question (Rare Earth ETF)

Every humanoid needs roughly 1.3 kg of NdPr magnet material, and China makes about 90% of the world's rare-earth magnets. That is a real physical dependency. It does not follow that a rare-earth ETF is a way to own robotics — so I tested it rather than assuming it.

Correlation with REMX

Weekly return correlation, 103 weekly returns from 104 aligned weekly closes to 16 Oct 2026 (ISO week 42, the last complete week: week 43 opened with the 19 October Tokyo session and does not close until Sunday 25 October, so the in-progress week is dropped and the window is unchanged for a fourth run; three cells carried on it were corrected on 20 October, see the method note), re-bucketed from daily closes into true ISO calendar weeks so Tokyo, Xetra and New York are matched to the same week — not Yahoo's native weekly bars, which anchor Tokyo/Xetra weeks about one week off from New York's.

Robotics component names Rare earth & critical minerals names

The two groups trade differently, but less starkly than this page showed before the 18 Aug alignment fix. Lynas, MP Materials and Perpetua move with REMX at 0.65, 0.56 and 0.53. The robotics names sit between 0.18 and 0.46 — every one of them, Nidec included, is a genuine positive correlation once Tokyo and Xetra weeks are properly aligned to REMX's calendar. A weekly-rebalanced equal-weighted robotics basket correlates to REMX at 0.39, not the 0.19 this page carried before the fix — and the basket definition is worth stating, because it moves the figure: held without rebalancing the same six names give 0.40, which is the construction this page published through 16 September without saying which one it meant. Both are defensible; only one was disclosed. See the method note and the claim audit.

Meanwhile those same robotics names correlate to the basket at 0.55–0.82. They still form a tighter bloc with each other than with REMX, which is a real but partial exposure, not a stand-in. The four-week columns still disagree, but by much less than they did: from 18.6 points to 14.9, then 12.6 and 10.9, back out to 13.0 and 13.2, sharply in to 8.8 and 8.4, out again to 9.8, in to 7.7, out to 8.6, in to 8.3, and now in again to 7.4 points. REMX is 24.1% lower on the four-week lookback the tables use, against the basket 16.7% lower, the mean of the six tier-one names’ own 1m cells, which is the construction, stated, because this page once published a basket four-week figure of 5.2% that cannot be rebuilt from any of them. And this run the calendar is back in it, on one side only. The four-week bases have split by venue: Tokyo’s stay pinned on 18 September for a third consecutive run, because the exchange was shut on 21, 22 and 23 September, while the Western names’ rolled to 21 September. REMX’s cell went from −21.7% to −24.1% on a session it fell 1.28%, and the basket’s from −13.4% to −16.7% on the 2.65% Tokyo rout, for a 7.4-point gap of which 1.8 points of narrowing is price and 0.9 of widening is the base roll. The previous run was the clean one: both tiers up, the minerals side up more, and no base anywhere to argue with. REMX’s cell cannot have moved: it has no new close, and sits unchanged at −19.8%. The basket’s went from −10.0% to −12.1%, and those 2.0 points split 0.3 to price and 1.7 to the calendar: Tokyo’s base rolling off 16 September lifted Nidec’s own four-week base from ¥2,646 to ¥2,856 and its 1m cell from −32.0% to −37.4%, which alone is most of the move in a six-name mean. So five sixths of the narrowest gap on record is a date change, and one run after this section finally got to describe a clean one. Read the bases before reading convergence. The decomposition that follows belongs to the earlier run in which the gap went the other way, and is kept as the record of it. Both sides fell and one fell much harder: REMX’s cell went from −13.6% to −17.5%, 3.9 points worse on its 4.58% session, while the basket’s went from −2.7% to −4.6%, 1.9 points worse. The difference between those two, 2.1 points, is the whole of the widening, and all of it is price. That matters because of what this section has had to say three runs in a row: the narrowing from 18.6 points to 10.9 was mostly the REMX base rolling off a crash session rather than either tier moving toward the other, and the one run where a real price did the work, Ambarella’s seven-point rumour session, pushed the gap the wrong way. Now a run with no base movement at all has pushed it wider again, and the mechanism is the obvious one: a minerals tier having its fourth day of rare-earth-specific selling, against a robotics tier that fell on a Tokyo de-rating and partly offset it with Yaskawa and Aichi Steel. Three runs of base-driven convergence have been undone by one session of genuine divergence. Read the bases before reading convergence, and read the prices before reading this. What survives is the point this section keeps having to make. The two tiers arrive at four-week numbers by different routes: REMX through rare-earth-specific selling that ran two sessions on a tape where gold was bid and then stopped, and the robotics names through a Tokyo de-rating of the gearbox layer, a partial reversal of it, and a US semiconductor name moving on an unverified bid report. A correlation of 0.39 permits exactly this. Equal four-week returns are not shared exposure, and unequal ones are not divergence; that is the error this whole section exists to refuse. And this is the run the window finally moved, on the date this note named in advance. Week 41 closed on Sunday 11 October, so the sample now ends at the week ended 9 October and the start rolls forward with it. The prediction was that one of the busiest weeks this page has recorded would land on the correlation as very little, and it did: basket-to-REMX goes from 0.3681 to 0.3687, a move of seven ten-thousandths. The four named check figures all came in as described, which is worth recording because they were published before the week entered the sample: Harmonic Drive entered at ¥6,220 against ¥6,570, a 5.33% weekly fall, TDK at ¥3,268 against ¥3,198, a 2.19% rise, Yaskawa 0.48% lower, and Ambarella at $67.43 against $68.65, 1.78% lower on the week despite Friday’s seven-point session.

But the reason the figure barely moved is not the one the word “cancels” implied, and the distinction is the whole lesson of this run. Week 41 did not cancel inside the basket. It was a broadly down week in both tiers: the basket fell 3.27% and REMX 3.54%, with five of the six tier-one names lower (Schaeffler 5.62%, Harmonic Drive 5.33%, Nidec 5.05%, Ambarella 1.78%, Nabtesco 1.36%, Yaskawa 0.48%) and four of the five minerals names lower (USA Rare Earth 7.58%, Novonix 5.02%, Lynas 2.78%, MP 1.77%, against Perpetua up 1.28%). A week in which both sides fall by almost exactly the same amount is not a quiet observation, it is an observation sitting almost on top of the existing relationship, so it confirms the correlation rather than changing it. That is a different fact from the one this note predicted, and the predicted number was right for the wrong reason. Had the two tiers fallen by materially different amounts the same busy week would have moved the figure hard in one direction or the other.

The one name the new week did move is Schaeffler, and it moved on both axes. Its correlation to the basket rises from 0.5997 to 0.6070 and to REMX from 0.4564 to 0.4645, the largest single change on the page when the window last advanced, and the only one big enough to round differently, from 0.60 to 0.61. It earned that by being the worst line in the basket in the week the basket fell, which is what a high-beta member does to its own correlation. Three other cells round differently on much smaller moves: Nabtesco to REMX from 0.22 to 0.21, Yaskawa to the basket from 0.82 to 0.81, and MP to the basket from 0.19 to 0.20; in the magnet tier TDK goes from 0.52 to 0.51 and Aichi Steel from 0.17 to 0.18. Everything else is unchanged at two decimal places: Lynas 0.6333, MP 0.5524, Perpetua 0.5248, USA Rare Earth 0.3678, Novonix 0.3603. The robotics names now run 0.18 to 0.46 against REMX, and 0.55 to 0.82 against the basket. On the 16 October window five cells round differently again, all by a single point and none of them changing a reading: Lynas to 0.64, MP to 0.56, Perpetua to 0.53, Novonix to 0.37 and USA Rare Earth to 0.38, with Nabtesco back out to 0.24 and Nidec to 0.35 against REMX. No conclusion in this section moves, which is the honest outcome of advancing a 103-week window by one week, even a week with this much in it. Separately, the four-week columns did move this run, and for once without any help from the calendar: the gap widened from 10.9 to 13.0 points on price alone, with all seven bases still sitting on 11 September. See the decomposition above.

Part of the reason is what REMX actually holds. Roughly 24% of the fund is in rare-earth companies and about 38% in lithium names — more lithium by weight than rare earths, as of April 2026. Top holdings run to MP Materials, Lithium Americas, Lynas, China Northern Rare Earth and Albemarle.

So a bet on REMX is substantially a bet on the lithium cycle and on Chinese miners, with roughly a third of the fund in Chinese companies. It is weighted to miners rather than to the separators and magnet makers a robot actually consumes.

What REMX is really tracking. Its drivers are Chinese export policy, MIIT production quotas and the NdPr price — not humanoid order books. Chinese Pr–Nd oxide was assessed at $97.40/kg on 4 August 2026, down about 12% from July and still below the $110/kg floor set under the US DoD–MP price-protection agreement; China's rare-earth price index closed the same day at 267.0, well below the early-2026 peak near 310. What has moved the ETF since is policy, not price: an upsized US government commitment behind USA Rare Earth's Brazilian offtake, and Beijing's own 2026–2030 materials strategy set out at a State Council briefing on 26 August. What has moved it over the past fortnight is neither, and the four-session run that closed September has now ended. REMX fell 5.1% to $72.42 on 10 September, its worst session since 23 June, inside a broad metals liquidation: US producer prices a tenth above forecast, a light Treasury buyback, the ten-year at 4.94%, silver −5.3% and the gold miners −3.5%. Then on 11 September the macro reversed — the S&P rose 0.86%, gold 0.6%, silver 1.1%, the gold miners 1.1% — and REMX fell anyway, 2.6% to $70.56. That second session is the tell. A liquidation accounts for the first day; only something specific to rare earths accounts for the second. Three smaller falls followed, 2.3% to $68.93 on 14 September alongside the whole precious complex, 0.9% on 15 September and 1.0% to $67.61 on 16 September — the lowest close since 31 July, and the sixth down session running. Then the run ended, and policy is what ended it: +2.2% to $69.10 on 17 September, flat at $69.06 on 18 September, and +1.8% to $70.27 on 21 September, when Trump's 18 September security agreement with Denmark and Greenland reopened the trade in anything holding an Arctic deposit. Greenland-linked micro-caps moved in multiples that session on press accounts not verified here, while the ETF moved 1.8% — roughly the difference between owning the story and owning a diversified basket. A third rise followed, +1.0% to $70.97 on 22 September, and it was the weakest of the three: the whole minerals tier was bid that session but none of it led, and the day's largest mover on this page was a gold name moving with gold miners rather than with rare earths. Then the run ended on 23 September, −3.1% to $68.76 — and the size of it is the point. Hawkish Fed remarks put the dollar index back above 100 and liquidated the whole metals complex that session, taking the gold miners down 4.4% and silver 4.2%; REMX fell less than either. The rare-earth-specific headline of the day — Bessent extending the Busan Agreement from 10 November to 10 January, removing a cliff edge that had been part of the scarcity premium — shows up not in the ETF but in the single names that ran past it, USA Rare Earth −6.8% and MP −4.2%. Then 24 September extended it without the same excuse: −2.7% to $66.93, its worst session since 10 September and its lowest close since 31 July, on a day the dollar index merely held above 101 rather than surging and the gold miners fell 1.3% — a third of REMX's move. So this one is not a dollar session and not a precious-metals session; it is rare-earth selling on its own account, and the two largest names in the fund did not lead it, MP closing higher. Then 25 September took it a third session lower and barely at all, −0.4% to $66.66, extending the lowest close since 31 July on no rare-earth news of any kind — this page called it the fourth at the time, and the claim audit carries the correction. The fourth came on 28 September and came hard, −3.3% to $64.47, its lowest close since 6 November 2025, on a day whose cause was an oil price and a rates repricing rather than anything upstream of a magnet. Then the run ended on 29 September, +0.5% to $64.79, and the way it ended is the more interesting half: every US rare-earth and minerals name on this page fell that session, MP 2.2%, USA Rare Earth 2.4% and Lynas 1.0%, while the fund holding them rose. A diversified basket can go up on a day its rare-earth constituents go down, which is the whole of this section in one session. Then 30 September ran the same experiment backwards and got the mirror answer: REMX fell 0.8% to $64.26, extending the lowest close since 6 November 2025, on a session in which MP rose 4.1% and Lynas 1.3%. Two consecutive sessions in which the fund and its largest holdings moved in opposite directions, once each way, is a better demonstration of a 0.37 correlation than any single day could be. Two sessions since have added almost nothing either way: −2.0% to $62.95 on 1 October, its lowest close since 23 September 2025, on the session Lynas fell nine per cent on its own announcement, +0.4% to $63.21 on 2 October, a fund barely moving while two of its holdings rose two and a half per cent and a third fell one and a half, +0.5% to $63.54 on 5 October, a third consecutive session in which the fund and its largest holdings disagreed about direction — MP, Lynas and Novonix all fell while the fund that holds them rose — and +0.4% to $63.79 on 6 October, which makes the same point by magnitude rather than by direction: MP rose 3.6% and Lynas 2.3%, and the fund holding both of them added four tenths of a point. Then 7 October ended the disagreement and ended it downwards: −3.0% to $61.88, the lowest close since 23 September 2025, and this time every minerals name on this page went with it — MP −4.6%, USA Rare Earth −3.7%, Perpetua −3.1%, Novonix −2.5%, Lynas −1.1%. After three sessions in which the fund and its largest holdings disagreed about direction, one in which they all agreed is the less interesting outcome statistically and the more informative one here, because of what was not moving: the S&P 500 fell 0.2% that session and the gold trust 1.7%. A fund that falls thirteen times its equity index on a day the broad market is flat is not being liquidated along with everything else; it is being sold on its own account. No rare-earth disclosure of any kind is dated to it, and no company on this page announced anything. That is the fourth distinct cause this section has had to record in a month, after a metals liquidation, a security treaty and a dollar move. Then 8 October ran it a second day, −2.1% to $60.58, the lowest close since 12 September 2025, and this session closes off the one explanation that was still available. On 10 and 23 September this page could attribute rare-earth selling to a liquidation of the whole metals complex. Not here: gold rose 0.73% and the gold miners 1.47% while REMX fell, with the S&P 500 down 0.47%. A fund that falls two per cent on a day the precious complex is bid and the broad market is flat is not being liquidated alongside anything; it is being sold on its own account for a second consecutive session. The single names went with it, USA Rare Earth −4.5% to its lowest close since 31 December 2025, Lynas −2.9% to its lowest since 2 January 2026 and Novonix −2.8% to a new two-year low, while MP sat almost still at −0.4%. Two causes are circulating for it and neither is dated to the session: August customs data showing 512 tonnes of Chinese magnets shipped to the United States, released 20–21 September, and the Xi–Trump state visit of 23–25 September. Both are standing conditions of this tier rather than events in it, and the next scheduled meeting is APEC on 18–19 November. Then 9 October ended the run, and the way it ended is the useful part: +0.6% to $60.97, a rise into a session in which the whole precious complex was bid, gold +1.57% and the gold miners +2.95%, with the S&P 500 up 0.59%. A fund that adds six tenths of a point on a day the gold miners add three is not leading a recovery in rare earths; it is declining to fall while everything adjacent rallies. Its own constituents split underneath it, Lynas +1.5%, Novonix +3.2% and Perpetua +2.6% against USA Rare Earth −0.6%, which extended its lowest close since 31 December 2025 on the day its tier recovered, and MP exactly unchanged at $46.14. Then 12 October resumed it and took the fund lower than any session in this whole account: −4.6% to $58.18 on 1.18m shares against 571,200, roughly double the volume, closing within a quarter of its low, and its lowest close since 10 September 2025. This time the constituents did go with it, and hard: MP −6.0%, USA Rare Earth −5.9%, Lynas −3.1%, Novonix −3.1%, Perpetua −1.9%. And the adjacent complex again refuses to explain it: gold fell 0.63% and the gold miners 0.84%, a fifth and a seventh of the fund’s move, so this is neither a dollar session nor a precious-metals liquidation. It is a fourth distinct day of rare-earth selling on its own account, with no company disclosure and no policy item dated to it. Two sessions since have taken it lower still, −2.91% to $55.78 on 14 October, its lowest close since 8 August 2025 and again a smaller fall than every producer it is meant to proxy. Then 15 October made the same point with the sign reversed: the fund closed −0.07% at $55.74, effectively unchanged, on 2.75 times average volume and after an intraday low of $53.75, while MP rose 4.16% and USA Rare Earth 7.46%. Then 16 October resumed the fall and took it through the August 2025 floor: −2.71% to $54.23 on 1.34m shares against a twenty-session average of 753,045, which is 1.78 times average, and the lowest close since 7 August 2025. This time it did not fall less than its constituents, it fell more than most of them — MP −3.46%, USA Rare Earth −4.96%, Novonix −1.38% and Lynas −0.52%, with Perpetua up 3.75% — which after seven runs of the opposite complaint is worth recording as the exception rather than a change of character. Then 19 October put the character straight back and removed the last macro excuse available to it: −1.60% to $53.36 on 702,000 shares, 0.89 times a twenty-session average of 788,965, and the lowest close since 7 August 2025. This was not a risk-off session in any direction. The S&P 500 rose 0.41%, the Nasdaq Composite 1.11% and the PHLX Semiconductor index 1.61%; a fund that falls while its own equity market and the chip complex both rise is not being liquidated with anything. Nor is it gold: the gold trust fell 0.61% and the gold miners 1.41%, both less than the producers underneath the fund. And underneath it the tier split again, which is the eighth session in this account where the fund and its largest holdings disagreed: USA Rare Earth −4.27% to its lowest close since 9 July 2025 and MP −3.04% to its lowest since 29 July 2026, against Lynas +1.83% on 1.29 times average volume and Novonix +0.47%. The fund fell a third as far as the worst name it holds and rose with none of the best. That is the fifth distinct cause this section has had to record, and it is the thinnest of them: no disclosure, no policy item and no macro, on turnover below average. Then 20 October broke the run, and it is the first up-session of any size in this whole account: +1.31% to $54.06 on 716,000 shares, 0.89 times a twenty-session average of 802,845, and its best session since 21 September. The split underneath it went the other way this time, which makes it the ninth disagreement here and the first of them in the fund’s favour: REMX rose more than four of the five producers it holds — MP +0.26%, USA Rare Earth −0.30%, Perpetua −0.27%, Novonix −2.31% — and less than one, Lynas at +3.35%. Nor did the tape hand it the move: the Nasdaq Composite was flat at −0.02%, the chip index fell 0.29%, the gold trust fell 0.54% and the gold miners 0.43%. A fund that rises 1.3% while its two largest producers sit still, the chip complex falls and gold falls is being bought on its own account, which is the same finding as the selling days with the sign reversed. Year to date REMX is now 26.9% lower with a drawdown of 51.5%, against Harmonic Drive up 42.6% YTD. Still not the same exposure — and note what moved this fund across the whole run: a metals liquidation, then rare-earth-specific selling, then a security treaty, then a dollar. No humanoid order book appears anywhere in that list.

If your intent is to own the magnet bottleneck specifically, REMX is a blunt instrument for it: the cleaner expressions are a rare-earth pure play or a magnet maker, not a diversified strategic-metals basket. If your intent is to own robotics, the component names above already carry the magnet input inside their own cost base — and rising NdPr prices are a cost to them, which is part of why the co-movement between the two groups, while real at 0.39, stops well short of making one a stand-in for the other — and 23 September showed the same thing from the other end, the minerals tier down 3–7% on a dollar move while Tokyo, closed that day, reopened bid. On the magnet input itself, the position has changed, and in the direction that matters. The last like-for-like SMM figure verified here is still 4 August's $97.40/kg, and that series remains behind a paywall with only aggregators quoting it. But a second price-reporting agency has now published on the record: Benchmark Mineral Intelligence's Q3 2026 rare-earths review, dated 25 September 2026, assesses Chinese PrNd oxide at RMB729,500/t, about $108.7/kg, up 1% through September, and ex-China PrNd at $106,500/t CIF, up 12%. That is a different assessor on a different basis, so it does not retire the SMM number or get spliced onto it; it is carried as its own series. What it does retire is this page's standing claim that NdPr sits comfortably below the $110/kg DoD floor. At $108.7/kg it is within two dollars of it, which makes the floor close to the market rather than well under it, and that is a materially different fact about MP's price protection. The same review carries the number this section had been missing entirely. Heavy rare earths outside China have decoupled from Chinese domestic prices to a degree no NdPr figure captures: dysprosium oxide at $3,500/kg CIF Europe, +56% in September and 16.3 times the Chinese domestic level, terbium at $6,745/kg, +23%, and yttrium oxide CIF North America at roughly 196 times the Chinese level. That is the export-control premium priced, and it lands on exactly one name here: Lynas, the first and so far only commercial producer of separated dysprosium and terbium outside China, whose ADR fell 17.1% over the same month the ex-China price of its scarcest product rose by half. A third assessor has now printed in October, and it moves nothing: the China Rare Earth Industry Association posted its own price index at 263.6 on 9 October 2026, against the 267.0 this page carries from 4 August, with NdPr oxide quoted at ¥729.8–749.8/kg. That brackets Benchmark’s 25 September RMB729,500/t rather than contradicting it, so the Chinese domestic price has been roughly flat for a month while the index has eased about one per cent, and the $110/kg DoD floor stays close to the market rather than comfortably under it. One figure circulating alongside it is not an assessment and is not carried as one: small-volume terbium transactions reported above $12,000/kg, against Benchmark’s $6,745/kg, are trade talk relayed by a paywalled outlet with no assessor behind them. None of this turns the divergence between the two tiers into a magnet-price story, but it does mean the magnet input is no longer the quiet part of this page.

05 Tier two — the minerals list, assessed

The five critical-minerals names get the same treatment as the component makers — but they stay on their own tier, because the data says they are an upstream policy trade rather than robotics exposure. Three of the post's five descriptions turned out to be wrong or out of date, and two of the companies have nothing to do with magnets at all.

Company What it actually is Last 1m YTD 1y vs 52w high Corr REMX Corr robotics
MP MaterialsMP · NYSE Mountain Pass mine + magnet plant; DoD-backed $39.50 −21.0% −21.8% −46.7% −48.6% 0.56 0.21
USA Rare EarthUSAR · Nasdaq Stillwater commissioned, no magnet sales yet; Round Top exploration $10.23 −39.0% −14.0% −61.7% −68.8% 0.38 0.15
Lynas Rare EarthsLYSDY · ADR Largest producer outside China; first Dy/Tb $8.05 −19.7% −2.7% −32.9% −48.9% 0.65 0.18
Perpetua ResourcesPPTA · Nasdaq Antimony & gold, Idaho — not a rare earth $18.74 −20.9% −22.6% −21.0% −49.9% 0.53 0.21
NovonixNVX · Nasdaq Synthetic graphite for batteries, Tennessee $2.13 −25.0% −78.9% −89.3% −89.7% 0.37 0.27
Correlations are weekly returns over the same 103 weekly returns, re-bucketed by ISO calendar week. "Corr robotics" is against an equal-weighted basket of the six tier-one names. Novonix is shown restated for the one-for-ten ADS ratio change effective 27 August; its daily bars around that change keep appearing and vanishing, so the 28 August close is pinned to the verified figure rather than re-derived each run — see the method note.

Sort them by whether they touch a magnet. Only three of the five sit anywhere near the chain a robot actually consumes — and only two of those, MP Materials and USA Rare Earth, make finished NdFeB magnets. Perpetua is antimony and gold; Novonix is battery graphite. Both are legitimate critical-minerals businesses and neither goes into a robot joint.

The cards below rank them on that basis, closest to the magnet first. Note the correlation asymmetry throughout: even MP, the most robotics-adjacent name here, sits at 0.56 to REMX against 0.21 to the robotics basket — a real gap, if a narrower one than this page previously showed. These trade as mining and policy assets, which is the whole point of keeping them on their own tier.

Mine to magnet Closest to the robot

MP Materials

MP · NYSE

The only vertically integrated Western play, and the one genuine bridge between "rare earths" and "robot actuators." Q2 2026 revenue of $108.5m (+89%) came with NdPr production of 840 tonnes (+41%) and sales of 1,006 tonnes — more than double the prior year — pushing adjusted EBITDA positive and narrowing the diluted loss to $0.11 from $0.19.

The government backstop is unusually deep: the Department of Defense took $400m of preferred stock in July 2025 to become the largest shareholder, with a ten-year $110/kg NdPr price floor, and has since signed a ten-year offtake for 100% of the output of the planned 10X facility in Northlake, Texas — a $1.25bn-plus campus commissioning from 2028 that is meant to lift MP's total US magnet capacity to roughly 10,000 tonnes a year, not to produce 10,000 tonnes on its own. Beijing noticed: China's Ministry of Commerce added MP to its export-control blacklist in June 2026, and the stock fell nearly 30% through July.

The 13 Aug earnings call surfaced a new line: a multi-year, nine-figure agreement signed in July to supply separated gadolinium oxide to an undisclosed US aerospace and defense manufacturer, recovered as a co-product of the existing Mountain Pass ore stream. Terms are undisclosed so it cannot be sized precisely, but it is the clearest evidence yet that MP is building toward a multi-element refinery rather than a single-product (NdPr) business.

Two sessions have taken the stock back to where it started the week, and neither carried a disclosure. 6 October added +3.61% to $48.53, the largest Western gain on this page that day and nine times REMX's own move; 7 October handed all of it back and more, −4.57% to $46.31, its lowest close since 1 October, inside a session in which every minerals name here fell and the S&P 500 moved 0.22%. The standing story is unchanged and is still the company's own: commercial magnet shipments to General Motors from the Fort Worth Independence plant are guided for the fourth quarter, which is now running, and the magnetics segment booked $16.5m of the $108.5m Q2 revenue. On the input side the $110/kg NdPr floor under the DoD agreement is no longer comfortably above the market: Benchmark's 25 September assessment puts Chinese PrNd at about $108.7/kg, within two dollars of it, which makes the price protection worth materially less than it was when this card was first written. A third session followed on 8 October and it barely moved at all, −0.37% to $46.14, on a day REMX fell 2.1% and the rest of the tier fell three to five times as far: the fund and its largest holding disagreeing about magnitude rather than direction, which is this card’s argument restated. Four sessions since took it a good deal lower, the last of them in the CPI selloff: −5.84% to $39.95 on 14 October, on 1.88 times average volume and its lowest close since 29 July. 15 October reversed part of it, +4.16% to $41.61 on 1.16 times average, off an intraday low of $38.60, its best session since 21 September — and it arrived with the gold miners up 4.34% and the ten-year yield 10bp lower rather than with anything rare-earth. 16 October gave most of that back, −3.46% to $40.17 on 0.97 times average volume, inside a chip-led risk-off session rather than anything rare-earth. Twelve-month return −52.1% against a 16 October 2025 base of $83.84, and 52.2% below the high, the third-deepest drawdown in tier two behind Novonix at 91.0% and USA Rare Earth at 67.9%. Part of the previous run’s improvement was a date rather than a price: this name’s own 52-week high rolled from $91.99 to $84.15 on 16 October, which was 4.1 of the six points the drawdown cell came in, and it rolled once more on 17 October to $83.99, the only one of eleven to move that run.

Q2 rev $108.5m Magnetics $16.5m NdPr floor $110/kg Gadolinium deal 9-figure, multi-yr

20 October: +0.26% to $39.05 on 0.68 times average volume, effectively still, in a session the Dow rose 1.02% and the Russell 2000 1.65%. Nothing is dated to it. Both lookback columns moved far more than the price did, and in opposite directions, which is the clearest single illustration this page has of why they are read with the base in hand. The 52-week high rolled $80.89 to $76.80 as the 20 October 2025 session dropped out of the window, taking the drawdown cell from 51.9% to 49.2% and under fifty per cent for the first time in this account, on a quarter-point session. The twelve-month base rolled the other way on the very same day, $80.79 to $82.90, so the 1y cell worsened from −51.8% to −52.9% on a session the stock rose. Neither number is a judgement about the business.

WatchMagnetics segment revenue. At $16.5m against $95.6m from materials it is still the small half of the business — but it is the half that matters for anything robotic, and the only number here that scales with Western magnet independence. The tape went the other way meanwhile: a 5.5% fall to $51.32 on 10 September inside a broad metals liquidation, then a further 1.6% to $50.51 on 11 September against a rising market and a rising gold complex, then it paused — +0.3% to $50.68 on 14 September, one of only two tier-two names to hold a session that took REMX to a six-week low — then −3.0% on 15 September and −0.4% to $48.99 on 16 September, +0.8% to $49.38 on 17 September, −4.3% to $47.26 on 18 September — its lowest close since 3 August — then +5.8% to $50.00 on 21 September on the Greenland pact, its largest single gain in more than a month, and +2.1% to $51.04 on 22 September — before −4.2% to $48.89 on 23 September, its lowest close since 18 September — then a pause, +0.8% to $49.30 on 24 September, one of only two names on this tier to rise on a session that took REMX to its lowest close since 31 July, then −1.0% to $48.83 on 25 September on nothing at all. Those sessions tipped the year twice. The 22 September close put MP positive year to date by fifty-two cents against its $50.52 close of 2025; 23 September took it straight back under and it has gone further since. A company whose magnetics revenue nearly doubled over the year is back below square one in the price and has taken none of it back on its own account. The 23 September fall is worth separating: the dollar-led metals liquidation that day took the gold miners down 4.4%, so MP's 4.2% is roughly market beta — but it came alongside the Busan Agreement's extension to 10 January, which removes the November cliff edge that had been part of the scarcity bid. Two columns to read carefully either way. Three more sessions took it lower without a rare-earth headline in any of them: −4.9% to $46.45 on 28 September, its lowest close since 3 August, on the oil-and-rates repricing that hit the whole tier, and −2.2% to $45.43 on 29 September, a fresh low for the move, on a session when gold recovered 1.3% and REMX itself rose 0.5%. That last one is the cleanest statement of this card's argument: the fund that holds MP went up while MP went down two per cent. Three sessions then went the other way without a headline either: +4.1% to $47.29 on 30 September, the only Western move above two points that day, −2.5% to $46.09 on 1 October, and +1.9% to $46.97 on 2 October. Year to date it is 6.3% lower and it remains 50.8% below its high. As of this run MP shows 18.0% lower over a month on a four-week base that has rolled onto 16 September's $48.99, 20.5% lower year to date, and a twelve-month cell of −52.1% against 16 October 2025's $83.84, a level set inside last October's spike rather than in a normal session. Read all three against their own dates.

Magnets Already shipping

USA Rare Earth

USAR · Nasdaq

The source post is still wrong about the timeline, but this page was wrong about the other end of it, and the correction matters more. USAR did commission its Phase 1a commercial magnet line at Stillwater, Oklahoma in Q2 2026, pulling the plant forward by about two years from the 2028 date the post implies — and the company says it “has commenced commercial production.” What it has not done is sell any of it. The Q2 10-Q is explicit that Stillwater “has recently been commissioned and has commenced commercial production; however, we have not begun generating revenue from” sintered NdFeB magnets, and the 15 September risk-factor supplement goes further, describing Stillwater and Blacksburg as “under development and… not yet completed” with “no… revenues to date from the sale of neo magnets, critical minerals or rare earth minerals.” This page previously said USAR “began filling customer orders” in Q2 2026. It did not. Phase 1a is guided to a 600 mtpa run-rate by the end of Q4 2026 and 1,200 mtpa combined with Phase 1b in Q1 2027, against roughly 5,000 tonnes at full build — every one of those a target, none of them yet a shipment.

Q2 2026 revenue was $5.8m against a $10.3m net loss (down from $142.5m a year earlier, when the company had no commercial revenue at all). None of that $5.8m is magnets: the 10-Q attributes it “all” to Less Common Metals, the Cheshire metals subsidiary acquired in November 2025, and states that all revenue “is derived from sales of casting and strip casting” — at a gross loss of $1.6m on a negative 27.2% gross margin. The balance sheet is the actual headline: $1.53bn of cash at quarter-end, up from $359.9m at year-end 2025. USAR is deploying it into corporate structure as much as capacity — it closed the acquisition of Texas Mineral Resources Corp on 7 Aug, giving it outright ownership of Round Top, and finalized a roughly 13.6% stake in French rare-earth processor Carester. It agreed to buy Brazil's Serra Verde, the only scaled ex-China producer of all four magnet rare earths, for about $2.8bn; shareholders approved the share issuance on 28 August — 108,248,297 votes for against 1,403,269 opposed, with 16,879,393 abstentions — and the combination completed on 3 September 2026, announced the following morning and filed the same day on Form 8-K under Item 2.01. This page carried it as pending for a week longer than it was; that was wrong, and the correction is the more important half of this card.

What actually closed is bigger than the price tag suggested. USAR paid $300m in cash plus 126,849,307 new shares to Serra Verde's shareholders, lenders, warrant holders, employees and consultants, and took on Serra Verde's financing with it: a facility of up to $565m from the US International Development Finance Corporation, sized to fund the Brazilian optimisation and expansion programme through to positive cash flow. The Goiás operation has been producing since January 2024 and is finishing a commissioning and optimisation programme whose first stage targets a run-rate of about 4,000 tpa of total rare earth oxide by the end of 2026. Sir Mick Davis joins the board; Thras Moraitis becomes President immediately and succeeds Barbara Humpton as chief executive on 1 October. USAR now owns an operating heavy rare-earth mine, a magnet line and a separation stake — upstream, midstream and downstream in one company, which is what MP has and no one else outside China does.

The financing behind that deal landed on 24 August 2026 and is the most consequential development on this page since the last refresh. The special-purpose vehicle that will buy 100% of Serra Verde's Phase 1 output completed an upsized $1.55bn capitalisation: a $750m Department of War investment, raised from the $500m originally contemplated, a bank senior secured borrowing-base revolver of up to $500m, and a US government forward purchase contract for not less than $300m of rare-earth product over five years. The offtake runs fifteen years on take-or-pay terms with guaranteed price floors on the magnetic rare earths — including, on the company's account, the first such floors anywhere for dysprosium and terbium. Read against the $110/kg NdPr floor MP already has, Washington is now underwriting the price of the heavy elements too, which is the part of the chain China actually controls.

And on 9 September 2026 it broke ground on a second magnet plant, which this page should have carried a run earlier. The site is Blacksburg, South Carolina — 124 acres in Bailey Industrial Park, Cherokee County, about 800,000 square feet, roughly $1.2bn of investment and some 490 manufacturing jobs, commissioning in 2028. The capacity is the part that matters: 6,400 tpa of sintered NdFeB magnets plus 5,000 tpa of strip-cast metal and alloy. On its own that is larger than Stillwater's full build of roughly 5,000 tonnes, and it places a second and bigger magnet line behind the company's own metal. Measured against MP's 10X campus, which is meant to lift MP's total US magnet capacity to about 10,000 tpa from 2028, Blacksburg is the largest single increment to announced ex-China magnet tonnage anywhere on this page. The company says it screened nearly 275 sites before choosing it. None of this moved the stock, which fell 8.8% across the two sessions that followed.

The Round Top deposit in West Texas is the part that is genuinely years out, and the distinction matters: the magnets Stillwater is producing are made from purchased feedstock, not from USAR's own mine — and the 15 September supplement flags that too, warning that feedstock delays at Less Common Metals have already constrained the plant, and that China's 22 June 2026 export-control designation “has had and is expected to continue to have an adverse impact on our ability to source key raw materials.” Round Top did produce a first dysprosium oxide sample at 99.1% purity in January. Like MP, USAR was added to China's export-control list in June 2026. The stock sits 66.2% below its 52-week high, the steepest drawdown on this page bar Novonix, and closing the deal did nothing to lift it. It fell 5% on the day the SPV funding was announced, 6.5% on the day of the vote, 7.4% on 31 August when the result was disclosed and 3.1% on 1 September; it then drifted through six sessions either side of completion, fell 3.4% to $17.06 on 9 September, a further 6.0% to $16.04 on 10 September — the largest fall on the page that day, though that one arrived with the whole metals complex rather than alone — and 3.0% to $15.56 on 11 September, which did not: the complex rebounded that session and USAR made a fresh low regardless, its weakest close since 31 July. The one-way tape broke only briefly — +1.0% to $15.71 on 14 September, one of only two tier-two names to hold a session that took REMX to a six-week low, then −2.0% to $15.40 on 15 September and −1.9% to $15.10 on 16 September, a fresh low for the run. Then the move finally came, and not from the company: +3.5% to $15.63 on 17 September, −1.7% to $15.37 on 18 September, and +9.2% to $16.78 on 21 September — the largest single gain anywhere on this page in this period — on Trump's security agreement with Denmark and Greenland, followed by a much quieter +1.3% to $16.99 on 22 September — and then the whole policy bid came out at once, −6.8% to $15.83 on 23 September, the largest fall anywhere on this page that session and its lowest close since 18 September. That one is not market beta: the gold miners fell 4.4% and REMX 3.1% on the same dollar move, and USAR went half as far again as either, on the day Bessent extended the trade truce past its November expiry. The symmetry is the lesson — two sessions of policy bid on a treaty about an island it has no assets on, one session of policy unwind on a truce it is not party to either. USA Rare Earth owns nothing in Greenland and is not a signatory in Busan. A fourth session then took it lower again with no policy in it at all, −2.8% to $15.38 on 24 September, and the run has not stopped since: −1.3% to $15.18 on 25 September, −5.0% to $14.42 on 28 September on the oil-and-rates repricing, and −2.4% to $14.08 on 29 September, a fifth consecutive fall and its lowest close since 29 July, on a session when the benchmark that holds the tier closed higher. Three more sessions have carried it lower still: −2.0% to $13.80 on 1 October and −1.5% to $13.59 on 2 October, its lowest close since 29 July 2026. The selling has continued without a disclosure attached to any of it, and 14 October was the heaviest of it: −8.51% to $10.32 on 20.92m shares, 1.56 times average, its lowest close since 9 July 2025. 15 October then reversed it harder than anything else in the tier: +7.46% to $11.09 on 23.58m shares, 1.72 times average, after first trading as low as $9.82. 16 October resumed the fall, −4.96% to $10.54, and the turnover is the part worth recording: 10.96m shares against a twenty-session average of 14.32m, or 0.77 times normal, so Friday extended Thursday’s selling without fresh participation behind it. That leaves it 67.9% below its high, the steepest drawdown on the page bar Novonix, and 30.2% lower over a month. Its twelve-month return now reads −63.1%, and that figure needs its date more than any other on this page: the year-ago comparison has rolled onto 16 October 2025's $28.54, a close struck inside the October 2025 spike this name has never been back to, so the column is measuring the stock against its own mania rather than against a normal session. The year to date is −11.4%. The market is pricing the dilution ahead of the assets — 126.8m new shares against 244.7m outstanding is arithmetic, the assets require execution — and pricing the policy tape ahead of both. The claim audit carries the Greenland attribution.

Line commissioned Q2 2026 Q4 target 600 mtpa Magnet sales none yet Cash $1.53bn SPV funding $1.55bn Serra Verde closed 3 Sep Blacksburg 6,400 tpa Off high −69.3%

20 October: −0.30% to $10.06 on 0.70 times average volume, extending the lowest close since 9 July 2025 by three cents. The drawdown is 69.3%, still the second deepest here behind Novonix. The twelve-month cell fell four and a half points to −68.2% and none of that is the session: the year-ago base rolled $27.73 to $31.59, a 14% one-day step onto the day the market traded China’s export controls. Nothing is dated to it. The open items are unchanged and both are now close: third-quarter results are not scheduled, and the Stillwater 600 mtpa run-rate and the first magnet invoice are each guided to a quarter with ten weeks left in it.

WatchThe first magnet invoice, which on the company's own account does not yet exist. Two run-rates are due by the end of this year — Stillwater's 600 mtpa of sintered magnets and Serra Verde's 4,000 tpa of rare earth oxide — and the gap between “commissioned” and “sold” is now the whole question. Every financing gate has been cleared — the vote, the $1.55bn SPV, the DFC facility — so from here the only thing left to miss is production, and the first management test is a leadership handover three weeks after the merger closed. The tape has read each corporate step as dilution arriving rather than risk lifting; the fourth-quarter numbers are where that gets settled either way.

Separation Heavy rare earths

Lynas Rare Earths

LYSDY · ADR

Operationally the strongest of the five, and now with a full year on the board. FY26 results, reported 26 August 2026, were records across the line: revenue of A$977.9m, up 76%, net profit after tax of A$222.4m against A$8.0m the year before, REO production of 13,089 tonnes (+25%), NdPr production of 7,260 tonnes (+11%) and a record average realised price of A$80.7/kg. More strategically, it became the first commercial producer outside China of separated dysprosium and terbium — first terbium oxide in June 2026, on a heavy rare-earth circuit of about 1,500 tonnes a year.

The market did not take it as a clean beat. The ADR fell 5.9% on results day before recovering 5.0% the next session, then gave back another 8% into 1 September with the rest of the mining complex, and rose in four sessions to $11.23 on 8 September. That run ended abruptly: −2.9% to $10.91 on 9 September, then −4.3% to $10.44 on 10 September in the broad metals selloff, −2.2% to $10.21 on 11 September after it reversed, −3.2% on 14 September, −0.7% on 15 September and −2.9% to $9.53 on 16 September — its lowest close since 6 January. It has since recovered the handle: +2.5% to $9.77 on 17 September, +2.9% to $10.05 on 18 September, its first close back above $10 since 11 September, then the one faller on the page's Greenland session, −0.3% to $10.02, then the tier's second-strongest session the next day, +3.1% to $10.33 on 22 September, and then −2.6% to $10.06 on 23 September in the dollar-led liquidation. Nothing from the company behind any of them, in either direction; the Sydney ordinary line followed a session later, −1.9% to A$14.39 on 24 September, in an Asian rare-earth session the wires attributed to the truce extension. Over a month the ADR is 18.2% lower against REMX's 16.5% — and that ordering, which had flipped for a week, has flipped back: the single name is falling marginally faster than the fund again, which is what a 0.63 correlation and a higher beta ordinarily produce. A fifth session followed, −1.2% to $9.94 on 24 September, its lowest close since 17 September and its first below $10 since then. Its twelve-month column crossed below zero on 23 September, from +1.0% to −8.1%, the year-ago base moving up from $10.23 to $10.95 doing most of that, and it now reads −38.1% against a 16 October 2025 base of $12.33. Three more falls have taken it lower still — −3.8% to $9.58 on 28 September and −1.0% to $9.48 on 29 September, its lowest close since 6 January 2026, on a session when the benchmark that holds it closed higher — while the Sydney ordinary line went the other way a day later, +1.4% to A$13.83 on 30 September. Nothing from the company behind any of it. The reason is on the cost side: capital expenditure on the heavy rare-earth circuit has escalated 63%, to A$294m from A$180m, which the company attributes to sourcing equipment outside China. That is the price of the scarcity premium, stated in cash.

That heavy-element capability is the real scarcity, and it has just been repriced. Benchmark Mineral Intelligence's Q3 2026 review, dated 25 September 2026, assesses terbium oxide at $6,745/kg CIF Europe, up 23% in September, and dysprosium oxide at $3,500/kg CIF Europe, up 56% in a single month and 16.3 times the Chinese domestic level, with yttrium oxide CIF North America at roughly 196 times its Chinese price. Those ex-China terbium figures are well above the $4,500–$4,700/kg range this page carried through the summer, so the scarcity premium on the heavy elements is widening rather than holding. Dysprosium and terbium are what keep magnets stable at motor operating temperatures, which is why this is the part of the chain a robot actually cannot substitute away from. The uncomfortable part for the thesis is the tape: over the month in which the ex-China price of its scarcest product rose by half, the ADR fell 14.5%. Either the market does not price a CIF Europe assessment as revenue for an Australian producer selling largely under contract, or it is not reading it at all. The post's claim that Lynas is "now building a US processing facility" is out of date: on 16 March 2026 the US government redirected the US$96m earmarked for the Seadrift, Texas heavy rare-earth plant into a four-year purchase agreement for Lynas product instead, with a US$110/kg NdPr floor. The Texas plant is in limbo, not under construction.

FY26 revenue A$977.9m NPAT A$222.4m HRE capex +63% Seadrift redirected

20 October: +3.35% to $8.03 on 1.14 times average volume, the largest rise anywhere on this page and a second consecutive green session while the rest of the tier sat still. Its twelve-month cell fell five and a half points regardless, −36.4% to −42.0%, on a year-ago base rolling $12.21 to $13.84: a 13% one-day step, because 20 October 2025 is the session this ADR re-rated on the Chinese export controls. The best day on the page and the largest base roll on it are the same name. The September-quarter report is due late October and is the next dated test of the heavy rare-earth output this card turns on, including whether the ex-China dysprosium and terbium premium recorded in section 04 shows up in a realised price.

WatchThe Meteoric scheme, which as of 1 October is the largest single thing on this card. Lynas signed a binding scheme implementation deed to acquire 100% of Meteoric Resources at 0.0207 new Lynas shares per Meteoric share: no cash, an implied A$968m on a 60-day VWAP, a 68.4% premium, and about 5.9% of Lynas to Meteoric holders. The asset is Caldeira in Minas Gerais, on Meteoric's description the largest known ionic-clay JORC rare-earth oxide resource outside China, with a definitive feasibility study completed in July 2026. Three dates to hold: a scheme meeting in January 2027, implementation targeted for March 2027, and Brazilian critical-minerals approval somewhere in between, any of which can move. The tension is worth stating plainly rather than resolving. Ionic clay is the cheap end of the industry's cost curve and a second geography outside Malaysia and Australia, so the strategic case is real; but production is years out, the consideration is paper, and the dilution lands now. Shareholders voted the second half, 8.6% of it in a session. What the deal does not do is touch the heavy circuit, which is the part of this thesis that matters here, so everything previously on this line still stands: whether Seadrift is revived or quietly shelved, and the dysprosium/terbium ramp against that 63% capex escalation, now against an ex-China heavy price that moved more in September than the ramp will in a year. The heavy circuit is the part China cannot easily replace and the part no one else outside China has, though USA Rare Earth's US-backed Dy/Tb price floors are the first sign that someone else intends to be paid for it too. The scheme has now also acquired a downstream half, reported rather than released: on 12 October 2026 Minas Gerais mines and energy minister Alexandre Silveira told MINING.COM that Lynas has proposed a rare-earth oxide separation plant in the Poços de Caldas region, with development bank BNDES evaluating financing on unnamed sources and a technical visit to the Australian operations due before year end. Hold it at its actual weight: a minister’s written comment and an evaluation, with no Lynas release, no approval, no construction decision and no capital figure, so it is a proposal on this card rather than capacity, and it does not touch the heavy circuit either. And a permanent CEO is still outstanding: Pol Le Roux has run the company on an interim basis since 1 July, which is a notable thing to remain true of a company signing a billion-dollar scheme.

Antimony Not a magnet input

Perpetua Resources

PPTA · Nasdaq

A well-financed critical-minerals project that has almost nothing to do with robotics. Perpetua secured a $2.9bn EXIM loan, board-approved in May 2026 and expected to become available in the second half of the year, on top of a $255m private placement in October 2025 backed by Agnico Eagle and JPMorgan. Construction at Stibnite in Idaho is underway.

Two caveats the post skips. First, this is predominantly a gold mine: reserves of roughly 4.8 million ounces and about 450,000 ounces of gold a year over the first four years, with antimony supplying an estimated 35% of US demand alongside it. Second, production does not begin until 2029. Antimony goes into flame retardants, ammunition and alloys — not robot joints. It earns its place on a critical-minerals list, not on a robotics one.

The tape adds a third caveat, and fifteen sessions have now sharpened it in both directions. Perpetua shows −16.7% over the past month, and that relationship inverted for a week before reasserting itself: bullion is 4.4% lower over the same 30 days and the gold miners 10.4% lower, so a 16.7% fall still sits above both — a mild amplification of the equities rather than of the metal, which is the ordinary configuration for a high-beta gold miner. The explanation is in the sessions below: several of them moved on something other than gold. On 31 August gold rose and Perpetua fell 4.7% anyway, alongside the gold miners; on 1 September gold fell 1.9%, the miners 3.9%, and Perpetua 5.8%. Then it ran in reverse: on 2 September the miners rose 3.1% and Perpetua 4.1%. On 3 September the relationship held in direction but not in size — gold 1.9%, the miners 4.0%, and Perpetua only 2.4%, for once lagging the equities it usually amplifies. Then on 4 September it decoupled altogether: gold fell 1.4% and the miners 2.2%, and Perpetua did nothing at all, +0.2% to $25.09. On 8 September the usual relationship resumed quietly: gold eased 0.8% and Perpetua 1.3% to $24.76. On 9 September it went missing again: bullion added 0.9% and the gold miners 1.1%, and Perpetua closed unchanged at $24.76, to the cent. Then on 10 September it came back with force — bullion −1.7%, the gold miners −3.5% and Perpetua −4.4% to $23.67. On 11 September it went quiet once more: bullion rose 0.6% and the miners 1.1%, and Perpetua eased 0.2% to $23.63, its lowest close since 1 September and the only tier-two name that barely moved on a day the rest of the tier fell. Then on 14 September it amplified the complex again and harder than either leg of it: bullion −1.3%, the gold miners −3.1%, and Perpetua −4.6% to $22.55, its lowest close since 4 August — before it recovered 0.6% to $22.69 on 15 September, the only tier-two name to rise on a session when gold fell again. The three sessions since split the same way. On 17 September it tracked the equities closely — the miners +3.4%, Perpetua +3.8% to $23.37 — and on 18 September it tracked them again, the miners −0.5% and Perpetua −0.6% to $23.24. Then on 21 September it decoupled upward for the first time in this run on something that was not gold at all: bullion −0.7%, the gold miners −1.1%, and Perpetua +1.9% to $23.68, moving with the rare-earth complex on the Greenland pact rather than with the metal it is actually levered to. On 22 September it went back to the miners and amplified them mildly: bullion +0.4%, the gold miners +3.6%, and Perpetua +4.6% to $24.76 — the largest single gain anywhere on this page that session, and still an ordinary gold-equity beta rather than an antimony event, with no company disclosure attached to it. That is the exception that proves the rule this card exists to state — antimony is a critical mineral, so it catches a critical-minerals bid, and none of that is the gold mine that will supply 450,000 ounces a year from 2029. Four times in thirteen sessions it has ignored a moving metal and a moving miners index, and twice it has multiplied one. That session carries a caution worth recording, because this page names GOLD as the instrument to check before attributing a Perpetua move. GOLD is Barrick, and Barrick rose 11.2% that day against a falling metal and a falling miners index. A single-name divergence that wide is company-specific, not a gold signal — which is why the comparison above is drawn against the miners index rather than against Barrick alone. Then 23 September put it back in its ordinary place and took the year with it: bullion −1.8%, the gold miners −4.4%, and Perpetua −5.8% to $23.32, its lowest close since 18 September — a mild amplification of the miners in a dollar-led liquidation, with no antimony in it and no company disclosure, exactly as on the way up the session before. Its year-to-date column crossed back below zero in the process, from +2.3% to −3.7%, one session after crossing above. Then 24 September broke the pattern in the one direction it had not yet gone: Perpetua rose 0.4% to $23.42 while the gold miners fell 1.3% and bullion 0.3% — the first session in this run where it outperformed gold rather than amplifying it, and again on no company disclosure. Then 25 September put it straight back in line and lagging slightly: the gold miners rose 0.6%, bullion 0.4%, and Perpetua 0.3% to $23.49. Then 28 September delivered the largest single fall this page has recorded on any name this run, and it was still the same relationship: −7.1% to $21.82, its lowest close since 4 August, against gold miners −5.4% and bullion −3.9% — an amplification of the equities, on a session whose cause was an oil price and a rates repricing rather than anything in the ground. Brent went back toward $106 after the White House rejected Iran's proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the ten-year Treasury yield passed 5.2%, and gold had its sharpest fall in this run. Not one part of that chain is antimony, and no company disclosure accompanied it. Across eighteen sessions Perpetua tracked the mining equities, not the metal, and one session of mild outperformance does not change that. The exposure is to gold equities, not to gold. Then 29 September made the point from the other side: Perpetua fell 1.3% to $21.53, its lowest close since 4 August, on a session when bullion rose 1.3% and the gold miners rose 1.3% — the first time in this run the name has gone the opposite way to the equities it normally amplifies, and again with nothing published. Eighteen sessions of tracking the miners, one of tracking nothing. Two more sessions have continued it and the second is the one to read: −3.0% to $20.93 on 1 October on a session the gold trust rose 0.5%, and −2.6% to $20.38 on 2 October against a gold trust down only 0.7% — roughly four times the metal, with nothing published either day. Two quieter sessions have put it back in line. It eased 0.2% to $20.33 on 5 October against a gold trust down 0.1%, then rose 1.43% to $20.62 on 6 October against a gold trust up 0.72%, roughly twice the metal and in the same direction, which is the ordinary configuration this card keeps having to restate after the sessions that are not. Then 15 October handed it its best session since 19 August, +6.53% to $18.51 on 1.48 times average volume and off a $17.00 low, against a gold trust up 1.79% and the gold miners up 4.34%: roughly 1.5 times the miners, which is this card’s documented amplification of a metals move and not an antimony signal. 16 October extended it, and this time the metal cannot take the credit: +3.75% to $19.21 on 1.44 times average volume, while the two spot-tracking gold trusts fell, GLD 0.18% and IAU 0.17%, and the gold miners added only 0.79%. A documented amplification of a metals move cannot account for a session in which the metal did not move, and nothing on the company’s release feed is dated to it, so this one goes down as its own. Its year to date now reads −20.7% and the drawdown 48.6%, and its twelve-month cell −31.4% against a 16 October 2025 base of $28.00, from the +23.6% it carried in late September — a large part of that the base rolling onto progressively higher year-ago days rather than price. Antimony went nowhere throughout: $51.80/kg at the 18 September assessment, down 5.85% year to date and about 43% from a year earlier. The commodity that earns this name its place on a critical-minerals list is flat to falling either way.

EXIM loan $2.9bn Gold miners −11.4% 1m Antimony −5.9% YTD Gold ~450koz/yr US antimony ~35% First production 2029

20 October: −0.27% to $18.72 on 1.02 times average volume, and the gold check passes this time by sitting still. The gold trust fell 0.54% and the gold miners 0.43%, so a quarter-point fall is roughly half the metal rather than a multiple of it: no antimony signal, and for once no amplification either. Its twelve-month cell fell five and a half points to −31.4% on a year-ago base rolled $25.32 to $27.27, which is the calendar and not the metal. On the open item nothing has closed. The $2.9bn EXIM facility remains board-approved from 21 May 2026, with definitive documentation outstanding and the company guiding close to the fourth quarter, which has ten weeks left. Approved is still not drawn.

WatchFinancial close on the EXIM facility, and the guidance has tightened. At Mining Forum Americas on 28 September 2026 Perpetua put loan closing in the fourth quarter of 2026, narrowing the “second half” it carried at the 17 August quarterly, with a final investment decision after the close, an approximately three-year build after full sanction, and initial production in late 2029. It also sized the project at more than $3bn of construction capital, which is the company's own current figure and well above the $1.3bn attached to the groundbreaking coverage in the sources below. Approved is still not drawn: the $2.9bn was board-approved in May 2026 and the documentation is unsigned, so headlines describing the loan as received or secured are running a quarter ahead of the facility. With first metal four years out, financing terms matter more than commodity prices here. Cash at 30 June was $574.2m. The tape has run a long way ahead of any of that: −10.18% to $17.38 on 14 October, on 2.11m shares and 2.24 times average volume, its lowest close since 29 July and the worst session anywhere on this page that day, with nothing filed. The surrounding instruments rule the metal out as the cause and confirm what this card has said from the start: gold fell 1.49%, the gold miners 4.40% and the silver miners 5.45%, so this is roughly 2.3 times the miners in a rates-driven liquidation, not an antimony move. Check the gold tape before attributing anything here to antimony.

Graphite Not a magnet input

Novonix

NVX · Nasdaq

The weakest name on either list, and it deserves a plain warning rather than a bullet point. Novonix makes synthetic graphite for battery anodes in Chattanooga, Tennessee — a battery input, not a magnet input, and not part of any robot's bill of materials in the way the tier-one components are.

The financials are severe, and on 31 August 2026 the auditor said so in the accounts. The half-year report for the six months to 30 June shows a loss of $24.6m against $20.1m a year earlier, net operating cash outflows of $23.1m, and cash down to $59.5m from $79.9m at 31 December. Net current liabilities stand at $2.5m where six months earlier there were net current assets of $5.6m. The independent auditor's review report carries a material uncertainty that may cast significant doubt on the group's ability to continue as a going concern. The same report has the company backing away from a land purchase beside its Chattanooga plant and stretching the Riverside ramp-up, which is what conserving cash looks like in a capital project. The genuine positive is still the US$103m of 48C tax credits certified in April 2026 for the Riverside project — but those vest only when the first 11,000 tpa of capacity is in service before 7 April 2028, and a slower ramp is the one thing that deadline cannot absorb. Mass production for lead customer Panasonic is not expected before 2027.

The going-concern note names the trigger, which is what makes this more than a slow burn. $35m of face value in unsecured convertible debentures issued to Yorkville carries an A$0.12 floor on the ASX share price: a fall below it may constitute an amortisation event, under which the company could be required to redeem part or all of the outstanding balance in cash. On 31 August, the day that note was published, the ordinary shares closed at A$0.11, down 12.0% on 12.3m shares against a recent average nearer 3.5m, and the Nasdaq line fell 12.3% the same session. They have not recovered: A$0.11 on 1 September, A$0.105 on 2 and 3 September, A$0.11 on 4 September, A$0.105 on 7 September, then −9.5% to A$0.095 on 8 September — the first close below ten cents — A$0.098 on 9 September, a 7.1% bounce to A$0.105 on 10 September on 10.8m shares against a recent average nearer 3.5m, and A$0.105 again on 11 September — ten consecutive closes below the floor, the lowest of them 20.8% under it. Then on 14 September the shares rose 14.3% to A$0.12 on 7.0m shares, their first close back at the threshold since 28 August, with no ASX announcement attached to it. That was the top. Three sessions at A$0.11 followed, then A$0.10 on 18 September on 23.2m shares — by far the heaviest volume of this entire run, against a recent average nearer 3.5m — A$0.099 on both 21 and 22 September, A$0.097 on 23 September, a fresh low for the run, and A$0.099 on 24 September. The clause turns on a fall below A$0.12: the shares have now closed below it in eight consecutive sessions since touching it, the last of them 17.5% under it, and the heaviest volume of the run came on the way down. They are also 38% below the A$0.16 the June placement was struck at. Nothing has been announced. This is the position the going-concern note describes, arrived at. The directors rest the going-concern basis on a history of raising capital, including $14.5m from a June 2026 placement; the share purchase plan that followed it raised A$0.96m.

The US listing is a separate problem, already solved once. On 12 August the company agreed with BNY to change its ADS ratio from one ADS per four ordinary shares to one per forty — economically a one-for-ten reverse split of the ADSs, effective 27 August 2026, done to lift the traded price back over Nasdaq's minimum bid threshold. The underlying ASX ordinary shares are untouched; only the US wrapper changed. On the new ratio the US line fell to $2.86 on 3 September, rebounded 5.2% to $3.01 on 4 September, fell 8.3% to $2.76 after Labor Day, eased 0.7% to $2.74 on 9 September — a two-year closing low — then rose 6.2% to $2.91 on 10 September, the only US line on this page to rise that session and a day behind the Australian bounce it was following, added a further 2.4% to $2.98 on 11 September, and then jumped 8.4% to $3.23 on 14 September — its highest close since 28 August and the largest single gain anywhere on this page that session — before handing most of it back, −5.6% to $3.05 on 15 September. Since then it has followed the Australian line down with a session's lag and no news at either end: $2.97 on 16 September, $3.03 on 17 September, −4.8% to $2.885 on 18 September, −1.6% to $2.84 on 21 September, a near-flat $2.85 on 22 September, −3.4% to $2.801 on 23 September and then −5.7% to $2.64 on 24 September — its worst session since 8 September and the lowest close in its three-year series, taking out the $2.74 of 9 September that had been the floor. The 52-week low proper is $2.52, an intraday print rather than a settlement. The Sydney line, a session ahead, closed A$0.098 on 25 September — a ninth consecutive close below the A$0.12 Yorkville amortisation threshold, 18% under it, and 39% below the A$0.16 the June placement was struck at, with no announcement attached to any of it. It then steadied: +1.5% to $2.68 on 25 September and +0.4% to $2.69 on 28 September, the only riser in the whole minerals tier on a day the rest of it was sold off. Then 14 October put it somewhere it has never been: −4.70% to $2.23, the lowest close in its Nasdaq history, with no close beneath it in 1,179 sessions back to 2 February 2022. There is no prior level to measure that against, which is the point of recording it. 15 October went lower again, −2.24% to $2.18, a second consecutive record low, on 0.76 times average volume. With Lynas it was one of only two names in the minerals tier that did not join that session’s reversal, and the only one to set a low in it. 16 October set a third consecutive record low, −1.38% to $2.15 on 0.69 times average volume, with no close beneath it anywhere in the series. That leaves the US line 91.0% below its high, 89.0% down over a year against a 16 October 2025 base of $19.60 and 78.7% lower year to date, still the worst figures in every column on this page. A ratio change buys compliance, not solvency: the US line has gone from $3.51 to $2.15 since it took effect, still clear of Nasdaq’s $1 threshold but closer to the range where it matters.

H1 loss $24.6m Cash $59.5m Auditor going-concern doubt Yorkville floor A$0.12 Off high −89.8%

20 October: −2.31% to $2.11 on 1.00 times average volume, a fresh record closing low on exactly its own average turnover. The drawdown cell barely moved, 90.0% to 89.8%, because the 52-week high rolled again, $21.50 to $20.70, and this run the base roll and the price all but cancelled. It is still the deepest drawdown here by twenty points, and the twelve-month cell fell to −90.6% on a base rolled $19.80 to $22.50.

WatchWhether the A$0.12 floor being breached is now treated as an amortisation event. The shares touched the level exactly on 14 September and have closed below it in every one of the fifteen sessions since, ending at A$0.094 on 5 October, 22% under it, with the heaviest volume of the run on the way down. The Nasdaq line has gone further since: −4.70% to $2.23 on 14 October is the lowest close in its entire Nasdaq history, with no close beneath it in 1,179 sessions back to 2 February 2022, and again on no disclosure from the company. That is no longer an open question about whether the threshold gets tested; what is open is the consequence, and a cash redemption against a $59.5m balance falling by roughly $23m a half is a large one. Dilution or a raise was already the base case; the auditor has written the reason into the accounts and the tape has now written the trigger. It is the only name on this list where solvency is the question rather than growth.

Correlation with the robotics basket

The same 103 calendar-aligned weekly returns, measured against an equal-weighted basket of the six tier-one component names. The ordering still inverts — the minerals names lead on REMX, the robotics names lead on the basket — just not as sharply as before the alignment fix.

Robotics component names Rare earth & critical minerals names
06 Tier three — the magnet layer

This layer explains the correlation result above. Robotics OEMs almost never buy magnet blocks directly — magnet procurement sits upstream, with the motor, encoder and actuator manufacturers. That is part of the mechanism behind a still-moderate 0.39 correlation between the robotics basket and REMX: the magnet is real, and it enters the robot through Nidec's and Yaskawa's purchase orders, priced into their cost of goods, but not through anything an assembler or an ETF holder touches directly.

It also explains why the layer is so hard to own. China controls roughly 90% of midstream NdFeB processing, and most of the Western and Japanese alternatives are private, subsidiaries, or state-funded projects that have not yet produced at scale. Of the seven magnet names below, three are directly investable — and only TDK combines real scale in magnets with a clean listing.

Company What it makes How you would own it Last YTD 1y Corr robotics
TDK6762.T · Tokyo Largest non-Chinese NdFeB maker; ferrite Direct — listed in Tokyo ¥2,780.5 +25.8% +12.2% 0.53
Aichi Steel5482.T · Tokyo Permanent magnets for robotic actuators Direct — listed in Tokyo ¥2,857 −2.2% +7.1% 0.17
Arnold Magneticvia CODI · NYSE Permanent magnets, magnetic assemblies Only via Compass Diversified, its parent $10.28 +114.2% +27.9% 0.18
MP MaterialsMP · NYSE Sintered NdFeB — see tier two Direct — the only listed mine-to-magnet $39.50 −21.8% −46.7% 0.21
Proterialformerly Hitachi Metals Advanced magnetic materials, RE-free R&D Not investable — private since 2022 — — — —
Niron Magneticsprivate · Minnesota Iron nitride, rare-earth-free magnets Not investable — VC and DoW funded — — — —
Noveon Magneticsprivate · Texas Sintered NdFeB from recycled feedstock Not investable — private, Series B — — — —
Correlations are weekly returns against the equal-weighted tier-one basket over 103 weekly returns, re-bucketed by ISO calendar week. TDK at 0.53 is still the exception that proves the rule — and it is a large Japanese electronics exporter, so most of that is shared market beta rather than magnet demand. Aichi Steel, Arnold and MP sit at 0.17–0.21: the listed magnet makers still trade only loosely with the component makers who buy from them.
Listed Largest ex-China

TDK

6762.T

The most substantial magnet business you can actually buy. TDK is the largest non-Chinese neodymium magnet manufacturer by revenue and the most globally diversified, producing sintered NdFeB in Japan and China alongside ferrite and metal-powder products. The company's origins are literally magnetic — it was founded in 1935 to commercialise ferrite.

Two honest caveats. Magnets are a modest slice of the group: TDK is dominated by its energy business, including ATL, one of the world's largest lithium battery makers, plus passive components and HDD heads. And its 0.53 correlation to the robotics basket — the highest of any name outside tier one, above every robotics ETF tested — largely reflects its status as a large Japanese electronics exporter moving with the same market, not humanoid demand reaching its P&L. You would be buying a battery-and-components group with a major magnet business attached.

Price ¥2,902.5 YTD +31.3% 1y +18.8% Corr robotics 0.53

21 October: +2.42% to ¥2,902.5 on 0.74 times average volume, recovering most of the previous session’s fall on three quarters of normal turnover. It is now the only name anywhere on this page whose four-week cell is positive, at +2.0%. The twelve-month cell slipped a little further even so, +19.1% to +18.8%, on a year-ago base rolled ¥2,379 to ¥2,443.5. Still no segment disclosure sizing magnets.

WatchAny segment disclosure sizing magnets against the battery business. Without it, the magnet exposure is real but unmeasurable — the same problem Aichi Steel has, at much larger scale. The 0.53 correlation keeps earning its keep: TDK fell 6.9% on 8 September — the worst session of any name on this page — in a yen-driven selloff that had nothing to do with magnets, recovered 1.4% and a further 1.4% to ¥2,850.5 by 10 September, gave back 1.5% on 11 September as oil and bond yields took the whole Tokyo market down, added 0.3% on 14 September while the index fell 0.81% on its AI complex, rose a further 0.6% on 15 September and added 1.4% to ¥2,872 on 16 September, before giving all of it back and more on 17 September, −2.3% to ¥2,806 — one of only two Tokyo names on this page to fall on a rising index — then recovering +1.4% to ¥2,845 on the Bank of Japan's hike, the smallest of the five Tokyo gains that session — and then, on the reopen after the three-day holiday, the largest: +3.9% to ¥2,954.5 on 24 September, the biggest single gain anywhere on this page that day, on a session led by the semiconductor-equipment names rather than by anything magnetic. It added +0.8% to ¥2,978 on 25 September, its highest close since 7 September — though the index rose 1.30% that day, so this was a lag rather than a lead — and gave a little back on 28 September, −0.8% to ¥2,955, roughly with an index down 0.73%. It moves with Murata and Taiyo Yuden rather than with the gearbox makers, which is the point: this is a Japanese electronics exporter that happens to make magnets. Note what it did not do on 14 September: the AI-pace selloff that took the US semiconductor complex down more than 5% that session left TDK higher on both sides of it. A passive-components maker is not an AI-silicon name, and the tape agrees even when the sector label does not. It eased again on 29 September, −1.2% to ¥2,919, against an index down 0.60%, then took it back on the quarter's last day, +2.1% to ¥2,981 on 30 September, its highest close since 1 September, and on an index up 1.94% that is a lag again, which is the shape this name keeps making. Then on 1 October it stopped lagging and led: +7.35% to ¥3,200 on 15.6m shares, closing exactly on its session high, more than double a Nikkei that rose 3.30%, its highest close since 17 August and the largest single gain anywhere on this page this run. For once there is a dated disclosure behind it, and it is instructive about what this name is. On 29 September TDK and Taiyo Yuden signed a memorandum of understanding to open discussions on a potential business alliance in multilayer ceramic capacitors and inductors for AI data centres, AI servers and physical AI systems, with manufacturing and procurement cooperation in scope, a possible future capital alliance left open, and the two naming MLCCs as Specified Critical Products under Japan's Economic Security Promotion Act. It is an agreement to talk rather than an alliance: no terms, no stakes, no joint venture, and nothing that touches NdFeB. So the single best session this page has recorded for its largest non-Chinese magnet maker came out of a capacitor line, which makes the caveat at the top of this card concrete rather than theoretical. And it has now happened twice on the same disclosure: 5 October added +7.8% to ¥3,447 on 22.4m shares against 11.5m the session before, its highest close since 6 July, in a Tokyo session led by semiconductors in which TDK outran Tokyo Electron, Advantest, Murata and SoftBank alike. Then it happened a third time and on a third catalyst, and a fourth session undid part of it. 6 October added +5.25% to ¥3,628 on 32.4m shares, its highest close since 3 July, on a Bloomberg report that Seagate and Toshiba are bidding for its HDD magnetic-head business: a fourth consecutive gain, and +21.7% in four sessions. Then 7 October gave part of it back, −2.70% to ¥3,530 on 16.6m shares, after Toshiba told the same outlet the report was “inconsistent” with its understanding and denied that any three-way discussion of head supply had taken place. 8 October gave back a good deal more, −5.01% to ¥3,353 on 12.7m shares, closing exactly on its low against a high of ¥3,515 — two sessions now worth −7.6% from the ¥3,628 peak, which returns about 42% of the four-session run and leaves it still +12.5% on 30 September. The tape has priced the denial rather than the report, and neither TDK nor Seagate has said anything at all. Four catalysts in a fortnight (HDD capacity, a capacitor memorandum, a reported auction for the head business, and a denial of it), and not one of them touches NdFeB. A third down session followed on 9 October, −2.54% to ¥3,268 on 16.1m shares, which returns 56% of the four-session run and leaves it +9.6% on 30 September and 24.3% below its high. Twelve-month return +43.2% and YTD +47.8%, both of which have swung ten points or more inside a month on where the lookback base lands. Three sessions since have undone the rest of that run and more: ¥3,133 on 13 October, ¥3,152 on 14 October, then −7.88% to ¥2,903.5 on 15 October in the CPI selloff, on 14.52m shares against a twenty-session average of 12.63m and its lowest close since 18 September. 16 October recovered part of it, +1.27% to ¥2,940.5 on 0.90 times average volume, and 19 October eased again, −0.94% to ¥2,913 on 0.76 times. That now leaves the twelve-month return +29.2%, the year to date +31.8% and the drawdown 32.5%, and once again not one of the four catalysts above was the reason for any of it. Until a segment disclosure sizes magnets against the battery and passives businesses, that is the whole problem with owning this name for magnets: the exposure is real, unmeasurable, and repeatedly outvoted by the rest of the group.

Listed Toyota group

Aichi Steel

5482.T

The cleanest direct way to own a magnet maker on this list. A Toyota Group company engineering permanent magnets tuned for robotic actuators, with an explicit design goal of reducing dependence on constrained rare earths — the same strategic bet Proterial and Niron are making, but in a listed vehicle.

It is also the steadiest chart in this report: up 13.4% over a year and 16.5% below its 52-week high, after 15 October left it the one Tokyo name that barely moved, −1.40% to ¥2,823 against a tier falling six to twelve per cent, and 16 October took it +4.00% to ¥2,936 on 1.42 times average volume, the best of the six Tokyo lines that session. 19 October closed it exactly unchanged at ¥2,936, the only flat close on the page. That drawdown has taken back the title it briefly lost: Compass Diversified has widened to 24.5% after its own 5.74% fall on 16 October, so Aichi is the tightest on the page again, against 27–51% for the six tier-one names. That is partly a virtue and partly a warning: magnets are a modest slice of a diversified steelmaker, so the humanoid narrative barely moves it in either direction, up or down. It sat out the 4 September rally with a 0.8% fall, sat out Monday's 2.1% index rally with a 0.2% fall, and lost 1.8% on 8 September on a day the component names lost 3–7%. What it had not sat out was the drift: four consecutive falls, ending −0.8% to ¥3,115 on 10 September, on a day Harmonic Drive rose 2.7% and Nidec 5.6%. Then it did the rarest thing on the page — on 11 September it closed unchanged at ¥3,115, to the yen, while the Nikkei fell 1.93% and every other Tokyo name here lost ground. On 14 September it added 0.3% to ¥3,125, its first rise since 3 September, on a day the index fell again, added 0.8% on 15 September, 1.3% to ¥3,190 on 16 September and a further 2.7% to ¥3,275 on 17 September — four consecutive gains and its highest close since 3 September — before doing the one genuinely contrary thing on the page: −1.4% to ¥3,230 on 18 September, the only Tokyo name here to fall on the Bank of Japan's hike, on a session when the index rose 1.38% and the gearbox makers rose 0.8–4.8%. Then it did the contrary thing again from the other side: on the 24 September reopen it closed unchanged at ¥3,230, to the yen, while the index rose 0.76% and every other Tokyo name on this page moved 1.2–3.9%. It repeated the trick on 25 September, −0.2% to ¥3,225 against an index up 1.30% — two consecutive sessions of doing almost nothing while Tokyo moved two points. Its four-week column is now 0.0%, flat to the yen against a 26 August base of ¥3,225. Steadiness cuts both ways. It sat out the drawdown and it has now sat out three rallies, which is exactly what a magnet line inside a diversified steelmaker should be expected to do — and it is why this name will not tell you anything about humanoid demand in either direction.

Price ¥2,879 1y +11.4% Off high −18.1% Ex-div ¥75, 29 Sep Corr robotics 0.17

One caution attaches to the figures above, because the largest session this card has recorded was not a market judgement. On 29 September 2026 the shares fell 3.9% to ¥3,080 — the worst of the six Tokyo names that day — and they went ex-dividend the same morning, ¥75.00 a share, payable 26 November. On the ¥3,205 previous close the distribution is 2.3 points of that 3.9%, leaving about 1.6% of actual repricing, and nothing was disclosed by the company. Both the year-to-date cell and the drawdown widen on the ex-date for the same mechanical reason. It is the dividend version of the base-roll problem this page flags elsewhere: a column can move several points because of a corporate action, and a reader comparing it with yesterday's is comparing two different things. The following session removes the excuse, though, and it is the reason the caution does not end there. 30 September took it a further 1.3% to ¥3,040, its lowest close since 31 July, on a day the Nikkei rose 1.94% and every other Tokyo name on this page went with it. Three points of relative ground on a session with no dividend in it and nothing disclosed is the only part of the two-day fall that is a market judgement, and it is the part worth watching. It has kept going, and that is now the story on this card: −0.7% to ¥3,020 on 1 October, −1.0% to ¥2,990 on 2 October and −0.7% to ¥2,969 on 5 October, its lowest close since 31 July. Five consecutive falls, and on the last of them it was the only Tokyo name on this page to fall at all, against an index up 2.40%. One session of that is a dividend; five is a name the market is marking down while it marks the rest of Tokyo up, on nothing the company has disclosed. The sixth broke the run, +1.4% to ¥3,010 on 6 October, and the seventh gave all of it back and more: −2.19% to ¥2,944 on 7 October, its lowest close since 11 June 2026 and the worst of the six Tokyo names on this page, on an index down 0.92%. Then the eighth went further than any of them: −4.28% to ¥2,818 on 8 October, on 321,200 shares against 163,400, its lowest close since 20 May 2026. Eight sessions, ¥3,205 to ¥2,818, 12.1%, with one up day in the middle of them and not a single disclosure behind any of it. The ninth broke it, +0.71% to ¥2,838 on 9 October, on roughly half the previous session’s volume. Still nothing disclosed across any of them. Three sessions since have left it the steadiest name on the page by a wide margin: ¥2,898 on 13 October, ¥2,863 on 14 October, and on 15 October a fall of just 1.40% to ¥2,823 while the rest of Tokyo lost six to twelve per cent. The twelve-month cell now reads +13.4% against a base rolled onto 17 October 2025’s ¥2,590 from 16 October’s ¥2,617, which is the whole of that cell’s move on a session the price did not change at all, and the drawdown is the cleaner read at 16.5% below the ¥3,515 high, which on this run hands the title back: Compass Diversified has widened to 24.5%.

21 October: +0.42% to ¥2,879 on 0.75 times average volume, the smallest move in Tokyo on a day the index rose 0.85%. The year-to-date cell stays negative at −1.4%, and the drawdown remains the shallowest anywhere on this page at 18.1%, which is roughly what a name with no humanoid disclosure and no rare-earth leverage looks like through a selloff in both.

WatchAny disclosure sizing the magnet business separately from steel. Without it you are buying a steelmaker with a magnet option attached, and the option is not priced because it is not visible.

Subsidiary Owned, not listed

Arnold Magnetic Technologies

via CODI

A real magnet business you cannot buy directly. Arnold makes permanent magnets, precision thin metals and magnetic assemblies to the tolerances robotics OEMs need — and in March 2026 signed a distribution agreement with USA Rare Earth, linking it straight to tier two. But it has been a subsidiary of Compass Diversified since a $130.5m acquisition in 2012, and CODI is the only way in.

That is a poor trade for magnet exposure, and the reason is not subtle. CODI is a diversified holding company whose stock fell 59% in May 2025 when a probe found pervasive accounting fraud at its Lugano Diamonds unit. It restated fiscal 2022–2024, deconsolidated Lugano after a Chapter 11 filing in November 2025, triggered credit-facility defaults requiring forbearance, and suspended its distributions. The stock is up 108.5% year to date because it is recovering from that hole, not because of magnets — and it fell 2.7% on 9 September and a further 2.3% to $10.96 on 10 September, its lowest close since 6 August, in a session that had nothing to do with either magnets or diamonds. It has since gone nowhere with unusual precision: +0.5%, +2.7% to $11.31, −1.9%, −0.8%, +0.6%, −0.5%, +1.6% to $11.21 on 21 September, +1.1% to $11.33 on 22 September, +0.2% to $11.35 on 23 September — the only US name on this page besides Ambarella to rise on a day the minerals tier was liquidated — −0.9% to $11.25 on 24 September, unchanged at $11.25 on 25 September, −0.4% to $11.20 on 28 September — one of only two US names on this page to fall less than a point on a day the minerals tier was sold off wholesale — and −1.4% to $11.04 on 29 September, its largest fall of the sequence and its lowest close since 18 September, on a session when the metals complex recovered. That is thirteen sessions inside thirty-five cents, eight cents above the 10 September low they started from. Nothing about Arnold changed in either direction across any of them, which is the recurring problem with owning a magnet business this way: the only listed route to it is a holding company whose price is set by its own recovery. 16 October made that point at size and with nothing attached to it. CODI fell 5.74% to $10.01 on 1.07 times average volume, its lowest close since 29 July 2026 and the largest single-session fall anywhere on this page that day, on a session with no company disclosure behind it and nothing about the magnet business in it. That takes the year to date to +108.5% and the drawdown to 24.5%, which costs it the tightest-drawdown title it had taken off Aichi Steel a run earlier.

The Q2 2026 call, held 17 Aug, is the freshest read on Arnold specifically. Subsidiary adjusted EBITDA came in at $91.5m (+12.6% year over year), helped by the 1 May sale of the Sterno food-service business, whose proceeds (over $280m) went straight to paying down the senior secured term loan — total debt fell to $1.59bn from $1.89bn at year-end 2025. COO Zach Sawtelle, who succeeds retiring CEO Elias Sabo at the end of 2026, called Arnold's segment "a standout, up nearly 50%," with a strong backlog tied to non-China rare-earth magnet sourcing and progress at a Thailand facility. Management said it is still pursuing further divestitures to cut debt, but did not name Arnold as a candidate — if anything, a segment growing 50% is the one they would want to keep. CODI shares still fell 4.8% on the day.

Parent CODI YTD +115.8% Arnold EBITDA ~+50% YoY Corr robotics 0.18

20 October: Compass Diversified +3.08% to $10.36 on 0.78 times average volume, the second-largest rise on the page, with nothing on the company’s feed dated to it. It is the mirror of the session before, which put 2.15 times the volume behind four tenths of a point: this one puts three per cent on below-average turnover. Neither is a disclosure, and this is still the only route to Arnold on this list.

WatchWhether CODI divests Arnold. Management's 17 Aug commentary points the other way for now — Arnold was singled out as a growth standout, not flagged among the divestiture candidates — but a holding company still repairing its balance sheet post-Lugano remains a seller in waiting.

Private Rare-earth-free

Niron Magnetics

private · Minnesota

Not investable, but the most strategically interesting name in this section — because it is trying to make the bottleneck irrelevant rather than relieve it. Niron's iron nitride permanent magnets, out of University of Minnesota research, use no rare earths at all. If they work at scale, the entire NdPr supply argument underpinning tier two weakens.

It just got a serious endorsement: on 7 August 2026 the Department of War's Office of Strategic Capital issued a conditional commitment for a direct loan of up to $150m over 20 years for a 287,000 sq ft plant in Sartell, Minnesota — intended as the world's first full-scale iron nitride production site, targeted at robots, defence systems and electric motors. The same release names a second $150m loan from the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community for the same site, so the plant carries up to $300m of committed debt against roughly $50m of venture capital raised to date.

Construction reached a visible milestone on 10 September 2026: Niron raised first steel at Sartell and, in the same release, disclosed an equity investment from Honda, made through Honda Xcelerator Ventures on undisclosed terms. That is the part worth marking. Every dollar behind this company so far has come from venture funds or from government — the Department of War loan, the tribal loan. An automaker putting its own balance sheet into rare-earth-free magnets is a customer-side endorsement, and customers are the constituency whose behaviour would actually reprice tier two.

A customer has now put the magnets through qualification, which is that constituency acting. Niron disclosed on 2 October 2026 that Moog is testing and qualifying its iron nitride magnets in electromechanical actuators aimed at Army land vehicles and guided munitions, with the two exhibiting together at AUSA 2026 from 12 to 14 October. The collaboration dates to December 2025, so the release marks a stage rather than a new deal, and it carries no magnet grade, no test data and no terms: it is a trade-show announcement and worth no more than that. What it does establish is the application. Actuators are precisely what tier one sells, so a rare-earth-free magnet being qualified into them is the threat to tier two arriving through the product rather than through the mine. Niron says it has been producing and qualifying with customers since 2025 and expects commercial production within 18 months, which is a claim to hold against the 2027 Sartell date rather than alongside it.

The number that matters for tier two is the capacity. Sartell is scoped at up to 1,500 tonnes a year of rare-earth-free permanent magnets, operational in 2027 — small against MP's planned ~10,000 tonnes, but Niron says a follow-on 10,000 tonne US plant breaks ground in 2028, with site selection already under way. If the second plant lands on schedule, the rare-earth-free capacity arriving at the end of this decade is the same order of magnitude as the Western NdFeB capacity being subsidised into existence today.

DoW loan up to $150m Announced 7 Aug 2026 Sartell 1,500 t/yr, 2027 First steel 10 Sep 2026 Honda equity, undisclosed Rare earths none

WatchSartell's commissioning, still pointed at 2027 now that the structure is going up, whether the 10,000-tonne follow-on site is actually named, and whether any other original-equipment maker follows Honda in. Track it as a threat to the tier-two thesis rather than as a position — the first credible rare-earth-free magnet at volume reprices every name in that tier downward.

Private Context only

Proterial, Noveon and the Chinese incumbents

Proterial — formerly Hitachi Metals, a genuine heavyweight in advanced magnetic materials and rare-earth-free development — has not been buyable since October 2022, when a Bain Capital-led consortium completed a roughly $7.5bn take-private and the shares were delisted. It was renamed in January 2023. Any list presenting it as a way to invest in magnets is out of date by nearly four years.

Noveon Magnetics is a private Texas manufacturer producing sintered NdFeB through its EcoFlux recycling process — a closed-loop route that sidesteps mining entirely. It has raised a $75m Series B and is operational, which makes it a real competitor to MP and USAR, just not a tradeable one.

On the Chinese side, the incumbents are what make the ~90% midstream share real. Two names circulating in research summaries, Ningbo Zhanhao and Mainrich Magnets, could not be verified as listed entities and should not be treated as tickers. The clearest listed Chinese pure-play in rare-earth permanent magnets is Ningbo Yunsheng (600366.SS) — A-share access and Chinese policy risk apply, which is much of the reason the West is building alternatives at all.

Proterial private since 2022 Noveon $75m Series B China midstream ~90%

WatchConsolidation. A Western magnet maker being acquired, floated or spun out is the most likely route by which this layer becomes investable at all — and every name here is a candidate.

07 What would move this list
Order books, not forecasts

Harmonic Drive's quarterly humanoid order figure and Ambarella's robotics design wins are the only two disclosures on this list that convert narrative into countable units. Everything else is guidance, and the nearest test of it has now happened: Yaskawa revised FY2/27 on 9 October 2026, raising revenue to ¥600bn on a weaker yen and cutting operating profit to ¥57.5bn after the new ERP system hit first-half production and shipments. What it leaves is a back half that has to deliver +47.8% operating profit growth against a first half that delivered −5.5%. The same filing did produce a countable number, and it cuts against the premise of this list: second-quarter orders of ¥185.4bn, a record, +38% year on year, with Motion Control up 56% and attributed by the company to data centre and semiconductor demand rather than to robots. An order book can be countable and still be about a different end market. Schaeffler answered the same question four days later, and answered it the other way. Its preliminary nine-month release of 13 October put humanoid-robotics orders on hand at approximately €400m, against €350m at the half year, after two new Greater China customers in the quarter took its humanoid customer count to five. That is an order book attributed to humanoids specifically rather than to an adjacent end market, and it is the only one on this page. The next dated tests are TDK on 30 October, Schaeffler’s validated statement on 3 November and Yaskawa’s third quarter in January.

1 January 2027

US defence sourcing rules bar Chinese-origin NdFeB magnets, tungsten, molybdenum and tantalum across the supply chain. This is the date the minerals tier is actually trading on.

Nidec, end of October

Resolved, and replaced by a bigger date. The FY3/26 annual securities report was filed on 30 September, the day its twice-set deadline fell: a net loss of ¥564.6bn on revenue of ¥2,708.7bn, with impairments above ¥632bn, so the real figure landed between the ~¥250bn Nidec had under review and the ¥1tn the press reported, and neither circulating number was right. But PwC Japan disclaimed its opinion on both the accounts and the internal control report, the second consecutive year, so the figures are filed and unassured. The date that now matters is the end of October, and it is the anniversary of a designation rather than a discretionary deadline: the Tokyo Stock Exchange made Nidec a Security on Special Alert effective 28 October 2025, and its rules require the written confirmation of internal management system one year on, with delisting if the exchange judges the controls inadequate. New president Michio Kaida has said he intends to keep the listing. That makes this the only name on the list carrying a listing risk rather than a valuation question, and the April–June quarter is still missing behind it. Seven days out, the position is that Nidec says it aims to complete the work needed to obtain audit opinions by the end of October, while its auditor’s chief executive said in public on 1 October that evidence from officers and employees who had made false representations could not be trusted. The stock closed at its lowest since 31 March 2026 on 9 October with nothing filed. A second question now sits alongside the deadline: on 7 October Oasis Management, holder of about 8%, asked the board to begin a preliminary review of privatization options, naming the disclaimer and the delisting risk as its reason. Oasis calls it a feasibility check rather than a decision to sell, no board response is on the record, and it cuts both ways here: a take-private removes the listing risk this trigger is written about and removes the disclosure with it. A third strand arrived on 16 October, and it is no longer pending: Nidec received the report of its Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee on whether current and former directors, auditors and vice presidents are legally liable for the improper accounting, and a second release the same day published the Committee’s conclusion. Nine individuals are named or identified as “believed to be liable in damages”: founder Shigenobu Nagamori, Hiroshi Kobe, Akira Sato, Hiroyuki Yoshimoto, Jun Seki and Mitsuya Kishida under Article 423(1) of the Companies Act, Kazuya Murakami and Hiroyuki Ochiai under the same article, and an unnamed former vice president, the CFO from May 2022 to March 2026, under the Civil Code or Nidec’s Vice President Regulations. The redacted Report itself was published on 20 October, on schedule, and the Japanese digest of it puts the damage at about ¥27.6bn — investigation costs, audit costs and the exchange penalty — with the apportionment among the nine left to a court. The same release notes that the appropriation of surplus was excluded from the Committee’s remit, because the amended securities reports for past years have not been filed, and says Nidec will examine legal action on that separately once they are. What has not happened is the decision: Nidec says it “will consider necessary legal actions such as filing a claim for damages”, which is deliberation, and an aggregator reporting a board resolution to sue is wrong, as the claim audit records. So the only dated event still ahead is an actual damages claim, and this trigger now cuts two ways against the listing question: a company suing its own founder is evidence of the governance reset the exchange is asking for, and a public account of what the directors did is evidence for the exchange to read.

Price floors spreading to Dy/Tb

Chinese NdPr oxide spent the summer below the $110/kg DoD-backed Western floor and has climbed back to roughly $108.7/kg on Benchmark Mineral Intelligence's 25 September Q3 assessment, which puts it within two dollars of the floor rather than comfortably under it. Ex-China heavies have gone further: dysprosium +56% in September to $3,500/kg CIF Europe, terbium +23% to $6,745/kg. The 24 August USA Rare Earth SPV extends guaranteed floors to dysprosium and terbium for the first time — watch whether the next deal does too. Floors are bullish REMX and a cost headwind for the component makers.

The 2027 volume ramp

The entire thesis assumes humanoid volumes inflect from 2027. Safety standards are not expected until around 2028, and the projected NdPr deficit widens to 21,000 tonnes by then. Slippage hits the tier-one names first.

Segment disclosure

Schaeffler breaking out actuators, or Ambarella breaking out robotics, would let this watchlist be priced on robotics revenue instead of inference. Neither does today.

Western magnet tonnage

MP's magnetics revenue and USA Rare Earth's 600 mtpa target are the two live measures of whether ex-China magnet supply is actually materialising — and only one of them is yet a revenue line at all, because USAR states it has not commenced sales of neo magnets. Both report quarterly; both are currently small enough to verify claim against invoice. The announced pipeline behind them grew again on 9 September, when USAR broke ground at Blacksburg, South Carolina on 6,400 tpa of sintered NdFeB for 2028 — bigger than Stillwater's full build, and still a groundbreaking rather than a tonne.

Greenland, from headline to permit

The 18 September US–Denmark–Greenland security agreement repriced the rare-earth tape in one session without adding a tonne of capacity. Greenland has no scaled rare-earth mine, and the named projects need permits, infrastructure and local consent. Watch whether a permit or an offtake actually follows; until one does, this is a policy premium on the whole tier, and the names here with no Greenland exposure at all caught most of it.

Iron nitride at scale

Niron's Sartell plant, backed by a conditional $150m Department of War loan and a matching $150m tribal loan, raised first steel on 10 September and targets 1,500 t/yr from 2027, with a 10,000 t/yr follow-on breaking ground in 2028. Honda has now taken equity alongside the state money, and Moog has been qualifying the magnets in electromechanical actuators for Army land vehicles and guided munitions since December 2025, restated on 2 October 2026: the first named customer doing so in tier one’s own product. A working rare-earth-free magnet at volume does not help tier one much, it undercuts tier two.

10 November, in the published text

Nineteen days out, and the extension everyone is trading is not in Chinese law. MOFCOM Announcement No. 70 of 2025, dated 7 November 2025, suspended Announcements 55 to 58, 61 and 62 until 10 November 2026, and that is still the only expiry Beijing has published. On 23 September Treasury Secretary Bessent said the Busan Agreement, due to lapse on 10 November, would be extended to 10 January 2027, adding that whether a broader deal lands by then “was not yet clear”, and a ministry official said the same on 28 September. Neither is an instrument. Trackers reading MOFCOM’s 2026 announcement list on 1 October and again on 16 October found it running to Announcement No. 48 with nothing extending or replacing No. 70, and the US side has published no matching extension of its own measure either. So the position to hold is the narrow one: a stated intention on both sides, no text on either, and a hard date twenty days away that becomes real if nothing is filed. Xi met Trump at the White House on 24 September, arriving the day before for a 23–25 September state visit, and the tier repriced for the stated extension in the same session: USA Rare Earth −6.8%, MP −4.2%, REMX −3.1%, with the Asian rare-earth names following on 24 September. Tier two now trades both ways off these: a durable arrangement erodes the scarcity premium, a lapse restores it, and an extension merely moves the date the question gets asked. A stated extension with no published text is the worst of the three to hold, because it has already taken the premium out while leaving the date in place. The next scheduled meeting is APEC on 18–19 November, which falls after 10 November rather than before it. Beijing blacklisted MP and USA Rare Earth in June 2026 and MP fell ~30% through July; further list additions remain the clearest downside catalyst, and barely register in tier one. One counter-current to the thaw trade, reported by Reuters on 4 September: some Chinese suppliers have refused US shipments since early August, after Beijing sanctioned the Responsible Business Alliance, and some US buyers have waited over six months for licences. The physical market was tightening in the same fortnight the equity premium compressed, and it still is: China shipped 512 tonnes of magnets to the United States in August, 21% fewer than in July, while its total magnet exports fell only 6%, to 5,010 tonnes. An extension of the truce is not a resumption of licences.

08 Method & caveats

Prices are last closes from Yahoo Finance chart data, taken as the most recent completed session in each venue, which means the as-of date usually differs by market. This run all three venues carry a new close, in the normal one-session shape rather than the weekend alignment. Tokyo reads 22 Oct 2026; Xetra and the US read 21 Oct 2026. A 07:00 UTC run on a Thursday sits after Tokyo has settled its own session at 15:30 JST, an hour and a half earlier, and after Xetra and New York have settled Wednesday, but before either Western venue opens again, so Tokyo is always one session ahead. The gap is structural to the cadence rather than a data fault, and only a weekend refresh closes it, as the 17 October run did. Xetra’s figure this run had to be recovered rather than read, and the window to recover it has already shut. Schaeffler’s 21 October daily bar is null, close and volume both, and it is null on every German line tested, Xetra, Munich, Düsseldorf and Hamburg alike, so it is the standing upstream gap described below rather than a broken ticker. The close was taken from regularMarketPrice at €5.82, stamped 17:35 CEST, five minutes after the 17:30 Xetra auction and before the 22 October session opened. By 09:06 the next morning that same field had rolled to an intraday €5.70 and the 21 October close was no longer retrievable from it at all. That is the sharpest argument this page has yet produced for running the refresh before the European open rather than after it: the figure existed for one overnight window and nothing but the quote carried it. No volume survives for the session, so Schaeffler is the one tier-one name with no volume comparison this run. Tokyo settles at 15:30 JST, not 15:00. The exchange extended its afternoon session by thirty minutes on 5 November 2024, so continuous trading stops at 15:25 and an itayose closing auction fixes the close at 15:30; every Tokyo figure here is taken at that auction, and a quote read at 15:00 is a pre-auction print rather than a close. The claim audit carries the consequence, including one instance of this page stating the old time itself. Every 1d cell on the page is still a true one-session move, but no longer over one pair of dates: Tokyo’s four tier-one cells span 21 to 22 October and the Western two span 20 to 21 October, so the 1d column still needs a date adjustment before it is read across venues. The four-week bases have split by venue, which ends the two-run single-base stretch. Tokyo’s stay pinned on 18 September for a third consecutive run, and the reason is a three-day holiday block: the exchange was closed on 21, 22 and 23 September for Respect for the Aged Day, a Citizens’ Holiday and the Autumnal Equinox, so a four-week window ending on 22 September cannot reach any session later than 18 September. The Western names’ bases rolled to 21 September. The tier gap this run, 8.3 points to 7.4, therefore carries calendar where last run carried none: held on a common 18 September base it would read 6.5, so price narrowed it 1.8 points and the base roll widened it 0.9. The largest single effect sits in MP, whose four-week base rolled $47.26 to $50.00 and took its 1m cell from −16.4% to −21.0% on a session the stock rose 1.15%. One column does not follow that rule, and it is worth stating plainly: fiftyTwoWeekHigh is anchored on the request date rather than on the venue’s last completed close, so the drawdown lookback window can roll on a day the price behind it did not. That is what happened again on 16 October, when the window moved onto the 17 October 2025 highs and took MP’s from $91.99 to $84.15 and USA Rare Earth’s from $34.03 to $32.80, and it is the mechanism this page wrongly denied for weeks. It rolled again on 17 October and that time barely registered: only MP’s high moved, $84.15 to $83.99, two tenths of a per cent, with the other ten unchanged. It did not roll at all on the 19 October run, when all eleven 52-week highs held. On the 21 October run two moved again, and they were the same two: MP’s high rolled $80.89 to $76.80, improving its cell from 51.9% to 49.2% and taking it under fifty per cent for the first time in this account, on a session the stock rose a quarter of a point; and Novonix’s rolled $21.50 to $20.70, which left its cell all but still at 89.8% because the price fell 2.31% into it. MP’s is the largest step this column has taken in a single run, and the decomposition is stark: held at today’s price on the old $80.89 high the cell would read 51.7%, so of the 2.7 points, price contributed 0.2 and the 20 October 2025 high dropping out of the window contributed 2.5. The other nine were unchanged. On this run not one of the eleven moved, so every change in the drawdown column is price, and in Tokyo there was a great deal of it: Harmonic Drive’s cell widened 5.6 points in a single session to 46.7%, Nabtesco’s 3.2 to 31.9%, Yaskawa’s 2.1 to 49.0% and Nidec’s 1.6 to 41.7%, while Ambarella’s narrowed 2.9 points to 31.7% and is now the tightest drawdown on the page. The larger base movement this run is again in the one-year column, and it is the exact mirror of the last one. Tokyo’s bases rolled from 21 onto 22 October 2025 and the Western names’ from 20 onto 21 October 2025, which takes 20 October 2025, the session the market traded MOFCOM’s extraterritorial controls and the Western producers re-rated on scarcity, back out of the window. Last run that session rolling in cost four minerals cells between four and six points; rolling out, it hands back more than it took. Perpetua’s 1y goes −31.4% to −21.0% on a base rolled $27.27 to $23.71, and 10.3 of those 10.4 points is the base with a tenth of a point of price; Lynas’s −42.0% to −32.9% on $13.84 to $11.99, 9.0 points of it base; USA Rare Earth’s −68.2% to −61.7% on $31.59 to $26.73, 5.9 of base; MP’s −52.9% to −46.7% on $82.90 to $74.11, 5.7 of base; and Novonix’s −90.6% to −89.3% on $22.50 to $20.00. Tokyo’s step ran the other way and was swamped by price: Harmonic Drive’s 1y falls from +65.6% to +49.1% on a base rolled ¥3,255 to ¥3,270, of which only 0.7 of the 16.5 points is the base and 15.8 is the session itself; Nabtesco’s +17.1% to +8.3% splits 3.6 to base and 5.1 to price, and Yaskawa’s −3.4% to −11.6% splits 4.2 and 3.9. The rule is unchanged and this run states it in both directions at once: read the 1y column with the base in hand. Both documented feed traps appeared in the same ticker on consecutive runs, pulling opposite ways, which is the clearest demonstration of why the rule is split in two. Last run the German daily array carried a 12 October bar at €5.97 stamped 09:04:22 CEST on 57,043 shares, an intraday quote masquerading as a close, and it was discarded because the venue was open. This run that same session has become a hole: the 12 October daily bar is null, and the close had to be recovered rather than read. Two independent routes agree on €5.95: regularMarketPrice carrying it stamped after the 17:30 auction, captured in the narrow window before that field rolled forward to a live 13 October print of €5.93 on 5,823 shares, and previousClose returning the same €5.95 on a five-minute request made after Xetra reopened. The continuous five-minute series is the trap inside the trap: it stops at 17:25 on €5.89, and taking that last tick would have published a flat session rather than the +1.19% one that happened. So the rule holds in both halves. If the venue is open, the last bar is discarded regardless of what it says; and when a bar is missing, prefer the auction print over the last continuous tick. That was the twenty-fifth hole in this series. The gap has recurred on both sessions since, at 13 and 14 October, while 12 and 13 October have each backfilled at exactly the figure published here, €5.95 and €5.85. The 14 October bar backfilled at exactly €5.94 and the 15 October bar has now backfilled at exactly €5.75, both the figures published here from three routes, so the reconstruction that stood open last run is confirmed. 16 October is null in its place, and this one is a genuine hole rather than the ordinary open-venue case, because Xetra had been closed for thirteen hours when this page compiled. 16 October has since backfilled at exactly €5.83, the figure published here from two routes, and a thirtieth hole opened in its place on 20 October. So the standing tally is thirty holes, thirty reconstructions, twenty-nine confirmed to the cent, with 20 October the only one open, closed here at €5.89 on two routes: regularMarketPrice stamped 17:35:05 CEST against the 17:30 close, and previousClose returning the same €5.89 on a request made after Xetra had reopened. This one is a deeper hole than its predecessors. The 16 October bar had made the shape of these gaps unusually clear, its volume field populated at 877,225 shares while its close was null, so the session was in the feed and only the price was missing; the 20 October bar drops the volume too, which is a different and worse failure, and the twenty-session comparison had to be made against the quote-level volume field instead. The trap inside the trap also pulled the opposite way from last time: the continuous five-minute series stops at 17:25 on €5.94, so taking the last tick rather than the auction would have published a +2.95% session instead of the +2.08% one that happened. That session also produced this series’ first corroboration from outside the vendor altogether: a German market report stamped 15 October 13:20 CEST quotes the preceding “Xetra close of EUR 5.94 on October 14, 2026”, matching the reconstruction rather than the feed that lost it. One route was weaker than last run’s, and it should be recorded as such: the 17:30 five-minute bar carried €5.75 on zero volume, so it is the continuous close rather than the auction print, where 14 October had shown the auction itself on 1,221,280 shares. The largest moves on the page this run are in a column again, and this is the biggest base roll the series has recorded. Every twelve-month base stepped from 9 onto 10 October 2025, one session on from the one it occupied last run, and that single day does something none of the others did: it split the page. 9 October 2025 is the session MOFCOM published Announcements 61 and 62, the extraterritorial rare-earth export controls; 10 October 2025 is the day the market traded them, and the Western producers re-rated on scarcity while the broad complex sold off on the tariff threat that followed. So the bases moved in opposite directions and the twelve-month cells followed them. Novonix’s base rose 35.8% in one step, from $21.65 to $29.40, which is the largest single base movement this page has seen in any column, leaving its cell at −91.8%. Compass Diversified’s rose 13.6%, from $7.35 to $8.35, and its cell fell 18.5 points, from +47.6% to +29.1%, on a −0.65% session. MP’s rose 8.4%, from $72.29 to $78.34, for an 8.5-point fall to −44.7%, and USA Rare Earth’s 5.0% for a 4.2-point fall to −63.8%. Ambarella went the other way and furthest: its base fell 13.5%, from $84.28 to $72.88, so a 3.89% loss left its cell 8.9 points better, from −20.0% to −11.1%. The instructive one is REMX, whose own base fell 7.1%, from $74.78 to $69.47: on the session that priced China restricting rare-earth exports, the rare-earth ETF fell while three of the five producers it is meant to proxy rose, which is this page’s third finding stated by a single day of data. The four-week bases, by contrast, did not move at all, and this note’s prediction that 13 October would be the first chance for the venue alignment to break was wrong. All seven are still 11 September, for a fourth consecutive run, because 12 and 13 September were a weekend: a 30-day lookback from 12 October and from 13 October both land back on the same Friday close. The alignment the previous run called a coincidence of the calendar turns out to be a fairly durable one, and it will hold until a lookback clears a weekday. Read every column against its own base date, and treat a large move in one on a small move in the price as a date problem until shown otherwise. A venue date is still not a page date; read each column against its own. One trap, recorded on 19 Aug 2026: Yahoo’s daily bar array can lag a venue’s latest close, and that afternoon it still ended at the 18 August Tokyo session while the quote metadata already carried the 19 August close. Taking the bars at face value would have shown Harmonic Drive at ¥5,960 rather than ¥5,670, understating the fall by about five percentage points. The German feed keeps swallowing sessions, and the running tally is the argument for the method rather than against it. The deepest case in the series stays closed and confirmed: 24 September, the largest session of the series at −6.2% and the only one closed on four independent routes rather than two, backfilled at exactly €6.54, the figure the auction bar, previousClose, chartPreviousClose and an independent German quote service all carried at the time. That took the tally to sixteen holes, sixteen reconstructions, sixteen confirmed to the cent through the end of that week. It has not stayed there for a single run since. The nineteenth hole, at 1 October, has now healed, and it is the strongest confirmation in the series because it was the one closed on three independent routes rather than two. That bar now reads exactly €6.23, which is what all three carried when it was absent: regularMarketPrice stamped 17:37:57 CEST against a 17:30 close, previousClose on a five-minute request made after Xetra reopened, and a five-minute bar stamped exactly 17:30:00, the auction itself rather than a proxy for it. Three routes, one figure, and the vendor has now agreed with all three. The twentieth hole, at 5 October, was the first in the series that could not be closed on a second daily route, and it has now healed on the vendor's own bar at exactly €6.24 — the figure regularMarketPrice carried stamped 17:39:37 CEST against a 17:30 close, in the single narrow window it was available, since on the next request the same field had already rolled to a live print. That capture window is the whole of the method here, and the single-route reading has been vindicated rather than merely left standing. A twenty-first hole opened immediately behind it, at 6 October, and that one closed on two routes: regularMarketPrice at €6.36 stamped 17:35:22 CEST, and a five-minute bar stamped exactly 17:30:00 carrying the same €6.36, which is the auction itself rather than a proxy for it. The Frankfurt line carries the identical hole for a second consecutive session, which again confirms the gap is one upstream failure rather than a broken Xetra ticker, and again removes the second German daily route in the same stroke. So the tally reads twenty-one holes, twenty-one reconstructions, twenty-one confirmed to the cent, and that sentence is only true as of this run: when it was first published the 6 October bar was still null, so the twenty-first case was reconstructed rather than confirmed, and this note said “none open” while the entry above it correctly reported the bar as missing. The vendor has since backfilled 6 October at exactly €6.36, which is what both routes carried, so the claim has caught up with itself and nothing published ever depended on the difference. The twenty-fourth hole, at 9 October, has now healed as well, and it was one of the better-closed cases in the series rather than a single-route reading. The vendor's bar now reads exactly €5.88 on 932,268 shares, which is what both routes carried when it was absent: regularMarketPrice stamped 17:39:43 CEST against a 17:30 close, and a five-minute bar stamped 17:35:00 at the same €5.88 on 435,144 shares, against 2,745 to 18,539 in each of the six bars before it. That took the tally to twenty-four holes, twenty-four reconstructions, twenty-four confirmed to the cent, and none open, on the session that took Schaeffler to its lowest close since 2 October 2025. Three further holes have opened since, at 12, 13 and 14 October, and the first two have already backfilled at exactly the figures published here, so the standing tally is twenty-seven holes, twenty-seven reconstructions, twenty-six confirmed to the cent with the newest open. The procedure has been contradicted on none of the twenty-six closed cases, which is as settled as a workaround gets. It stays in place, because the gap has recurred often enough that its absence for one session would not be evidence it had stopped. The rule stands with its clause: when a German bar is missing, prefer the auction print, and where the intraday series stops short of the auction, previousClose on a request made after the venue reopens is the auction, not the last tick before it. The US feed's own hole has healed too. The 22 September daily bar was missing for four days for Ambarella, Lynas's ADR, Perpetua, Novonix, REMX, Compass Diversified and the iShares gold trust, while MP, USA Rare Earth and the SPDR gold trust carried it throughout — the same split, and mostly the same names, as the 28 August attrition recorded below. All seven were closed from previousClose and all seven have now returned, matching the reconstruction on every one: Ambarella at $67.06, REMX at $70.97, Perpetua at $24.76, Lynas at $10.33, Novonix at $2.85. That last one is the figure the claim audit's newest row turns on, and it is worth noting that the page's table had it right on the day and only the prose did not. The same gap hit an earlier run from the opposite direction, when the daily bars for every US name ended at 2 September while the metadata already carried the completed 3 September close. The metadata timestamp, converted to exchange-local time, is what decides whether a session is complete. Returns are computed on the local primary line, so no currency translation is embedded. This is a dated snapshot — the page cannot fetch live quotes and does not pretend to. It is refreshed daily at 07:00 UTC, and the compiled date in the masthead moves every time any content on this page changes, so that stamp is always the age of what you are reading.

28 Aug 2026: the corporate-action trap. Novonix changed its ADS ratio on 27 August, effectively a one-for-ten reverse split of the US line. Yahoo adjusted its quote metadata immediately — the 52-week high became $38.60 — but had not yet restated the daily close history, which still ran to $0.435. Read together, the two would have put Novonix 98.9% below its 52-week high, an invented 10× drawdown. Yahoo restated the history in stages, and for a fortnight put the seam in the wrong place: the 10× step sat between 21 and 24 August, three sessions before the change took effect on 27 August, so 24–26 August were carried at post-change prices they never traded at. That restatement has now completed. The whole series is on the post-change ratio, the misplaced step is gone, and a scan of two years of daily bars finds no jump larger than the two genuine ones from November 2024 and October 2025. The figures on this page were computed throughout with both sides on the post-change ratio, scaling closes at the seam the data actually contained rather than the one the corporate action implied — and they did not move when the vendor caught up, which is the only real test such a patch gets. Taken raw at the time, the same mismatch would have reported Novonix up 618% in a month, the earlier error wearing the opposite sign. Any screen mixing adjusted metadata with unadjusted bars across a corporate action produces the same class of error, silently.

A hole in the German feed, since filled. Yahoo's daily bars carried no 28 August close for any German single stock — Schaeffler, SAP, BMW and Continental all return null for that session, as do the Frankfurt, Munich, Düsseldorf and Hamburg lines, so it is one upstream gap rather than several — while the DAX index itself printed 26,570.0 that day. Taking the bars at face value would have held Schaeffler at its 27 August close of €7.35 and reported a 2.4% rise as a flat session. The €7.53 on this page is reconstructed from the intraday series for 28 August and cross-checked against an independent price history that agrees to the cent and matches Yahoo's own daily bars for 24–27 August exactly. A missing bar is not the same as an unchanged price. Yahoo backfilled the session later the same day at €7.53, matching the reconstruction to the cent.

The German hole is now a standing feature — and it heals itself, which is the useful part. It has recurred on eleven sessions since late August, and it is not Schaeffler-specific: SAP and Siemens return null for exactly the same days, so it is one upstream gap rather than a broken ticker. What has changed is that the earlier gaps have since backfilled, which turns them into a test of the patch. Yahoo now carries daily bars for 28 August and 1–4 September, and every one of them matches the figure this page reconstructed at the time to the cent: €7.53, €7.22, €7.02, €7.30 and €7.43. Five reconstructions, five exact confirmations, using two different routes — the neighbouring session's quote metadata, and the intraday series. The 7 and 8 September holes needed a third route, because both were still missing while Xetra had already opened on 9 September, so the metadata carried a live quote rather than either settlement and the standard 5-minute series stops at 17:25, before the closing auction. Requesting the 5-minute series with pre- and post-market bars included returns the auction print itself, stamped 17:35 CEST: €7.34 on 7 September and €7.43 on 8 September, the latter on 229,007 shares against a few thousand in each of the preceding bars — the volume signature of a closing auction rather than a stray tick. The 8 September bar has since backfilled at exactly €7.43, a sixth reconstruction confirmed; the 7 September bar has still not returned at all. The 9 September close, €7.40, came back a fourth way and the simplest one yet: the daily request, made before Xetra's 10 September auction, still carried 9 September's settlement in regularMarketPrice stamped 17:39 CEST, and the 5-minute request made at the same moment returned the same €7.40 in its previousClose field. Two independent fields, one figure — and the vendor has since backfilled that session at exactly €7.40, a seventh reconstruction confirmed. Taken from the bars alone the page would have carried Schaeffler at €7.43 and called a live session unchanged. 11 September behaved the same way: €7.19 in regularMarketPrice, stamped 17:35:12 CEST against a 17:30 close, while the daily bars stopped at 10 September — and that session has since backfilled at exactly €7.19, an eighth reconstruction confirmed. 14 September has since backfilled at exactly €6.95, a ninth reconstruction confirmed, and 15 September at exactly €6.78, a tenth — that one having been closed by two independent routes on the day it opened, the metadata auction stamp and the 17:35 five-minute bar on 575,656 shares, rather than after the fact. 16 September took a different second route again: €6.86 in regularMarketPrice stamped 17:38:13 CEST, with the five-minute series stopping at 17:25 and never printing the auction, so the corroboration came from previousClose on a request made after Xetra reopened — and that session has since backfilled at exactly €6.86, an eleventh reconstruction confirmed. So has 7 September, at exactly €7.34, a twelfth — the hole that stayed open for a fortnight, and the only one that needed the extended-hours request to close at all. 21 September closed the quickest of that group: the five-minute series printed the 17:30 auction at €6.99 on the day, matching regularMarketPrice at 17:35:12 CEST, and it has since backfilled at exactly €6.99, a thirteenth reconstruction confirmed. 22 September followed at exactly €7.13, a fourteenth — the most instructive of them, because the intraday series stopped at 17:25 showing €7.16 and the page took previousClose over it; had it taken the continuous print it would have published a 2.4% session rather than a 2.0% one. 23 September has now backfilled at exactly €6.97, a fifteenth. Sixteen holes, sixteen reconstructions, fifteen of them confirmed to the cent; only 24 September, the largest session of the lot at −6.2%, is outstanding — and it is the one closed on four routes rather than two. That is settled enough to be a procedure rather than a surprise — when a German bar is missing, take the auction print from the metadata timestamp and check it against a second field before believing it.

Bars that come and go. Novonix's daily history around its 27 August ADS ratio change is not stable between requests: 28 August read $3.51 at one run and had disappeared again, along with 26 and 27 August, by the next. Left alone, that would have moved the name's correlation and shown a four-session fall as a one-day move. The 28 August close is pinned to the verified figure so the series does not wobble with the feed. By 3 September the instability had spread well beyond Novonix: the whole 28 August US session had gone missing for Ambarella, REMX, Perpetua, Lynas and Compass Diversified while surviving for MP and USA Rare Earth — per-ticker attrition, not one dropped day. That has since healed. All five carry 28 August again, and Novonix's bar for it has returned at exactly $3.51, the figure this page pinned when it kept vanishing. The weekly series takes each ISO week's last available close, which absorbs this without shifting a week; where it removes a Friday, that week ends on the Thursday instead. Where a vendor's history changes underneath you, the fix is to record what you verified, not to re-derive it each run.

4 Sep 2026: a continuous futures series that is not continuous. This page has priced gold off GC=F, Yahoo's front-month gold contract, to sanity-check Perpetua's moves. That series silently rolled: GC=F now resolves to Gold Dec 26, and its own bar array still carries $4,366.3 for 2 September — the expiring contract — while the December contract closed that session at $4,414.6. Differencing across the roll would have reported a +4.0% gold session on 3 September against +1.9% for the bullion ETFs, which agree with each other to four hundredths of a point (SPDR Gold Shares +1.85%, iShares Gold Trust +1.88%). A futures move measured across a contract change is a spread, not a return. Gold figures on this page are now taken from the spot-tracking ETFs, which also settle on the same 16:00 ET clock as Perpetua and the miners they are being compared with — the earlier $4,366/oz reference has been dropped for the same reason.

Correlations use 103 completed weekly returns bucketed by ISO calendar week so Tokyo, Xetra and New York lines align despite different trading calendars. Weekly rather than daily specifically to avoid the time-zone lag that inflates or deflates cross-market daily correlation. The window runs to the completed week ended 16 Oct 2026 (ISO week 42); it was extended from 53 weeks on 14 Aug 2026, which shifted several tier-two figures down by 0.10–0.20 without changing any conclusion. The basket is equal-weighted and rebalanced weekly — the basket return for a week is the mean of the six tier-one names' returns for that week — and stating that is not pedantry, because the same six names held without rebalancing give 0.3993 against the rebalanced 0.3877 on the current window. This page published 0.41 through 16 Sep 2026 without naming the construction, which made the figure impossible to rebuild from this note; the claim audit carries the full account. Every figure is cross-checked against a second bucketing method before publication, and on this run the two agreed to four decimal places on every series. The window did not move on the 20 October run, and three cells carried on it were still slightly wrong. ISO week 43 opened on Monday 19 October and does not close until Sunday 25 October, so the sample holds at 104 aligned weekly closes and 103 returns, week 2024-43 to week 2026-42, exactly where the 17 October run set it, and basket-to-REMX holds at 0.3885 on both methods. On an unchanged window a cell cannot move, so a cell that recomputes differently was carried wrong rather than overtaken. Three did: Lynas to REMX at 0.6471 against a published 0.64, Nidec to the basket at 0.6229 against 0.61, and Harmonic Drive to the basket at 0.8152 against 0.81. Each rounds a point higher than the figure on the page, each was published on a window identical to this one, and all three are corrected here to 0.65, 0.62 and 0.82 in both bar charts and in the tier-two table. The claim audit carries it. None of them changes a reading: the robotics names still run 0.18 to 0.46 against REMX and 0.55 to 0.82 against the basket, and the minerals names 0.37 to 0.65. The account that follows belongs to the run on which the window last advanced, and it did so on a judgement rather than a rule, so the judgement is kept on the record rather than left for a reader to infer from a moved number. ISO week 42 runs to Sunday 18 October, so on a weekday run it would still be in progress and excluded, which is what the last three runs did. This run is a Saturday: every venue has settled Friday 16 October and none reopens before Monday, so week 42’s last close is final even though its calendar week is not over. The week is therefore counted as completed, the sample now ends at the week ended 16 October. The count published with it, 104 returns against 103 on the preceding runs, was wrong: a two-year request rolls forward at both ends, so the week gained at the end is paid for by one dropped at the start, and the aligned sample held at 104 closes and 103 returns. The judgement about which week ends the sample stands; only the count was overstated, and it is corrected throughout on the 19 October run. That is a shift from “the calendar week has ended” to “the week’s trading has ended”; it can only ever differ on a weekend run, and it is the kind of definitional change this page has an audit row about making silently. Week 42 was heavy on both sides and they fell together: the basket −8.31% against REMX −11.05%, with Harmonic Drive −13.99%, Nidec −10.45%, Ambarella −8.50%, Yaskawa −8.47% and Nabtesco −7.64%, against Schaeffler nearly flat at −0.85%, and in the minerals tier USA Rare Earth −16.08%, Novonix −13.93%, MP −12.94%, Lynas −12.60% and Perpetua −6.93%. Two tiers falling hard in the same week sits close to the existing relationship rather than against it, so the headline figure rose slightly and no conclusion in section 04 moves: basket-to-REMX goes from 0.3687 to 0.3877. Both bucketing methods were recomputed from freshly fetched data and agreed on every series, 0.388 each on the headline figure. The one name the new week moved against the grain is Schaeffler. It was the only line in the basket not to fall materially in a week the basket fell eight per cent, and that pulled its correlation to the basket down, from 0.6070 to 0.6016 — the exact mirror of the mechanism recorded below, where being the worst line in a falling week had pushed the same figure up. The account that follows is the record of the last run in which the window actually advanced. Week 41 closed on Sunday 11 October, so the end advanced from the week ended 2 October to the week ended 9 October, and the whole of a busy week entered the sample in one step: TDK's four-session run and the three losses that followed it, Monday's Tokyo rally, Thursday's de-rating of the gearbox layer, Friday's partial reversal, Yaskawa's first-half filing, two sessions of rare-earth-specific selling and Friday's seven-point move in Ambarella. The headline figure moved seven ten-thousandths, from 0.3681 to 0.3687. The largest change anywhere on the page is Schaeffler, 0.5997 to 0.6070 against the basket and 0.4564 to 0.4645 against REMX; Lynas goes to 0.6333, MP to 0.5524, Perpetua to 0.5248, USA Rare Earth to 0.3678 and Novonix to 0.3603. Both bucketing methods were recomputed from scratch on fresh data and agreed to four decimal places on every one of the fifteen series, basket included, which is the stricter of the two outcomes this check produces. One prediction in this note was right in its number and wrong in its reason, and the correction matters more than the figure. It said the week would “substantially cancel”. It did not cancel: week 41 was a broadly down week on both sides, the basket 3.27% lower and REMX 3.54% lower, with nine of the eleven charted names falling. The figure barely moved because the two sides fell by nearly the same amount, which places the new observation almost on the existing line and so confirms the relationship instead of altering it. Equal-sized falls on both sides and mutual cancellation inside one side are different mechanisms that happen to produce the same small change, and only one of them was what occurred. The mechanical rules all held: a window ending at the last completed ISO week cannot move inside an open one, so neither a Friday close nor a Saturday refresh advances the end, which advances on the first refresh after a Sunday — the 12 October run was that refresh, and no run inside the same week can repeat it, which is why this run still holds that window. The start, separately, rolls forward on its own, which was the lesson of 16 Sep 2026 and is visible here: the sample start stepped from ISO week 2024-41 to 2024-42 as the end advanced, holding the length at 103. And a standing claim in this note has to be withdrawn, because testing it is what this check is for. The note has said that a two-year daily request yields 103 weekly returns rather than 104, that a true 104-return window needs a three-year request, and that the figures here are built from one. The first two are right; the third is not. Recomputing from a three-year request at a genuine 104 returns gives, on the window as it now stands, basket-to-REMX 0.3710, Lynas 0.6336, Schaeffler-to-basket 0.6022 and Harmonic Drive-to-REMX 0.1629, none of which is what this page publishes; the same test on the window ending 2 October gave 0.3670, 0.6322, 0.5991 and 0.1581. Every figure here reproduces exactly on 103 returns and on nothing else, so 103 is what the window is, and the counts in the charts and captions have been corrected to say so. The difference is about a thousandth and changes no conclusion, which is precisely why it survived: a discrepancy too small to notice in the output is only ever caught by rebuilding the claim rather than re-reading it. The four-week comparison between the tiers uses a different construction again, and it is now stated: the basket's 1m figure is the mean of the six tier-one names' own 1m cells — equal-weighted, not rebalanced, each name on its own venue's four-week (28-day) lookback — so a reader can rebuild it from the table above. This page previously quoted 5.2% for that figure and it cannot be reproduced on any construction tried; the claim audit carries that too. Correlation measures co-movement, not causation — treat 0.37 as "these travel together loosely," not as a precise constant.

A correction worth repeating, and a bigger one below it. Schaeffler's correlation to the robotics basket was originally computed on the SFFLY ADR and came out at 0.16; on the current window the same thin line gives 0.29. On the liquid Xetra line it is 0.60. Thin ADRs do not merely lag — they can invert a conclusion. Every correlation on this page now uses the primary listing.

18 Aug 2026 correction: the alignment bug. Every correlation figure this page had published through 17 Aug 2026 was computed from Yahoo's native weekly bars (interval=1wk). Those bars anchor Tokyo and Xetra weeks roughly one calendar week off from New York's — confirmed directly by comparing native bars against daily closes re-bucketed into true ISO weeks, which showed a consistent one-week offset for every Tokyo and Xetra ticker tested but not for US tickers. Because the tier-one basket is four-sixths Japanese names, this silently corrupted every cross-region figure: the robotics basket's correlation to REMX read 0.19 on the misaligned data and about 0.40 once daily closes were re-bucketed by calendar week (0.39 on the current window, weekly-rebalanced) — confirmed by two independent methods (ISO-week bucketing and Friday-anchored resampling) that agree to three decimal places. Correlations computed entirely within one region (e.g. TDK, a Tokyo name, against the mostly-Tokyo basket) barely moved, which is exactly what a same-direction shift on both sides of a comparison would produce, and is why the bug went unnoticed until a cross-region figure was checked against an independent method. Every correlation on this page, in every table, chart and paragraph, is now computed from daily closes re-bucketed into ISO calendar weeks.

Use the primary listings. The ADRs quoted in the source post are thin: HSYDF traded 200 shares in a session, YASKY 513, NCTKY 1,350. NJDCY has not printed since February. Prices on those lines can sit stale for days and will not reflect Tokyo. Where an ADR is the only access route, expect a spread.

Not investment advice. This is a research snapshot assembled from public filings, company releases and press reporting, built to check a social-media thesis rather than to endorse it.

09 Sources
Schaeffler AG — “Ready for the mass market: Schaeffler presents formed strain wave gearboxes for humanoid robots”: validation testing of the formed strain wave gearboxes concluded, laying the foundation for the start of mass manufacturing in 2027, beginning in Germany and rolling out to other regions; forming rather than cutting claimed to cut manufacturing cost by more than 25% and material consumption by more than 75%. Company claims, not independently verified here. The disclosure that put a second tier-one name on the strain-wave row of the parts table (13 Aug 2026)
China export-control timeline — MOFCOM Announcement No. 70 of 2025, dated 7 November 2025, suspending Announcements 55, 56, 57, 58, 61 and 62 until 10 November 2026; the April 2025 licensing regime for samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium never suspended; Announcement No. 72 suspending Article 2 of Announcement 46 of 2024 until 27 November 2026. Last verified 1 October 2026 with no extension published, and a second tracker reading the ministry’s 2026 announcement list on 16 October found it running to Announcement No. 48 with nothing extending or replacing No. 70. The basis for downgrading this page’s own verdict on the 6 October countdown piece (checked 20 Oct 2026)
China Rare Earth Industry Association — price index posted at 263.6 on 9 October 2026, against 267.0 on 4 August, with NdPr oxide quoted at ¥729.8–749.8/kg, bracketing Benchmark’s 25 September assessment of RMB729,500/t. Relayed through a paywalled trade outlet rather than read from the association directly, and carried on that basis; the small-volume terbium transactions above $12,000/kg reported in the same item are trade talk with no assessor behind them and are not carried as an assessment (9 Oct 2026)
Nidec Corporation — “Nidec Receives an Investigation Report from the Executive Responsibility Investigation Committee”: the Committee established 13 March 2026 to examine whether current and former directors, auditors and vice presidents “bear legal liability, including whether they breached their duties in the execution of their responsibilities” over the improper accounting; the Report to be disclosed only after redaction for trade secrets and privacy; Nidec to “deliberate legal actions such as lodging a claim for damages”; Board and Audit and Supervisory Committee meetings convened the same day. Carried on Business Wire at 12:23 AM EDT, which is 13:23 JST, inside the Tokyo afternoon session. The claim audit’s fifty-first row (16 Oct 2026)
Schaeffler AG — preliminary figures for the first nine months of 2026: revenue €17.5bn (prior year €17.7bn), EBIT margin before special items 4.5% (4.2%), nine-month free cash flow before M&A −€40m (+€47m), Q3 EBIT margin 4.2% and free cash flow +€260m, about €240m of one-off E-Mobility special charges, humanoid-robotics orders on hand of approximately €400m after two new Greater China customers, and confirmation of 2026 guidance and the 2028 mid-term targets; validated statement due 3 November (13 Oct 2026)
Japan Exchange Group — extension of Tokyo Stock Exchange trading hours with the arrowhead 4.0 launch: the afternoon session runs 12:30–15:30, continuous trading ending 15:25 ahead of a 15:30 itayose closing auction, effective 5 November 2024. The basis for treating a 15:00 Tokyo quote as a pre-auction print rather than a close (read 16 Oct 2026)
Investing.com — “At the close in Tokyo, the Nikkei 225 added 1.66%” against an actual 15:30 close of 65,324.29, +1.39%; the 1.66% is the 15:00 print of 65,493.63. The claim audit’s forty-ninth row (16 Oct 2026)
24/7 Wall St — USA Rare Earth “up 4%” at $10.77, MP “up 2%” at $40.82 and REMX “down 0.9%” at $55.26, stamped 1:53pm ET against closes of $11.09 (+7.46%), $41.61 (+4.16%) and $55.74 (−0.07%). The claim audit’s fiftieth row (15 Oct 2026)
ad-hoc-news.de — a market report stamped 15 Oct 13:20 CEST quoting Schaeffler’s “Xetra close of EUR 5.94 on October 14, 2026” and labelling its own −2.86% figure an intraday decline: the first confirmation of a reconstructed Schaeffler close from outside the price vendor (15 Oct 2026)
Yaskawa Electric — consolidated results for the first half of the year ending 28 February 2027: revenue ¥285,598m (+9.8%), operating profit ¥22,058m (−5.5%), and the revised FY2/27 forecast of ¥600,000m revenue and ¥57,500m operating profit (9 Oct 2026)
Nidec — internal-control improvement page: the 28 October 2025 Security on Special Alert designation in its timeline, and the prose dating it 28 October 2026; the claim audit’s forty-first row (read 9 Oct 2026)
Reuters — China Rare Earth Group in talks to buy Shenghe Resources, the holder of roughly 3% of MP Materials, and Shenghe’s Shanghai exchange filing denying any transfer of control (18 Sep 2026)
Milk Road AI — humanoid supply chain post (9 Aug 2026)
Jiji via nippon.com — Nidec’s FY3/26 results: ¥564.6bn net loss, ¥518.9bn operating loss, revenue ¥2,708.7bn, impairments above ¥632bn, and PwC Japan’s disclaimer of opinion (30 Sep 2026)
Reuters via Investing.com — Nidec slumps after its auditor declines to sign off; the ¥1,888 intraday low, and the end-October internal-control filing or delisting (1 Oct 2026)
Investing.com — the “slumped 17.2% to ¥1,949” figure, against a ¥2,100 close; the claim audit’s thirty-third row (1 Oct 2026)
TDK and Taiyo Yuden — memorandum of understanding to begin discussions on a potential alliance in MLCCs and inductors, with a possible future capital alliance (29 Sep 2026)
Benchmark Mineral Intelligence — Q3 2026 rare-earths price review: Chinese PrNd oxide RMB729,500/t (~$108.7/kg), ex-China PrNd $106,500/t CIF, dysprosium $3,500/kg CIF Europe +56%, terbium $6,745/kg +23% (25 Sep 2026)
Perpetua Resources at Mining Forum Americas — EXIM loan closing guided to Q4 2026, FID after close, initial production late 2029, construction capital above $3bn (28 Sep 2026)
24/7 Wall St — the “surges 6% to $48.29” figure for MP, against a $47.29 close and a $48.665 session high (30 Sep 2026)
Ambarella — CV7 launch, CES 2026
Ambarella — FY2026 results
Schaeffler — Hexagon Robotics partnership
The Robot Report — Schaeffler robot deployment
Investing.com — Nidec results delay and probe
Nidec — internal control investigation overview
Nidec — receipt of the third-party committee’s final report on accounting (17 Apr 2026)
Nidec — Q1 FY3/27 disclosure beyond 45 days (5 Aug 2026)
Nidec — shareholder request to file action (5 Aug 2026)
Nidec — second, joint shareholder request to file action (21 Aug 2026)
Nidec — annual securities report filing deadline extended to 30 September 2026
USA Rare Earth — completion of the Serra Verde combination (3 Sep 2026)
Ambarella — Citi Global TMT Conference remarks (9 Sep 2026)
Nikkei — Nidec limit-down, −¥500 (17.60%) to ¥2,340 on the impairment report (28 Sep 2026)
Bloomberg — Nidec’s statement: executive changes and large-scale impairment under consideration, nothing decided (28 Sep 2026)
Kyodo — Nidec considering large-scale impairment and management changes (28 Sep 2026)
Nikkei — the earlier “several hundred billion yen” impairment report (15 Sep 2026)
Ambarella — Developer Zone on Google Cloud, dated 15 Sep 2026, not 25 Sep
Niron Magnetics — first steel at Sartell and a Honda investment (10 Sep 2026)
Niron Magnetics — Moog qualifying iron nitride magnets in actuators, AUSA 2026 (2 Oct 2026)
Nidec — receipt of notification of litigation on derivative action, Kyoto District Court case 1749 of 2026 (10 Sep 2026)
24/7 Wall St — rare earths attributed to “U.S.–China thaw hopes” (10 Sep 2026)
CSIS — the 2026 Trump–Xi summits, including the 24 September Washington visit
USA Rare Earth — groundbreaking at Blacksburg, South Carolina: 6,400 tpa NdFeB, ~$1.2bn (9 Sep 2026)
Reuters via Mining.com — Chinese rare-earth firms halt some US shipments after the RBA sanctions (4 Sep 2026)
Rigzone — Brent +6.3% to $107.63 on Hormuz shipping attacks (10 Sep 2026)
Nikkei Indexes — Nikkei 225 daily close
Jefferies — Schaeffler target cut to €8.70 from €9.45, Buy retained, analyst Vanessa Jeffriess (23 Sep 2026)
Jefferies — the earlier Schaeffler cut, €10.45 to €9.45 (5 Aug 2026)
Schaeffler −2.24% on the session of the Jefferies cut (23 Sep 2026)
NBC News — Bessent: the Busan Agreement extended from 10 November to 10 January (23 Sep 2026)
Reuters via Investing.com — Bessent and He Lifeng meet before the summit; truce extension, 11:40 ET (23 Sep 2026)
Investing.com — Asian rare-earth names fall after the truce extension; Lynas −2% (24 Sep 2026)
Bloomberg — China’s magnet exports to the US fall 21% to 512 t in August, on customs data (21 Sep 2026)
SMM — China’s total rare-earth magnet exports 5,010 t in August, −6% MoM, −18% YoY
USAGOLD — hawkish Fed remarks, dollar index back above 100, metals liquidation (23 Sep 2026)
Nidec — receipt of the Investigation Committee’s report, publication set for 4 September (2 Sep 2026)
Nidec — disclosure of the quality Investigation Report and the company’s response (4 Sep 2026)
Nidec — response to suspected quality-related misconduct
News On Japan — Nikkei −3.2% on AI selling and bond yields (19 Aug 2026)
24/7 Wall St — robotics names in the 18 Aug AI selloff
Antimony spot price and year-to-date change
Shanghai Metals Market — Pr–Nd oxide benchmark
EE Times — Nidec gear design for humanoids
Investing.com — Harmonic Drive humanoid orders
JPX/TDnet — Harmonic Drive earnings forecast revision
Harmonic Drive — FY3/27 forecast raised to ¥74.5bn / ¥8.5bn (7 Aug 2026)
MP Materials — DoD partnership (Jul 2025)
MP Materials — Q2 2026 results
MP Materials — 10X site selection, ~10,000 t total capacity
CNBC — Pentagon stake in MP Materials
Nikkei Asia — 15% polysilicon tariff
MINING.COM — China blacklists MP and USA Rare Earth
MINING.COM — USA Rare Earth pulls timeline forward
USA Rare Earth — Stillwater Phase 1a commissioning
USA Rare Earth — Q2 2026 results, cash position, CEO transition
USA Rare Earth — 8-K, TMRC acquisition closing (7 Aug 2026)
Bloomberg — Oasis urges Nidec to explore privatization on delisting risk (7 Oct 2026)
Seeking Alpha — Ambarella gains on Betaville report of Qualcomm interest, unconfirmed (9 Oct 2026)
USA Rare Earth — Serra Verde definitive agreement
USA Rare Earth — 8-K, $1.55bn SPV capitalisation for Serra Verde offtake (24 Aug 2026)
The Motley Fool — MP Materials Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (gadolinium deal)
Lynas — US project updates
Lynas — Q3 FY26 record revenue
Lynas — FY26 results and heavy rare-earth capex escalation (26 Aug 2026)
Rare Earth Exchanges — Lynas Texas project status
CNBC — Perpetua secures $2.9bn EXIM loan
MINING.COM — Perpetua breaks ground at Stibnite
Novonix — $103m 48C tax credits certified
Novonix — divesting non-core business
Novonix — 6-K, one-for-ten ADS ratio change for Nasdaq compliance (12 Aug 2026)
Novonix — ASX half-year accounts and Appendix 4D, going-concern material uncertainty (31 Aug 2026)
Niron Magnetics — $150m Department of War commitment
Northern News Now — Niron Sartell plant
Arnold Magnetic — USA Rare Earth distribution agreement
Compass Diversified — Q2 2026 results, Sterno sale, Arnold segment, CEO transition
The Motley Fool — Compass Diversified Q2 2026 earnings call transcript
Compass Diversified — completion of restatement
Investing.com — CODI restated financials after Lugano fraud
Bain Capital — Hitachi Metals tender offer close
MarkLines — Hitachi Metals renamed Proterial
TDK — magnet product range
TDK as an NdFeB manufacturer — profile
SCMP — defence mineral supply chain order
CSIS — critical minerals executive order analysis
Rare Earth Exchanges — China price index, Aug 2026
S&P Global — rare earth supply bottlenecks 2026
Rare Earth Exchanges — humanoids and magnet control
Seeking Alpha — REMX composition analysis
VanEck — REMX holdings & performance
Yahoo Finance — Nikkei 225 chart data, checked against index closes each run
Yahoo Finance — Nomura Nikkei 225 ETF (1321.T), used to cross-check the index print
Yahoo Finance — Nikko Nikkei 225 ETF (1330.T), the second cross-check on the index print
Reuters — Japan’s 10-year JGB yield reaches 3%, first since 1996 (1 Sep 2026)
Novonix — land purchase dropped and Riverside ramp slowed, per the half-year report
Ambarella — Q2 FY2027 financial results (3 Sep 2026)
News On Japan — Nikkei +2.12% to 66,399.84 on a chip-led rebound (7 Sep 2026)
Sunday Guardian — the mid-session 8 September Nikkei figure corrected in the claim audit
Sunday Guardian — the mid-session 14 September Nikkei figure corrected in the claim audit
Business Recorder — Reuters Japan wrap, 14 Sep 2026: the Topix/Nikkei split, and a second morning index level
FinanzNachrichten — Schaeffler Xetra order book, used for the 7 September close
finanzen.net — Schaeffler daily price history, cross-check for the German feed gaps
Yaskawa FY2026 earnings commentary
Nabtesco FY2025 results breakdown
Federal Reserve — FOMC statement, 16 Sep 2026: first hike since 2023, to 3.75–4.00%
Nikkei 225 at 65,018.95 after the Bank of Japan decision, and Tokyo shut for the holiday run
CNBC — US-listed Greenland names surge after the Denmark security deal (21 Sep 2026)
Al Jazeera — what the Greenland security agreement does and does not cover
24/7 Wall St — the intraday USAR and MP figures corrected in the claim audit
The USAR-has-no-Greenland-assets point, made contemporaneously
StockAnalysis — Harmonic Drive 6324 daily history, independent cross-check for the 8 Oct close of ¥6,160 (−7.09%)
StockAnalysis — TDK 6762 daily history, cross-check for the 8 Oct close of ¥3,353 (−5.01%) and the ¥3,628 peak of 6 Oct
StockAnalysis — Nabtesco 6268 daily history, cross-check for the 8 Oct close of ¥4,795 (−4.29%)
News on Japan — 7 Oct 2026 Tokyo wrap: Nikkei 70,035.71, −648.27 points, with Tokyo Electron, Advantest, Fast Retailing, Kioxia and TDK the largest drags
ad-hoc-news — the 11:00 JST intraday Harmonic Drive quote of ¥6,380 corrected in the claim audit, and the 29th Mechanical Components Technology Exhibition dates
24/7 Wall St — the 7 Oct US minerals session, independent cross-check for MP $46.31 and USAR $13.23
The 23 Sep 2026 Bessent extension of the US–China truce to 10 January 2027 — the date the 6 Oct countdown coverage had missed
The 6 Oct 2026 piece still counting down to 10 November, corrected in the claim audit
Robotics watchlist — component, minerals and magnet layers. Compiled 22 October 2026 from public filings, company releases and press reporting. Prices are delayed closes, not live quotes. Research notes only; not investment advice.